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Platform and Ecosystem Transitions: 
Strategic and Organizational Implications 
Abstract 
 By most conventional measures of corporate success (revenue, market capitalization, 
global brand growth, etc.) businesses operating as multi-sided platforms (MSPs) and their 
associated ecosystems constitute the majority of the fastest growing organizations in the global 
economy. In the strategy and economics fields there is a burgeoning literature related to MSP-
governed businesses and their ecosystems primarily focused on pricing, growth, governance, and 
competitive considerations. Yet, in organizational studies and innovation there is a dearth of 
research analyzing characteristics of these businesses and their complementors and the 
managerial challenges they present. More specifically, an increasing number of mature 
incumbent organizations in a variety of industries are starting to operate in environments in 
which they either need to operate as MSP-based businesses, or join ecosystems governed by 
them to compete successfully and grow. This dissertation consists of two book chapters and one 
empirical project aligned with one overarching question:  As information constraints approach 
zero and MSP-governed businesses and their complementors become increasingly more 
prevalent in the global economy, what are the strategic and organizational issues affecting 
incumbent organizations that choose to become MSPs or compete as complementors to them?    
The first chapter, incorporating a forthcoming book chapter (see Altman, Nagle, & 
Tushman, 2015)  is a theoretical study exploring the effects on management research and 
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organizations when the costs of information processing, storage, and communication approach 
zero and organizations engage with a wide range of communities. As these information 
constraints are reduced, one effect is that MSP-based businesses and ecosystems thrive and 
impact large sectors of the economy. Thus, this chapter sets the context for the dissertation as it 
outlines the environment in which MSP-governed businesses and their complementors operate 
and introduces theoretical challenges posed by the growth of these networks. 
The second chapter, an empirical paper, focuses on challenges encountered by incumbent 
organizations joining MSP-governed ecosystems as complementors. This project is a multi-year 
qualitative inductive field-based research study analyzing the transition of a well-known 
consumer technology product provider as it joins a powerful MSP-based ecosystem. The 
accessory organization enters an asymmetric power relationship encountering, and responding to, 
multiple types of dependencies. I identify three types of dependencies faced by the organization: 
technological, information, and values-based, and three response strategies the organization 
deploys: compliance, influence, and innovation. I suggest that these dependencies and responses 
are related to, but distinct from, extant work on power and dependencies. I also classify three 
phases of complementor maturity through which the organization passes. I induce a grounded 
theory model identifying relationships between the concepts and discuss theoretical implications. 
The final chapter, also a forthcoming book chapter (see Altman & Tripsas, 2015), 
addresses organizational identity implications of transitions mature organizations undergo as 
they shift from product to MSP-based business models in which business considerations include 
network effects and interdependence. This chapter explains that organizational identity may 
affect, and may be affected by, product-to-platform transitions. It suggests that an organization 
must question its identity and modify it to be consistent with its re-defined business model.   
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Introduction 
To survive, compete, and thrive, organizations need to process, store, and communicate 
information. The easier it is for them to do so, the more flexibility they have in the business 
models they can employ. Today, information processing, storage, and communication costs are 
approaching zero. As a result, forms of business models that reach beyond traditional 
organizational boundaries and engage external communities are becoming increasingly 
prevalent. One such form is the multi-sided platform (MSP) business and its associated 
complementor ecosystems. Firms that deploy MSP businesses constitute the majority of the 
fastest growing organizations in the global economy (e.g., Amazon, Google, Apple, etc.). Each 
of these organizations enables extensive networks of suppliers, partners, and complementors. 
How the MSPs interact with complementors, and how these complementors respond to 
challenges imposed by MSPs, is the focus of this dissertation. 
 Strategy and economics scholars have studied platforms and ecosystems for some time 
with increasingly more attention being paid to them across the literature. Researchers generally 
focus on pricing, growth, governance, and competition. However, we have very little research 
exploring the strategic and organizational implications of firms either transitioning to become 
platform-based, or joining ecosystems governed by MSPs. This dissertation consists of three 
chapters all aligned with one overarching question:  As information constraints approach zero 
and MSP-governed businesses and their complementors become increasingly more prevalent in 
the global economy, what are strategic and organizational issues affecting incumbent 
organizations that choose to become MSPs or compete as complementors to them? 
 The first chapter, incorporating a forthcoming book chapter (see Altman, Nagle, & 
Tushman, 2015) explores the effects on management research and organizations when the costs 
2 
 
of information processing, storage, and communication approach zero and organizations engage 
with a range of communities. One type of community with which organizations engage is 
complementors, such as application developers and accessory providers. Facilitating engagement 
with complementors is a characteristic of MSP business models. Thus, this first chapter sets the 
context for the remainder of the dissertation by outlining environmental conditions that foster the 
growth of MSP-governed businesses and introduces theoretical challenges raised as these 
systems become more prevalent. 
 The second chapter focuses on challenges and responses by incumbent organizations 
joining MSP-governed ecosystems as complementors. This chapter introduces the notion of 
phases of complementor maturity, which capture the strategies a complementor employs as it 
gains experience in a particular ecosystem. This chapter is based on a multi-year qualitative 
inductive field-based research study analyzing the transition of a consumer smartphone and 
tablet accessory provider as it becomes a complementor in an ecosystem governed by a very 
powerful MSP. The organization enters an asymmetric power relationship encountering, and 
responding to, multiple types of dependencies. I identify three types of dependencies faced by 
the organization: technological, information, and values-based, and three response strategies the 
organization deploys: compliance, influence, and innovation. The study findings suggest that 
these dependencies and responses are related to, but quite distinct from, extant work on power 
and dependencies and interfirm relationships. In particular, I find that these dependencies and 
responses are impacted by the fact that they derive from an asymmetric complementor 
relationship, which is different from more traditional buyer-seller, alliance, or other interfirm 
relationships. I induce a grounded theory model identifying relationships between the concepts 
and discuss theoretical implications. 
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 The final section, also a forthcoming book chapter (see Altman & Tripsas, 2015), focuses 
on challenges mature incumbent organizations face as they transition from product-based to 
MSP-based business models. The chapter addresses organizational identity implications of 
transitions mature organizations undergo as they undergo such product-to-platform transitions. In 
most cases, these business model shifts include considerations of network effects and increased 
interdependence. The chapter explains that organizational identity may affect, and may be 
affected by, product-to-platform transitions. It suggests that an organization must question its 
identity and modify it to be consistent with its re-defined business model.   
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Chapter 1:  Innovating Without Information Constraints: 
Organizations, Communities, and Innovation When Information Costs 
Approach Zero 
 
Elizabeth J. Altman, Frank Nagle, and Michael L. Tushman 
 
ABSTRACT 
Innovation traditionally takes place within an organization’s boundaries and with selected 
partners. This Chandlerian approach is rooted in transaction costs, organizational boundaries, and 
information challenges. Information processing, storage, and communication costs have been an 
important constraint on innovation and a reason why innovation takes place inside the 
organization. However, exponential technological progress is dramatically decreasing 
information constraints, and in many contexts, information costs are approaching zero. This 
chapter discusses how reduced information costs enable organizations to engage communities of 
developers, professionals, and users for core innovative activities, frequently through platforms, 
ecosystems, and incorporating user innovation. When information constraints drop dramatically 
and the locus of innovation shifts to the larger community, there are profound challenges to the 
received theory of the firm and to theories of organization and innovation. Specifically, this 
chapter considers how shifts in information costs affect organizational boundaries, business 
models, interdependence, leadership, identity, search, and intellectual property. 
 
 
Keywords: managing innovation, information costs, information constraints, communities, 
organization boundaries, technological progress, platforms and ecosystems, user innovation 
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Modern business enterprise is easily defined . . . it has two specific 
characteristics: it contains many distinct operating units and it is managed by a 
hierarchy of salaried executives. 
 (Chandler, 1977, p. 1) 
 
What characterizes the networked information economy is that decentralized 
individual action—specifically, new and important cooperative and coordinate 
action . . . — plays a much greater role than it did. . . . The declining price of 
computation, communication, and storage have, as a practical matter, placed the 
material means of information and cultural production in the hands of a 
significant fraction of the world’s population. 
 (Benkler, 2006, p. 3) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Information is expensive to process, store, and communicate―at least, that has been the 
prevailing assumption upon which most of our organizational theories rely. Because information 
has been hard to gather and process, firms have emerged as hierarchical and control-based 
organizations (Chandler, 1962). Leaders have developed strategies to compensate for the 
difficulties of obtaining and processing data. Business models have been built with the 
underlying assumption that information costs are high (e.g., Tushman & Nadler, 1978). 
However, with the exponential growth in information processing, storage, and communication 
abilities, this is all changing. Information costs are rapidly approaching zero, and the constraints 
associated with information processing are disappearing. Organizations now have the ability to 
engage with external communities in unprecedented ways. This decrease in information 
processing costs is having a decentralizing impact on the locus of innovation and, in turn, on how 
organizations manage their innovation processes. 
In this new information context, institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton 
& Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) revolving around Chandler’s (1962) 
hierarchy and control-centric management, which have prevailed in firms such as General 
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Electric (GE), are being challenged by new logics centered on openness, sharing, and external 
engagement (Benkler, 2006).1 Recognizing that new doors are opening as information flows 
more freely than ever before, incumbent organizations are grappling with how and when to 
address these new logics. For example, in the summer of 2013, GE launched two online three-
dimensional (3D) printing contests, which they referred to as quests, inviting entrepreneurs and 
organizations to submit new designs for aircraft engine brackets and advanced materials 
production capabilities (General Electric Company, 2013). 
Adopting these new logics, and engaging more deeply with communities, has substantive 
implications for how firms organize and innovate. As we see with GE’s call for inputs related to 
design and production capabilities, the locus of innovation for incumbent firms has begun to 
move from within the firm to communities beyond its full control. Evidence of this shift and the 
tension it is creating can also be seen as firms engage with labor/task marketplaces (e.g., oDesk, 
eLance, TopCoder), developer ecosystems (e.g., Apple’s App Store), and user-generated 
contributions (e.g., open source software, user review websites). All three of these community 
engagements allow for reductions and blurring of firm boundaries and call into question what the 
firm does and what resources it owns. As we discuss throughout this chapter, this tension 
between a Chandlerian logic and a more open and community-centric logic challenges many of 
the assumptions underlying the strategic and organizational research that has been treated as 
foundational wisdom in management scholarship. 
To explore the implications of these phenomena, we start by discussing information 
processing, storage, and communication and note dramatic increases in capabilities coupled with 
                                                          
1Throughout this chapter, we adopt the definition of institutional logics put forth by Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p. 
804) as the “socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning 
to their social reality.” This definition embraces both the material and the symbolic and encompasses both formal 
and informal rules for decision makers. 
7 
 
substantial decreases in costs. Recognizing that cost reductions have enabled wide engagement 
with external communities, we present a typology of communities, emphasizing those enabled by 
information cost reduction: labor marketplaces, developer ecosystems, and user-generated 
contributions. Engagement with these communities involves parties outside the firm heavily 
participating in, or influencing, innovative processes and product offerings managed by the firm. 
We then consider how information costs approaching zero and engagement with external 
communities affect firm organization and strategy. We investigate what happens with respect to 
organization boundaries, business models, interdependence, leadership, identity, search, and 
intellectual property (IP) when organizations engage with communities for capabilities core to 
their innovative processes. Before concluding, we explore the impact of these organizational and 
strategic shifts on innovative processes. Utilizing the classic evolutionary process model of 
variation, selection, and retention, we identify ways in which engagement with communities 
shapes the path of innovation at each step of the process. We suggest that when information 
constraints drop dramatically and the locus of innovation shifts to the larger community, there 
are profound challenges to the received theory of the firm and to theories of organizations and 
innovation. We conclude with thoughts for how these changes present opportunities for research 
on innovation and organizations. 
 
INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS REDUCTION 
Just over 50 years ago, in 1961, the IBM 1301 disk drive, which could store 28 MB of 
information, cost $115,500 (almost $900,000 in 2013 dollars).2 In late 2013, Hewlett-Packard’s 
cloud service offered 500 GB (500,000 MB) of storage, almost 18,000 times the capacity, for 
                                                          
2IBM archives. Retrieved http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/exhibits/storage/storage_1301.html on December 15, 
2014. 
 
8 
 
free.3 This massive drop in price for information storage costs is representative of the reduction 
in information costs in general. 
Together, information processing, storage, and communication represent the three 
primary components of information usage. Costs for these three components represent important 
constraints on how information can be used to drive innovation (Maskell, 2000). As engineers, 
scientists, and others involved in technology development continue to push the boundaries of 
their craft, and thus increase technological efficiency, they generate exponential growth rates and 
price decreases for all three of these components. Recent assessments estimate that information 
processing capabilities grow at an annual rate of 58%, information storage capabilities at 23%, 
and capacity for information communication at 28% (Hilbert & López, 2011). 
Although the costs for information usage are dropping, not everyone is able to take full 
advantage of this reduction. First, use of many free services is predicated on access to computing 
devices and infrastructure. In many parts of the United States and the world, disadvantaged 
populations have limited access to such devices and infrastructure due to the so-called digital 
divide (Greenstein & Prince, 2007; Norris, 2001; Warschauer, 2003). Second, although we 
present examples in which information costs have dropped to zero, these frequently occur at 
scales useful only for individuals or very small firms (e.g., Google Drive’s free storage is only 15 
GB; larger capacities are offered for a fee to larger enterprises). Although costs for larger firms 
have also dropped dramatically, large-scale information operations can still be expensive. 
Third, whereas the costs of the three primary components of information usage may be 
approaching zero, there are many complementary assets that are required to fully capture the 
business value of the information. For example, as firms gather more data from their customers, 
                                                          
3The 500 GB of free storage is valid for 90 days.  Retrieved from https://www.hpcloud.com/free-trial on June 5, 
2013 . 
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they require more data scientists to manage the data and extract useful insights from it. Likewise, 
electricity costs for running and cooling massive data warehouses have started to affect firms’ 
bottom lines (Koomey, 2008). We keep these three caveats in mind as we explore how the 
capacity for information processing, storage, and communication has been increasing 
exponentially leading to declining prices that are rapidly approaching (and in some cases have 
already reached) zero. 
 
Information Processing 
Information processing refers to the ability of a device to take information and perform 
calculations using it. In the computerized world, this is frequently measured by the speed of a 
central processing unit (CPU), which is correlated with the number of transistors that can fit in a 
given space on a computer chip. Moore’s Law (Moore, 1965) predicts that the number of 
transistors that can be placed on a chip will double every 18 to 24 months. This leads to 
exponential growth and an associated reduction in cost per calculation, a pattern that has 
continued from 1971 to the present. Although some have predicted that Moore’s Law is not 
sustainable in the long run due to the size of transistors, which are approaching the molecular 
level (Latif, 2013; Merritt, 2013), new computing methods including multicore chips, DNA 
computing, and quantum computing should allow for Moore’s Law to hold from the perspective 
of how many calculations can be done per second.4 
The impact of such sustained growth is often underestimated because it is exponential. 
Many estimate that information processing power is passing an inflection point in its exponential 
                                                          
4Multicore chips contain two or more CPUs that run in parallel. DNA computing utilizes the self-assembling nature 
of DNA to craft problems as half-strands of DNA, which are solved by the matching pieces of DNA. Quantum 
computing takes advantage of qubits, which are bits of information that can exist as both a 0 and a 1 at the same 
time. 
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growth, described by Ray Kurzweil (1999) as entering “the second half of the chessboard.”5 We 
are entering a period in which the increases in processing speeds will occur in a manner never 
imagined before (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011). The effects of this exponential growth can 
already be seen: A modern cell phone has more processing power than all of NASA had in 1969 
when humans landed on the moon (Kaku, 2012). Likewise, the processing power of a 
multimillion-dollar military supercomputer in 1997 could be found, less than 10 years later, in 
the Sony PlayStation 3 gaming console, released in 2006 for $500 (Kaku, 2012). 
With this exponential growth in processing power has come a dramatic drop in price for a 
set amount of power (Figure 1.1). For example, in 1996, the best personal computers could 
obtain about 1 million instructions per second for each US dollar of cost (1 MIPS/$) (Koh & 
Magee, 2006), whereas today, the best personal computers can obtain about 176 MIPS/$.6 
Further, although these prices reflect the cost for cutting-edge performance, it is possible to 
obtain lower levels of performance for free when utilizing cloud computing services.7 For 
example, Amazon Web Services EC2 provides free processing power for 1 year that runs at 
approximately 1,933 MIPS and HP Cloud provides free processing power for 90 days that runs at 
                                                          
5East Indian lore tells the story of an Indian king who loved chess so much that he offered the inventor of the game 
any prize he desired. The inventor asked for one grain of rice on the first square of the board, two on the second, 
four on the third, and so on, doubling the amount for each of the 64 squares on the board. While the amount of rice 
on the first half of the chessboard was large, it was within the realm of the feasible. However, the amount of rice on 
the second half of the board was more than all the rice in the world. 
 
6The calculation was based on the Intel Core i7-3960X, which runs at 177,730 MIPS and could be purchased from 
TigerDirect.com for $1,009 in 2013. 
 
7Although there are many definitions of cloud computing, we use a fairly broad definition and consider cloud 
computing to be the use of computer servers and services that are hosted by a third party and are accessed via the 
Internet. One key feature of most commonly used cloud computing platforms, including Amazon Web Services and 
Google Drive, is the ability for a firm to utilize more computing power, storage, and bandwidth on demand, without 
needing to buy and install servers within the firm. 
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approximately 4,545 MIPS.8 Although today’s cutting-edge processing power is by no means 
free, the processing power that was cutting-edge for a personal computer approximately 10 years 
ago is now offered for free via cloud computing. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 MIPS per US Dollar over time (Source: Koh & Magee, 2006) 9 
 
Information Storage 
The costs of information storage have also dropped dramatically. For many years, disk drives 
have been a common object of study for management scholars due to constant technological 
disruptions in this industry (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003a; Christensen, 1993, 2006). These 
disruptions drove an exponential growth pattern similar to that of Moore’s Law for transistors. 
Although each generation of users frequently wonders, “How will I possibly use up all that disk 
space?,” they always do, as technologies evolve and enable people to create increasing amounts 
of information that needs to be stored. Indeed, industry approximations estimate that by 2010, 
                                                          
8Amazon Web Services free package information, retrieved from http://aws.amazon.com/free/ on June 5, 2013. HP 
Cloud free package information retrieved from https://www.hpcloud.com/free-trial on June 5, 2013. MIPS 
calculations for both were retrieved from http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/all-clouds-are-not-created-equal-
2x-cpu-performance-at-nearly-the#axzz3LuAiExLF on June 5, 2013. 
 
9 We gratefully acknowledge permission from the authors to use figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. 
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the amount of information created between the beginning of civilization and 2003 (5 exabytes10) 
was being created every 2 days.11 This rapid increase of information storage allowed for the 
progression from text as the only practically digitizable information to pictures and eventually 
video becoming storable at a reasonable cost. This increased storage has led to websites such as 
YouTube, to which users upload 100 hours of video per minute.12 
Not only has information storage space increased, but the portability of this storage has 
also grown. Magnetic tapes were followed by magnetic disks, optical disks, and flash memory. 
The latter now allows for up to 1 terabyte13 of information to be carried on a device the size of a 
person’s thumb. Flash memory was an important innovation that enabled the portable device 
revolution, which has led to the large-scale production and adoption of smartphones and tablets. 
Such massive amounts of storage have led to a “save everything” mentality at both individual 
and firm levels. 
Combined with increases in processing power, the ability, and thus the propensity, to 
save everything has led to the “big data” or data analytics phenomenon that is revolutionizing the 
way companies do business as they gain the ability to better understand their consumers.14 
Although basic data analytic capabilities have existed for many years, it is only through the 
emergence of cheap information storage that organizations can now save and analyze enough 
                                                          
10An exabyte is 1018 bytes, or 1 billion gigabytes. 
 
11Google CEO Eric Schmidt addressing the Techonomy 2010 conference, Lake Tahoe, California, August 6, 2010. 
 
12YouTube upload statistic. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html on December 15, 2014. 
 
13A terabyte is 1,000 gigabytes or 1012 bytes. 
 
14Although there are many definitions of big data and data analytics, Gartner (2013) defines big data as “high-
volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of 
information processing for enhanced insight and decision making.” 
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data to produce deeper and more nuanced analyses of customer behavior for use in prediction, 
market segmentation, and so on. 
As with information processing power, the growth in information storage space has also 
led to a decline in the cost of storage (Figure 1.2). For example, in 2000, the cost of hard disk 
storage was about 140 MB/$ (Koh & Magee, 2006); today, storage on an external hard drive 
costs about 22,073 MB/$.15 Further, although the largest storage devices are not free, there are a 
number of storage options that are free. Thumb drives holding 1 GB have become so cheap that 
they are regularly given out for free. 
 
 
Figure 1.2  Megabits per US Dollar over time (Source: Koh & Magee, 2006) 
 
 
More impressively, coupling gains in storage capacity with increases in information 
communication power has allowed for extremely cheap, and even free, storage via the Internet. 
For example, Google Drive offers 15 GB of free storage, Box offers 50 GB, and HP Cloud offers 
500 GB for 90 days. A 500-GB disk drive that cost $150 five years ago is $50 today. Further, the 
                                                          
15This calculation was based on the Seagate Backup Plus 4TB External Desktop Drive, which could be purchased 
from TigerDirect.com for $190 in 2013. 
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same storage space can now be obtained through the cloud for free. These impacts on processing 
and storage bring down information constraints for large incumbent firms and similarly reduce 
information costs to essentially zero for new entrants. 
 
Information Communication 
Information communication is the ability to move bits of data from one place to another, often 
from storage to processing and back. We consider this to encompass both machines 
communicating with each other and people communicating with each other via these machines. 
Although communication costs within a computer system are certainly one aspect of information 
communication, we focus primarily on the communication channels that move information from 
one device to another, namely bandwidth. The ability to move digital bits from one system to 
another has long relied on existing telecommunications channels, starting with phone lines and 
moving to cable lines and, more recently, fiber optic lines. Wireless data communication has also 
relied on existing channels, namely radio and cellular. In both wired and wireless domains, 
bandwidth has grown exponentially since the invention of the telegraph and radio in the 1800s 
(Koh & Magee, 2006). This increase in communication capabilities is what allowed for the 
creation of the Internet and its growth into a communication channel accounting for 8% of all 
retail products sold in the United States (Anderson, Reitsma, Evans, & Jaddou, 2011). Ever since 
the invention of the precursors to the Internet in the 1960s, bandwidth has increased rapidly. For 
example, in 1984, the fastest modem available to a home user had a speed of 300 bits per second 
(bps), whereas in 2010 it was 31 Mbps, an increase of 100,000 times in just over 25 years 
(Nielsen, 2010). 
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As with information processing and storage, the exponential growth of information 
communication has been accompanied by a rapid decline in price (Figure 1.3). Industry 
assessments estimate that the price per Mbps for Internet transit dropped from $1,200 in 1998 to 
$5 in 2010 (Norton, 2010). However, since the mid-1990s when America Online (AOL) mailed 
floppy discs to consumers providing free access to the Internet for a limited time, there have 
been avenues for free access to the Internet. Today, Google Fiber, which boasts maximum 
speeds of 1 Gbps, offers a free connection to the Internet with download speeds limited to 5 
Mbps.16 
 
 
Figure 1.3  Bandwidth per cable length per US Dollar (Source: Koh & Magee 2006) 
 
It is important to note that while such cheap bandwidth is readily available in many areas 
of the United States, in many other areas it is very difficult to get access to high-speed Internet 
service, creating what many have called the “digital divide” (Greenstein & Prince, 2007; Norris, 
2001; Warschauer, 2003). However, even in areas where the decreases in cost have not yet 
produced wider accessibility for broadband service, cheaper communications allow for 
                                                          
16Although the monthly fee is $0, there is a one-time installation fee of $300. Information retrieved from 
https://support.google.com/fiber/answer/2476912 on June 6, 2013. 
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innovations such as the delivery of agricultural market prices via text message to farmers in 
developing nations (Aker, 2010; Jensen, 2007). Around the world, this reduction in information 
communication costs has had an impact, allowing skilled workers from emerging economies to 
have access to developed markets via platforms such as oDesk, eLance, and TopCoder. Further, 
through the rise of massive open online courses (MOOCs), the reduction in information 
communication costs has allowed anyone with an Internet connection to gain access to high 
quality education in a vast array of fields. Finally, although some bandwidth may be free, 5 
Mbps is not nearly enough to allow a large business to operate effectively, and therefore they 
must still pay for access, even if the fees are much less than only a few years ago. 
Together, the reduction in costs of information processing, storage, and communication 
have led to more products that leverage modular technologies and standardized interfaces, 
greater engagement by consumers and other end users, and wide-scale availability of enormous 
computing power and comprehensive databases. This, coupled with the increased ability to 
collaborate and coordinate across large distances, has produced wide-ranging effects on the way 
organizations create and leverage innovations and on fundamental organizational processes. 
 
ENGAGING COMMUNITIES 
Organizations engage with many types of communities including customers, suppliers, partners, 
and complementors. One way to visualize the scale of these engagements is through the triangle 
shown in Figure 1.4. At the top are a small number of strategic alliances. For large technology 
firms, these may be multidimensional technology, service, and licensing relationships with other 
large firms. This type of alliance is custom-negotiated, and usually involves senior members of 
the executive team, possibly including the CEO. A firm will likely not have more than ten to 
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twenty relationships of this kind that are strategic in nature. Microsoft’s interaction with Intel is 
one example of this type of relationship (Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2007). 
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Community Logic          Developers 
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The next set of relationships is more tactical but still involves custom negotiations on a 
case-by-case basis. A relationship in this category is one in which a firm licenses a technology 
that it integrates into a product. A large firm might have tens of these tactical contributors but 
probably will not have hundreds. These relationships are usually managed by business 
development professionals trained to work with interfirm relationships (see the alliance 
literature; e.g., Gulati, 1998, 2007; Rothaermel, 2001). A mobile phone provider’s relationship 
Figure 1.4 Typology of communities 
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with a speech recognition technology provider such as Nuance is an example of this type of 
alliance (Nuance Communications, 2013). 
Beyond these custom-negotiated relationships are community engagements enabled by 
reductions in information costs. In this chapter, we focus on the bottom three sections of the 
triangle because they include the types of engagements that are accelerating as a result of the 
increase in information processing capabilities and the decrease in information costs. These 
categories of engagement are (1) the advent of external labor and task markets, (2) the rise of 
developer ecosystems, and (3) the growing prevalence of user-generated contributions. 
Considering labor marketplaces, we examine how firms engage with parties beyond their legal 
control to accomplish tasks they previously would have performed internally. With developer 
ecosystems, we look at how complementary firms provide value to end-users. With user-
generated contributions, we consider how firms engage users to contribute value. Organizations 
that use labor marketplaces might have many interactions with individual external workers 
contributing to a project. Organizations with developer ecosystems may have hundreds, 
thousands, or potentially more than a million developer relationships. Organizations that interact 
with users could have millions of contact points. In Table 1.1, we summarize how engaging 
external labor, developers, and users changes with and without information constraints. 
Reductions in information processing, storage, and communication costs make these 
relationships not only feasible but also attractive, though they need to be managed in an entirely 
different way from those in the top two sections of the triangle. Institutional logics that revolve 
around openness and sharing become essential, but they differ from the prevailing logics of 
hierarchy and control. Firms need to grapple with how to manage these multiple logics as they 
cope with an array of complex community engagements. These interactions create challenges 
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(e.g., contrasting logics, more user input than a firm can easily process) and opportunities (e.g., 
introducing benefits from entities beyond those directly controlled by the firm). Studying these 
phenomena may prompt us to think differently about innovation, organizations, and our classic 
theories that explain them. Innovation is no longer occurring primarily within a firm; rather, 
organizations now engage with others who also innovate in ways that improve the organization’s 
products, experiences, and value. These interactions result in new behaviors to create, capture, 
and select innovations while also introducing fundamentally new managerial challenges. 
 
Labor Marketplaces 
Labor marketplaces, also known as task marketplaces, are multi-sided platform-based businesses 
that allow firms and individuals that have specific tasks to find people to accomplish those tasks. 
Tasks posted on the most popular of these platforms (e.g., oDesk, eLance, TopCoder) include 
everything from website design to language translation and marketing. Sometimes also referred 
to as “the human cloud” and considered the next generation of outsourcing after information 
technology (IT) and offshore outsourcing, these marketplaces comprise an ecosystem of 
platforms linking virtual workers with employers who hire them on an as-needed basis. 
The recent rise of these platforms is substantial, with growth in global revenue amounting 
to 53% for 2010 and 74% for 2011 (Kaganer, Carmel, Hirscheim, & Olsen, 2013). Addressing 
some original concerns about transparency, quality control, and coordination in these labor 
relationships, these marketplaces now have mechanisms to allow hiring managers to monitor 
contractors’ work as well as standardized contracts and dispute resolution services (Needleman, 
2010). Task platforms allow a firm to rely on external parties for much of its labor supply in a 
way that was previously not possible before information technologies enabled the collaboration 
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and communication feasible today. As we discuss in the next section, this reliance on external 
labor has important implications for organizational and strategic decisions. 
 
Developer Ecosystems 
Technology developments enable firms to deploy goods that are increasingly modular, with open 
interfaces allowing independent entities to contribute to end-products (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). 
Although many firms design and develop self-contained products that provide a complete user 
experience, increasingly more products require after-market applications or accessories to deliver 
full value (Adner, 2012). In using labor marketplaces, organizations engage external parties 
directly and hire resources to further their missions. In contrast, when they build developer 
ecosystems, organizations enable external parties (developers) to create complementary products 
(apps or accessories) that customers acquire either directly from the external parties or through a 
marketplace. 
Prevalent examples of firms with developer ecosystems are those that offer smartphones, 
tablets, and other devices that users customize with apps and accessories. Beyond consumer 
products, this same phenomenon exists in other industries, such as medical diagnostic devices. 
Welch Allyn traditionally provided integrated systems to doctors’ offices and hospitals allowing 
medical practitioners to measure blood pressure, temperature, and so on. Today, it offers a 
platform system to which doctors and hospitals can add modules and apps provided by other 
firms (Welch Allyn, 2011, 2013). 
The widespread availability of apps is driven by underlying reductions in information 
costs. Firms are able to leverage today’s ease of processing and communication to open 
interfaces to their products, providing application programming interfaces (APIs) and software 
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development kits (SDKs) and encouraging other firms to contribute to their products. Consumers 
are able to easily download apps to improve products they purchase, and market evidence 
indicates that they are doing so in large numbers. In May 2013, Apple announced that 50 billion 
apps had been downloaded from its App Store, which offers more than 850,000 apps in 155 
countries for a suite of iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch products (Apple Inc., 2013). In Facebook’s 
second quarter 2013 earnings release, to benefit its 1.15 billion monthly active users, it 
announced that more than 100,000 apps had been built (Facebook, 2013). Complementary firms 
(such as app developers) are able and incentivized to develop these apps because they have easy 
access to product information through developer websites and ease of distribution through app 
stores and other means. Enticed by the prospects of serving enormous markets, and equipped 
with enabling technologies and documentation, developers invest in creating apps and 
accessories for other firms’ products. Firms and their complementary developers and accessory 
providers need to employ institutional logics consistent with operating in a world that is highly 
open and decentralized with significant sharing and interdependence. 
 
User-Generated Contributions 
As the drastic reduction in information costs has made it easier to engage an ecosystem of 
developers, it has also made it easier for organizations to connect with the users of their products 
and services (Von Hippel, 2009). In explaining this phenomenon, Benkler (2006, p. 5) highlights 
“the rise of effective, large-scale cooperative efforts—peer production of information, 
knowledge, and culture.” Indeed, in some cases, such as open source software, users have 
become the entirety of the organization developing the product. In these cases, the creative 
contributors no longer reside inside an organization. Rather, they exist in a loosely affiliated 
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community with its own set of operating procedures and norms that have developed to govern 
behaviors (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Shah, 2006). 
Many open source software projects started within an organization and then were taken 
over by a group of users after the code base was opened. For example, Apache began as a 
federally funded research project and is now a fully open source project that runs more than 50% 
of websites on the Internet (Greenstein & Nagle, 2014). In a survey of large organizations, 50% 
of respondents said they use open source software in their business, and another 28% said they 
are considering using it (Trapasso & Vujanic, 2010). 
Although these types of open source software projects exist in an entirely community-
based self-governing organizational form (Benkler, 2006), in more traditional firms there are 
increasing examples in which user-generated contributions provide firms with free inputs. For 
example, user-generated product and service reviews on Amazon, TripAdvisor, and Yelp help 
drive sales and profits of reviewed firms and products (Duan, Gu, & Whinston, 2008; Liu, 2006; 
Luca, 2011). Further, companies such as Threadless rely on users for idea generation and 
selection (designing products and determining which products are most likely to be successful in 
the market) (Lakhani & Kanji, 2008). All of these activities (open source software, user-
generated reviews, and user idea generation and selection) are enabled by reductions in 
information costs. 
As information costs drop sharply and all three types of community engagement increase, 
sharply inconsistent logics emerge within incumbent firms. Incumbents need to balance 
operating in their traditional internally focused mode with an approach that is more externally 
oriented and inclusive. They need to manage competing logics that will be more pervasive than 
ever before (Lounsbury, 2007). Table 1.1 summarizes how these three types of communities 
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(labor, developers, and users) change as the environments in which they operate move from a 
world where information is constrained to one in which information constraints are essentially 
nonexistent. 
 
Table 1.1  Engaging With Communities With and Without Information Constraints 
 
 With Information Constraints Without Information Constraints 
Labor  All internal to the firm, or specialized 
contracting through temp agencies and 
contractors 
 Long-term engagements and large-scale 
projects 
 Difficult performance quality control 
and monitoring 
 
 Labor marketplaces 
 
 
 Micro-jobs enabled 
 
 Community rating schemes and digital 
monitoring 
Developers  Organization-to-developer contracting 
 Select few high-maintenance 
relationships between organizations and 
developers 
 Significant case-by-case IP 
considerations and negotiations 
 
 Embedded applications (“pre-loads”) 
executed by engineering teams 
 
 User-to-developer contracting 
 Many arm’s length developer 
relationships governed by simple click-
through licenses 
 IP licensing tailored for engagement 
with high volume of organizations (e.g., 
automated websites for contracts) 
 App store applications (“post-loads”) by 
third-party developers 
Users  Users engage almost exclusively 
through customer service representatives 
 
 Inputs are primarily customer 
complaints or repair requests 
 
 External inputs are avoided 
 Users provide inputs across functional 
organizations (e.g., to engineering and 
marketing) contributing to full design 
process 
 Inputs include product design 
suggestions, manufacturing ideas, and 
so on 
 External inputs are embraced as a 
valuable part of product design and 
delivery 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
Organizations that flourished during the industrial age focused their energy on managing 
physical assets. The constraints they battled related to physical goods, production challenges, and 
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employment issues. In contrast, organizations during the information age leverage sophisticated 
information technologies to manage their resources and pursue product development. Incumbent 
firms reach beyond traditional organizations and interact with individuals, firms, and 
communities to create offerings integrating contributions from a variety of sources. They 
undergo structural transitions to operate in a networked information economy characterized by 
decentralized action by individuals cooperating and coordinating through distributed 
nonproprietary, non-market strategies (Benkler, 2006). 
The effects of this new economy span organizational and institutional levels. As these 
firms engage beyond their boundaries, they outgrow the strategies, business models, and 
organizational processes theorists have been studying for decades and challenge their 
institutional logics. Whereas previously they managed based on a Chandlerian logic that 
emphasized hierarchy and control (Chandler, 1977; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), firms today 
balance multiple logics that incorporate peer production, information sharing, data access, and 
free goods. As they modify their institutional logics in response to new strategies and 
organizational transitions (Gawer & Phillips, 2013), they undergo institutional work, which 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 215) defined as “the purposive action of individuals and 
organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions.” 
Take, for example, research and development (R&D), an institutionalized category with 
well-understood meaning and value in society beyond the work it encompasses (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). As information constraints decrease, categories of activities change in terms of 
work processes, symbols, and myths that surround them, creating challenges for institutionalized 
rules. For example, whereas R&D used to be performed almost entirely by professionals 
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employed within a firm, it can now be a joint activity spanning internal experts and external 
contributors. 
In the context of increased community engagement and enhanced roles for user 
contributions, institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004) are increasingly found outside traditional 
boundaries of firms. One example is social networks, which were originally a means for students 
to connect with each other and now have evolved to become, among other things, a primary 
venue for sharing photographs as well as a useful setting for firms to garner insights into 
consumer sentiment (Nagle, 2013). This change was largely driven by user innovators rather 
than members of existing firms. 
Another example is the evolving role of quality assurance (QA) departments. In the days 
of mainframe computing, a QA department would be responsible for extensive testing of 
mainframe software before release. Today, users provide immediate feedback to software firms, 
so the role of QA professionals includes developing and managing mechanisms to collect and 
manage quality-related feedback from users. At the extreme, in community-centric peer 
production contexts such as Wikipedia, the QA role has been entirely shifted to the community 
(Piskorski & Gorbatai, 2013), further challenging institutionalized norms. 
These community-based innovation processes affect a range of topics associated with 
strategy, innovation, and organization theory. These topics include organizational openness 
(Boudreau, 2010; Chesbrough, 2003b), community engagement (Lakhani, Lifshitz-Assaf, & 
Tushman, 2013; O’Mahony & Lakhani, 2011), user innovation (Lakhani & Von Hippel, 2003; 
von Hippel, 2009), networked economies (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 1996), and other related 
topics such as multi-sided markets (Hagiu & Spulber, 2013; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005), and 
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social media (Piskorski, 2013).17 Regardless of where one falls on the spectrum of views related 
to these topics, or to which version of openness or community engagement one subscribes, they 
all clearly have organizational implications. These include the effects on firm boundaries, 
strategy and new business models, interdependence and community engagement, leadership, 
identity, search, and IP. Table 1.2 shows how these organizational and strategic characteristics 
vary as information processing, storage, and communication become virtually free.  
  
                                                          
17 For a broad overview of the technology and innovation management literature, see Altman, Nagle, & Tushman, 
2013. 
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Boundaries 
The concept of firm boundaries and what is considered inside versus outside the control of a firm 
(March & Simon, 1958; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967) is challenged as 
information constraints decrease and firms become more community-centric (Gulati, Puranam, & 
Tushman, 2012; Lakhani et al., 2013). Gulati et al. (2012, p. 573) introduced the notion of meta-
organizations comprised of “networks of firms or individuals not bound by authority based on 
employment relationships, but characterized by a system-level goal.” They developed a typology 
based on degrees of stratification and permeability of boundaries. These organization types, all 
of which bring together autonomous entities into an interconnected system, are largely enabled 
because information costs are so modest. Researchers have also explored the porosity of 
boundaries under various circumstances (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005), and alliance researchers 
such as Dyer and Singh (1998) have considered the strategic value of relationships between 
alliance partners and networks. Yet, there remains substantial opportunity for research that 
considers the effects on organization boundaries as information constraints approach zero and 
community engagement becomes more prevalent. 
A reliance on external labor leads to a weakening of firm boundaries. Task marketplaces 
reduce an organization’s need to hire internal employees by providing a marketplace with 
standardized contract terms and efficient matching of tasks to task performers. The matching 
mechanisms allow task performers to very clearly showcase their skills and portfolios of past 
projects, while also allowing organizations to concretely define tasks they need completed 
(Kaganer et al., 2013). Standardized contracts are designed to let two parties negotiate price, time 
for completion, and task details while covering issues such as IP and task monitoring in a 
consistent way. Traditionally, hierarchies are utilized to limit coordination and contracting costs 
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(Coase, 1937; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1975). However, task 
platforms allow organizations to limit these costs by using markets instead of hierarchies to 
execute tasks. 
For organizations engaging with task marketplaces, the two primary risks are projects not 
being completed and IP leaks (Kaganer et al., 2013). However, the scale of these marketplaces 
makes it possible for organizations to engage in redundant projects, which decreases failure risk. 
Further, task performer reputations are publicly available, incentivizing performers to complete 
projects that garner good feedback from their employers. To manage IP concerns, organizations 
employ multiple strategies such as breaking tasks into small subunits such that any individual 
contributor does not have enough information to make a leak valuable. Further, the high volume 
of individual task performers participating in labor marketplaces results in competition, which 
allows organizations to seek qualified individuals, test their services, and easily contract with a 
different person if the first is unsatisfactory. This reduces the importance of hold-up problems 
(Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) because organizations contract with individual contractor 
employees rather than hiring an outsourcing organization. Hart and Moore (1990) noted a 
distinct difference between firms hiring employees directly and those contracting with 
outsourcing firms. When hiring employees, firms can fire individuals who underperform. In 
contrast, when outsourcing with third-party contractors, firms cannot address problems with 
individual workers. Task marketplaces eliminate this problem because individuals are contracted 
on a discrete basis, and thus contracts can be managed individually. 
Activities enabled by reductions in information constraints and broader engagement with 
communities of complementors and developers also allow for a reduction in the need for vertical 
and horizontal integration, and thus organization size. Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
32 
 
maintains that firms come into existence when the costs of a transaction in the market are higher 
than the costs of performing the same transaction within a firm (Coase 1937; Williamson 1981). 
However, when user-generated contributions are freely supplied, the costs of transactions are 
essentially zero, and therefore it is no longer logical to have these activities located within a firm. 
For example, because the creative agency Victors and Spoils relies on crowdsourcing to develop 
advertising campaigns, it does not need to employ as many creative designers as a traditional 
firm. Although it has long been known that firm boundaries shrink as IT (Malone, Yates, & 
Benjamin, 1987; Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani, & Kambil, 1994; Hitt, 1999) and the Internet 
(Afuah, 2003) reduce information costs and associated transaction costs, few studies have 
considered what happens to organizations when information costs, and thus transaction costs, 
essentially vanish. 
Cloud computing similarly leads to potential reductions in firm boundaries by decreasing 
information costs and allowing organizations to rely on external parties for critical needs (e.g., a 
powerful set of IT tools for innovation). Traditionally, risk reduction has been an important 
reason for firms to conduct activities internally (Chandler, 1962). However, by allowing 
organizations to rapidly scale their computing needs, cloud computing greatly reduces the risks 
associated with purchasing large and expensive servers. Cloud computing allows an organization 
to offload the risk of overbuilding computing capacity by contracting a third party who pools 
capacity demand with other organizations (Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, & Simchi-Levi, 1999). 
 
Strategy and New Business Models 
As organizations leverage more free and open assets (e.g., open source software, user reviews 
and ideas), it becomes less clear what assets an organization needs to own and how it 
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differentiates itself from competitors. When information constraints were high, these assets were 
expensive to produce, and user inputs were essentially impossible to capture. Now, these goods 
are widely available, and organizations can leverage them to accomplish their goals. However, 
organizations also need to re-think their basis of competitive differentiation. Perhaps the 
knowledge and strategies for utilizing such free and open assets will become the most important 
assets of an organization, and perhaps the only assets it truly owns (Teece, 2007). Consequently, 
an organization’s most valuable assets, the knowledge and information within the organization 
(Arrow, 1975; Teece, 1982) and the mechanisms through which this knowledge is processed 
(Tushman & Nadler, 1978), will become the largest avenues for sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
Taking advantage of these new assets and modes of competition requires the adoption of 
new strategies and business models and/or the modification of more traditional ones 
(Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007; Dahlander & Gann, 2010). With information costs decreasing, 
community engagement increasing, and new opportunities related to opening and expanding 
boundaries, organizations need to supplement existing business models with new approaches that 
capture the creativity and inventiveness of external innovators, such as those related to developer 
ecosystems, labor marketplaces, and user contributions. Crowdfunding, in which organizations 
search for funding by engaging with a wide community of potential investors, is an example of 
an emerging business practice in which organizations can also capture resources from external 
parties through taking advantage of dramatically reduced information constraints. 
Entrepreneurship provides a business approach that by its nature leverages scarce resources and 
thus thrives as information costs decrease and more resources become available with much less 
investment. Within large organizations, the entrepreneurial model can be mimicked through 
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corporate entrepreneurship, in which small groups within organizations can enable mature 
incumbent organizations to explore new and innovative areas while continuing to exploit existing 
capabilities (Bresnahan, Greenstein, & Henderson, 2011). 
Another business model enabled by inexpensive information capabilities is the rise of 
“solopreneurs,” individual entrepreneurs who can build entire companies without ever hiring 
internal employees. Solopreneurs, such as AllergyEats and SociallyActive, no longer need to 
acquire large amounts of capital to buy servers and IT support, formerly an important barrier to 
entry; rather, they rely on cloud computing. Further, solopreneurs can utilize labor marketplaces 
to perform functions that previously would have required entire departments. Website design, 
marketing, and even sales can all be contracted out to external parties via task marketplaces. 
Additionally, these types of organizations can engage their users as sources of content and 
direction. Although solopreneurs have existed throughout history, drastic reductions in 
information costs are allowing them to have a broader impact that helps them compete with 
larger, established organizations by focusing on their core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990) in highly specialized entrepreneurial ventures. 
 
Interdependence and Community Engagement 
The Internet and peer production processes function as effectively as they do because of adoption 
of new technical and organizational architectures combining contributions from diverse 
providers (Benkler, 2006). These architectures have as a defining characteristic their ability to 
deal with interdependencies among modular components. As Internet-based technologies 
become more pervasive throughout core business processes, incumbent organizations and 
institutions will continue to adopt new institutional logics consistent with the new processes 
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(Thornton et al., 2012). As these organizations participate more broadly in peer-production 
processes, contribute to sharing communities, and generally engage in more modern forms of 
community interaction, they will need to develop organizational processes that embrace 
interdependence and community engagement. 
Coordination and integration are challenges organizations face as a result of this 
increased interdependence and more complex logics. Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) addressed 
these topics and considered the creation of integrative conditions for coordination, such as 
accountability, predictability, and common understanding. In ecosystems incorporating 
community engagement, the conditions for accountability are sometimes unclear. For example, 
when a platform owner decides to upgrade technologies it is unclear whether the platform owner 
is responsible for maintaining backward compatibility to protect all developers and for how long 
it would need to do so. The extent to which platform owners need to provide predictable 
technology roadmaps is also debatable. To leverage reduced information constraints and build 
and maintain a developer ecosystem, an organization needs to focus on the questions associated 
with these coordination mechanisms (Adner, 2012). 
Interdependencies vary depending on the type of entity with which the focal organization 
is engaging. Organizations have interdependencies with suppliers with whom they contract 
directly (e.g., cloud computing, IT service providers). They also have interdependencies with 
complementors. Both types of interdependencies have significant implications for organizations 
related to how they consider and manage firm boundaries (March & Simon, 1958; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005; Thompson, 1967). And, both increase as information 
constraints decrease and organizations engage with communities more broadly. 
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Complementor interdependencies are becoming more frequent and complex as product 
design, development, and deployment are evolving, particularly as more modularized products 
are introduced into the world with open interfaces ready for additions by other organizations 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Formerly, product development efforts were primarily internal or 
occurred through a network of closely affiliated suppliers and strategic alliance partners, but 
when organizations build and engage with communities, the product experience is developed in 
conjunction with organizations operating outside the central organization’s legal and economic 
boundaries. The central organization may exert control in terms of regulating distribution of 
products through app store requirements or branding programs (such as Apple’s “Made for 
iPhone” logo), but complementors act and innovate independently. 
An example of complementors’ actions influencing a central organization is privacy 
breaches by Facebook application developers (Steel & Fowler, 2010). Developers disclosed 
users’ personally identifiable information (PII). Users were infuriated with Facebook. In fact, 
Facebook was not releasing data; app developers were releasing information after users opted in 
to using the apps. However, the perception was that Facebook was releasing user information. 
Facebook was harmed by actions of complementors they did not control. 
With lower information constraints, organizations are enabled to develop and grow 
ecosystems and encourage communities, consisting of either organizations or individuals, to 
invest on their behalf. An example is a smartphone maker that encourages app developers and 
accessory providers to create products that work with its particular smartphones. This creates 
interdependencies between the phone maker and the app and accessory providers in which both 
become dependent on each other for business success. The smartphone provider needs apps and 
accessories to be available so that its product is attractive to consumers. The app and accessory 
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providers need the smartphone provider to make available sufficient advance information so they 
can create compelling complementary products. Additionally, app and accessory providers must 
address the risk that smartphone providers might introduce new models rendering existing apps 
and accessories obsolete. The app or accessory organization has no control over a situation that 
could potentially lead to a significant negative impact such as high inventory scrap costs. 
Interdependence among various members of an ecosystem also leads to risks being 
shared. From the perspective of the focal organization, there is a diversification of risk to 
developers or accessory providers. From the vantage point of an app developer or accessory 
provider participating in an ecosystem, there is risk associated with decisions the focal 
organization might make to the detriment of the accessory provider. However, these risks are 
usually justified by the great benefits that also exist from potential growth of the overall market. 
 
Leadership 
As information costs dramatically decrease and organizations engage more actively and 
comprehensively with communities of all types, leaders are faced with new challenges, and new 
leadership styles emerge. Roles transition from directing work in a traditional hierarchy 
(Chandler, 1977) to sourcing and organizing contributions in a more interdependent loose 
affiliation of communities. This is true for interactions within incumbent organizations 
(managing employees), outside the organization (managing suppliers and complementors), and 
in the newer community-based organizational forms. As Benkler (2006, p. 67) explained 
regarding the large-scale Linux operating system development process, “a certain kind of 
meritocratic hierarchy is clearly present. However, it is a hierarchy that is very different in style, 
practical implementation, and organizational role than that of the manager in the firm.” 
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Because of increased access to information, leaders no longer can use asymmetries of 
information as a significant source of control. Herbert Simon (1945/1997) outlined 
considerations related to the creation of an administrative organization and highlighted the notion 
of influencing staff members (beyond just directing them). This is even more relevant when staff 
members have the same or better access to information and information processing than 
managers. Similarly, in a context where user-generated contributions play a significant role in 
product development and brand management, leaders need to influence not only staff members 
but also those in the community who contribute work, reviews, and other resources to projects. 
Leaders also need to manage and orchestrate interactions with ecosystem members, and 
the form of management cannot be one of traditional hierarchy and control because the members 
are independent entities outside the organization. Instead, leaders need to use incentives and 
persuasion, frequently referred to as “developer evangelism” by practitioners in this arena, to 
convince developers to invest in their products. Developer conferences, websites, tools, and 
cross-promotions are all means that leaders can use to influence developers to invest valuable 
resources on behalf of their organization as they expand their search for innovative solutions 
beyond their boundaries (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). 
Illustrating the importance of engaging individuals, Samsung has long had a developer 
program through which developers can obtain product information online and attend local 
conferences. Expanding this activity, Samsung hosted a worldwide developer conference in 
October 2013. The conference website invited participants to “Engage with industry leaders; 
Collaborate with fellow developers; Learn about new Samsung tools and SDKs; Create what’s 
next” (http://samsungdevcon.com/sdc13/). This highlights the importance that Samsung’s 
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leadership is placing both on building relationships with ecosystem members worldwide and also 
on the role they need to play in fostering community interactions among members. 
Beyond considering influence and persuasion, Simon’s (1945/1997, p. 199) notion of an 
administrator as one who satisfices, choosing actions that are satisfactory or “good enough,” is 
worth reconsidering when inputs are from large external communities. To what extent do 
administrators need to satisfice when the solutions from which they are choosing come from 
external communities widely diverse in functional expertise, geography, motivations, and 
experiences? No longer are managers bound by inputs from their employees and close partners; 
rather, they may be able to get closer to the economic model of maximizing decision making 
when search extends beyond the boundaries of their organization to large-scale communities. 
Furthermore, top management team operations and roles (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) 
may be affected by changes as a result of decreasing information constraints. Just as individuals 
might be affected by shifts in the relative importance of roles when firm boundaries shift and 
interdependence increases, so too might dynamics within top management teams change. For 
example, as developer communities become increasingly important, the roles of team members 
who create and nurture these communities might also increase in importance. However, in a 
management team where product development professionals have traditionally held sway, 
shifting power to business development staff might be a difficult transition for a leadership team. 
Additionally, the openness associated with more community engagement may introduce top 
management team challenges related to managing paradoxes and contradictions as leaders aim to 
protect traditional proprietary advantages while embracing creative innovative inputs from 
external parties (Smith & Tushman, 2005). 
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Moreover, across the organization, shifts to broader external community engagement, 
sharing, and openness may introduce challenges related to roles and functional responsibilities. 
In the past, primary engagement with external communities was largely restricted to particular 
staff members, such as customer service personnel. Now, in cases where sharing with external 
parties becomes important and more pervasive, other functional areas (such as product 
development) might need to interact directly with external parties and process their inputs (e.g., 
suggestions from users). 
Monitoring costs, a central topic in the TCE discourse (Williamson, 1981), vary in the 
context of interdependent communities. One might initially think that monitoring costs would 
increase as the number of developers in an app store increases. In fact, through network effects, 
the more popular an app store becomes, with an increasing number of apps, the larger the 
community of users it develops, and that community then contributes reviews to the marketplace, 
which serve as a form of monitoring. In practice, a conglomeration of developers monitors all the 
individual developers. Therefore, not only does lack of information constraints allow for 
production of complementary goods by parties outside the organization, it also allows for 
monitoring and quality control of these goods for free by users. Leaders may no longer need to 
manage organizations of individuals monitoring outputs but rather organizations of individuals 
nurturing and managing the community that monitors outputs. 
 
Identity 
Organizational identity research encompasses both an internal perception of organizational 
identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985) and an external conception, which is sometimes referred to as 
an organization’s image (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). As information constraints decrease and the 
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locus of innovation moves outside the organization, both internal and external conceptions of 
organizational identity may be challenged. With respect to internal organizational identity, as an 
organization transitions from creating innovations entirely internally to sourcing and selecting 
innovations externally, it may change from considering itself as primarily a research-based 
organization to being one that delivers innovative product experiences regardless of where they 
are sourced. This may lead to changes in which functions have the most power in an 
organization, potentially shifting the power base from engineers to business development 
professionals or vice versa, depending on the nature of the organization. 
Relative to external identity, an organization may change from presenting itself as 
primarily a technology-led product organization to a services-based one. It may move from 
having an organizational identity centered on the organization alone to one that encompasses 
both the organization and its related communities (e.g., its developer ecosystem). In both cases, 
the organization’s identity may be threatened and undergo a transition as a result of transitions 
prompted by technological changes (Tripsas, 2009). 
Identity spans levels of analysis considering both individuals and organizations (Gioia, 
1998). Both of these identity types may shift as organizations transform, and the two may 
influence each other (Fiol, 2002). How employees identify with their organization and with their 
professions is likely to be challenged as the locus of innovation moves outside the organization. 
When much of the innovation included in an organization’s product offering is being sourced 
externally, do employees have the same level of pride in their organization? As engineers 
transition from considering themselves creators of innovations to evaluators of others’ 
innovations, is there also a potential threat to their professional identities (Ibarra, 1999; Lifshitz-
Assaf, 2013)? Must organizations hire people with different profiles when the roles of people 
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within R&D include much greater levels of interaction with external communities? Professional 
identities are increasingly associated with engaging external communities, sourcing, and 
selecting creative outputs rather than with internal development and creativity when an 
organization is more focused on external engagement. Both individual and organizational 
identities provide powerful lenses through which we can study these changes. Further, 
organizational identity research could likely benefit from examples that link changes associated 
with information constraints reduction, such as product-to-platform transitions, with identity 
transitions (Altman & Tripsas, 2015). 
 
Search 
Search and decision making (Cyert & March, 1963) are relevant topics to reconsider with respect 
to organizations and communities in the context of minimal information constraints. A 
fundamental underpinning of rational choice theory is that there is a cost associated with 
gathering better information. In his behavioral model of limited rational choice, Simon (1955, p. 
112) tied these costs to aspiration levels of individuals and then built his argument on the idea 
that a “behaving organism does not in general know these costs” and thus cannot be fully rational 
in its decision making. In the world of social media, users employ tags, “like” buttons, and 
hashtags to signify their approval (or disapproval) of content.18 Through these mechanisms, they 
self-organize into communities supporting particular ideas. These freely created groups exist and 
are searchable by entities looking for trends and insights into popular culture. When we have free 
contributions (e.g., user reviews), costs associated with searching for better information are 
                                                          
18Tags are keywords included in the metadata of text that make it easier to search. Like buttons are a small button 
that allows a user to indicate that they approve or agree with an action or statement by another user. Hashtags are the 
# symbol followed by a keyword or phrase within a block of text to allow for easier searching and grouping. 
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greatly reduced.19 This reduction in constraints enables individuals to meaningfully operate in 
less boundedly rational ways and thereby adopt a classic welfare-maximizing approach to 
decision making.20 
At an organizational level, absorptive capacity is understood to characterize an 
organization’s ability to exploit external knowledge as a function of its prior related knowledge 
and is dependent on the structure of communication between the organization and its 
environment (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In a world of free contributions from individuals and 
self-organized groups, it is not clear whether the gatekeeper and boundary-spanning roles in 
traditional R&D organizations (Allen, 1977; Tushman, 1977), which are important for absorptive 
capacity, maintain the same functions or possibly morph into more of a curatorial or distributor 
role, managing inputs from the community at large. Although community contributions increase 
alternatives available to managers and introduce new complexity into the search process, on 
balance these changes present an enormous opportunity for leaders to make better decisions from 
better alternatives. 
At an organizational level related to search, innovative organizations continually strive to 
balance the challenges and trade-offs of exploiting existing knowledge while also exploring new 
opportunities (March, 1991). Within product development particularly, search behavior varies in 
terms of both how organizations re-use existing knowledge and how widely they look for new 
knowledge (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). User-generated contributions can apply in modes of both 
exploitation and exploration. In the exploitation mode, user-generated contributions can extend 
                                                          
19We recognize that these reviews can potentially be manipulated by the organization or 
individual of focus and thus must be monitored. Nevertheless, these reviews are having sizable 
impacts across business models and industries and thus are relevant to this discussion. 
 
20We acknowledge also that we are assuming individuals can easily process information without bias, but we believe 
this is a reasonable enough assumption to make this point. 
44 
 
the reach of an existing product through localization efforts. A specific example is when 
organizations enable users to localize products for particular markets and then capture these 
localizations for the benefits of other users, as Facebook does when it relies on users to translate 
its site into non-English languages. User-generated contributions and developer interactions offer 
even greater opportunities in an exploration mode because they dramatically increase the 
available search area. When an organization casts a wide net for user contributions and developer 
applications, it dramatically increases its ability to explore new alternatives. If managed 
properly, these contributions allow the organization to gain important insights into how products 
are used. Further, engaging with users and developers leads to products that better satisfy the 
needs of users and are therefore more widely adopted. 
 
Intellectual Property 
Decreased information constraints, greater engagement with communities, and a shifting locus of 
innovation lead to strategic considerations regarding how organizations manage IP. When 
innovation and the accompanying invention were conducted entirely within the boundaries of an 
organization, the situation was relatively straightforward. Organizations protected IP through 
legal mechanisms such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. When they engaged 
in interorganization collaboration, they executed appropriate licensing contracts to document 
ownership and usage rights of the IP created during that relationship. 
Organizations, individuals, and groups of users all need to understand IP considerations 
in a world where organizations regularly solicit inputs and then incorporate these contributions 
into product offerings (Harhoff, Henkel, & von Hippel, 2003). Beyond determining who owns 
outputs (which is a challenge in itself), organizations need to be concerned about verifying 
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ownership of inputs. When a user leaves a suggestion on a feedback forum and the organization 
integrates that suggestion into the next version of a product, does the user have any ownership 
rights? And, how can the organization be certain that the user did not steal that idea and its 
implementation from someone else and thus whether the user has the rights to contribute it in the 
first place? Similarly, when open source software is used to develop proprietary software (e.g., 
Mac OS X is based on the open source BSD Unix kernel), one must carefully consider how that 
particular open source license is framed (O’Mahony, 2003). Further, when cloud computing 
resources are used to develop important innovations, clear ownership agreements with the cloud 
provider must be in place. The full scope of strategic implications and considerations related to 
IP in a world of external resources, app developers, and user-generated contributions are well 
beyond the purview of this chapter. However, it is clear that increases in processing capabilities 
and reduction in information constraints create novel and complex challenges for IP attorneys 
and the leaders and individuals with whom they work. They may even call into question the 
utility of IP laws for spurring innovation (Benkler, 2006; Jaffe & Lerner, 2004). 
In summary, while many of the traditional organizational and strategic theories do not 
necessarily fail as information costs approach zero, several of the assumptions that underlie these 
theories may no longer apply. Therefore, in all of the areas discussed (boundaries, strategy and 
new business models, interdependence and community engagement, leadership, identity, search, 
and IP), research is required to understand how organizations shift strategic visions to account 
for the reduction in information constraints. However these shifts occur, it is clear that the 
process of innovation will be significantly altered. 
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IMPACT ON INNOVATION 
Scholars often use evolutionary process models, incorporating variation, selection, and retention 
as lenses through which to view innovation (Campbell, 1960; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Staw, 
1990; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). We employ this framework to help better understand how the 
reduction of information constraints affects innovation. Variation is the process through which 
individuals, organizations, communities, and institutions take existing problems and explore 
potential solutions through a process of experimentation. In a world without information 
constraints, the locus of this innovative process shifts from being centered within an organization 
to more broadly encompassing organizations, individuals, and communities. Selection is the 
process through which competing alternatives are evaluated and the dominant solution is chosen 
and brought to market. Finally, although the classic evolutionary view of retention is that of a 
hereditary process of distributing the selected attributes to the next generation, we instead use the 
term to mean retention and adoption by the community of users (or potential users). In all three 
of these stages, dramatic reductions in information processing, storage, and communication costs 
allow individuals and communities to be more engaged in the innovation process than previously 
was possible. In Table 1.3, we compare these three innovation stages in contexts with and 
without information constraints. 
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Table 1.3  Innovating with and without information constraints 
 With Information Constraints Without Information Constraints 
Variation  R&D conducted internally and 
with select partners 
 
 Long prototype and pilot 
cycles 
 Inputs from internal domain-
specific experts 
 
 Reseller models do not 
encourage complementary 
innovation 
 
 Computing tools are 
expensive and inaccessible 
 
 Organization defines the problem, 
uses community to help generate 
possible solutions 
 Faster experimentation (lean) 
 
 Inputs from diverse disciplines (e.g., 
biologists answering physics 
problems) 
 Multi-sided platforms (marketplaces) 
create opportunities for a large 
variety of offerings from a 
community of sources 
 High-performance tools are available 
for innovators 
Selection  Management hierarchy 
decision making 
 Homogenous perspectives 
during evaluation 
 Traditional market research 
techniques (e.g., focus groups) 
 
 Community-based decision 
making (or at least input) 
 Heterogeneous perspectives 
during evaluation 
 Online and field-based rapid 
experimentation 
Retention (by 
Communities) 
 Limited and costly 
communication to potential 
customers (e.g., traditional 
advertising) 
 Complexity in segmenting and 
targeting customers 
 Organization/customer 
relationship ends with product 
purchase (e.g., brick and 
mortar checkout) 
 Slower diffusion and difficult 
distribution of product 
offerings 
 
 Easy and inexpensive 
communication to potential 
customers (e.g., social media) 
 
 Big data enables specific 
customer targeting 
 Organization/customer 
relationship starts with product 
purchase (e.g., account signup) 
 
 Leverage platforms and 
ecosystems for wide diffusion 
of new products (e.g., apps) 
 
Variation 
In settings both with and without information constraints, the process of variation is a key driver 
of innovation. Whereas the first movers create the variation via new innovations, all other 
organizations must react to the variation. Both must manage the variation as it inevitably affects 
the status quo. During the variation stage, organizations conduct research and development by 
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searching the existing solution space for a problem, use innovation tools to experiment with 
possible new solutions, and are open to complementary innovations that add value to the original 
innovation. However, as we move toward a world without information constraints, all of these 
activities require more engagement with communities and in some cases may be conducted by 
communities. Individuals are capable of performing many of these activities on their own when 
they are armed with the tools enabled by reductions in information constraints. 
Previously, most R&D was conducted within an organization that perhaps engaged a few 
select partners in their innovative efforts. Now, platforms such as TopCoder and InnoCentive 
allow organizations, and even complex government agencies such as NASA, to focus their 
efforts on defining problems that are then opened to the community to help generate possible 
solutions (Lifshitz-Assaf, 2013). This allows organizations to seek inputs from individuals based 
in diverse disciplines who can engage in out-of-the-box thinking (e.g., a biologist may have the 
solution to a physics problem). 
Powerful new tools, such as cloud computing, allow individual innovators to create 
solutions that previously could have been developed only within an organization with vast 
resources. These same tools allow all innovators (organizations, individuals, and communities) to 
conduct faster experimentation whenever fully detailed prototypes are not necessary to gain 
accurate measurements of how a product will function or be adopted. Web-based communication 
tools, including email, mobile phones, and sharing sites (all sometimes gathered under the term 
“social media”), are also making it much easier for groups to quickly form and grow and for new 
types of groups to gather. As Shirky (2008, p. 20) explained in his popular book on self-
organization, “We are living in the middle of a remarkable increase in our ability to share, to 
cooperate with one another, and to take collective action, all outside the framework of traditional 
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institutions and organizations,” all of which leads to production of knowledge that organizations 
can employ in their innovation efforts. 
With information constraints dramatically reduced, organizations are changing how they 
leverage creativity of entities outside their organizations and engender ever greater levels of 
variation. Open and distributed innovation research provides insights into how organizations 
manage some of these engagements (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011; von Hippel, 2009). In related 
work, the burgeoning literature on multi-sided platform-based businesses and ecosystems 
provides guidance for how organizations leverage complementors to increase the value of their 
offerings (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011; Zhu & Iansiti, 
2012). Although there are numerous types of multi-sided platform business models, they all 
enable interactions between two or more types of customers (e.g., buyers and sellers) interacting 
in a market (Hagiu & Wright, 2013). Transitioning to this business model may enable increased 
variation and better innovative outcomes, yet may also create new challenges for organizations. 
 
Selection 
After going through the variation process, in which firms either create or react to a new 
innovation, an innovating entity must select which version of an innovative solution it wants to 
bring to market (Lakhani et al., 2013). However, without information constraints, the 
organization can engage with external communities to gain important feedback regarding what is 
most likely to be successful. For example, when a traditional clothing retailer, such as The Gap, 
must decide which designs to mass manufacture and release to the public, the decision is 
frequently made by the management hierarchy, with input from consumers, if any exists, filtered 
via a marketing or market research organization using tools such as focus groups. However, 
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when a firm such as Threadless desires to launch a new product, it has the user community vote 
directly on competing designs. In this manner, Threadless already has a good sense of a 
product’s potential consumer acceptance and demand before it manufactures the product. 
Organizations no longer need to rely primarily on traditional market research techniques like 
focus groups; they can directly engage a large subset of the user community to experiment with 
reactions to products before making final selections. 
Similar to the variation process, engaging communities outside an organization during the 
selection process allows for heterogeneous perspectives to be sampled before a decision is made. 
This gives experts in fields outside an organization’s core competencies the ability to identify 
potential challenges the organization might not have considered. These contributors can be 
professional experts, as when a biologist answers a physics-based problem on a competition 
website, but they can also be amateurs who have become “experts” with particular products. This 
often occurs with user-generated reviews: End-user customers contribute to e-commerce 
websites by posting product reviews, and then other customers vote on the level of helpfulness of 
the comment. In one recent instance, one of us received a catalog from a mail-order firm 
highlighting the top ten rated products on the firm’s website and offering discounts on those 
goods. The firm was engaging users to select products on which the firm then offered a 
promotional discount through its catalog, which blended the traditionally unidirectional world of 
mail order catalog merchandising with the digital world of customer ranking and ratings. 
 
Retention (by Communities) 
For an innovation to survive, the innovator must ensure that it is retained, diffused, and adopted 
by the community. The reduction of information constraints has important implications for the 
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diffusion of innovations, which has been an important topic of economic inquiry for many years 
(see Griliches, 1957, and Rogers, 1962, for early examples and Geroski, 2000, for an overview). 
The reduction of information constraints speeds communication about new innovations, but this 
means that organizations have less room for error in early versions of products. Big data and data 
analytics, enabled by major information cost reductions, allow organizations to mine their 
existing customers’ behaviors to better identify potential early adopters of new products; this can 
greatly improve the speed with which an innovation diffuses. However, it also causes an 
organization to increase its engagement with customers after they purchase the product. In many 
instances with today’s online products, the first thing users do when they start to engage with a 
product is create an account with the organization selling the product. This establishes a link 
between the organization and the user that represents an ongoing relationship, enabling the user 
to provide feedback to the organization that can be integrated into the innovation process. 
 Further, application marketplaces (e.g., Apple’s App Store, the Facebook App Center) 
have large captive audiences that developers want to reach. By using cloud hosting services (e.g., 
Heroku, Amazon Web Services), which integrate seamlessly with the marketplaces, developers 
are able to quickly and widely distribute applications to an audience well beyond what they 
could reach without such services. Additionally, utilizing cloud computing to host innovative 
applications allows organizations to experiment and update software-based products without 
requiring users to download a new version to their desktop after every update. 
Importantly, the world without information constraints not only allows for more rapid 
diffusion of information and physical goods but also allows for some physical goods to diffuse as 
rapidly as information goods via the invention of 3D printing. 3D printing enables individuals to 
send digital files of goods rather than sending actual physical goods. Receivers can then print 
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their own versions of a physical good from files they have received. Sending digital information 
that represents a physical good is much easier (and less expensive) than sending actual goods. 
 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
During the time we were writing this chapter, we frequently encountered situations in which we 
found ourselves thinking, “This is it! This is what we are writing about! This is innovating in a 
world without information constraints. This is an organization acting differently because 
information is essentially free.” An example occurred while we were researching incumbent 
organizations engaging with communities. One of us found GE’s open innovation call for 
participation, thought it was well executed, and tweeted the link with reference to the source.21 
Within 15 minutes, much to our surprise, GE tweeted back. That interchange represents exactly 
the type of organizational change examined herein. A decade ago, this type of interchange could 
never have happened. In addition to the technological constraints, there were organizational 
ones, particularly for large, hierarchical control–centric organizations. Before GE, or any large 
organization, distributed text publicly, it would need to go through an onerous approval loop. 
Today, embracing new tools and approaches enabled by reduced information constraints, GE has 
changed how it engages with the world and is publicly posting multiple tweets per hour, chatting 
with consumers and potential innovators. 
In this chapter, we explored the implications of information processing, storage, and 
communication costs approaching zero. We showed that the reduction of these costs allows 
organizations to engage with communities of laborers, developers, and users, and that this 
engagement leads to shifts in fundamental assumptions of traditional organizational theory. In 
                                                          
21“Tweeted” in this context refers to posting an update on the twitter.com website to a community of followers. 
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turn, these organizational shifts lead to new innovation methods. What we see with the simple 
social media interchange just described, and the phenomena from which it derived, is the 
instantiation of these shifts. 
The changes described herein lead to opportunities for theoretical and empirical research. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the existing assumptions that many fundamental organizational 
theories are built upon may no longer be accurate portrayals of a world without information 
constraints. Although the theories may still be valid, there are open questions as to which of them 
remain relevant in the modern world. From an empirical standpoint, it is logical to focus on 
changes to existing business models and development of entirely new ones. Mature organizations 
are struggling with new levels of interdependency and complexity as they share and engage more 
broadly and attempt to manage multiple logics simultaneously. Entrepreneurial organizations are 
emerging with entirely new approaches to managing innovation. These organizations and 
institutions are undergoing significant transitions, at multiple levels of analysis, which neither 
practitioners nor scholars fully understand. 
Quantitative and qualitative research methods should be employed to improve our 
knowledge of these phenomena and their theoretical implications. We see a wealth of research 
questions related to these studies. In particular, the value of free contributions by users also 
deserves further research. Is this value accounted for in productivity and growth measurements? 
Do organizations that utilize such free inputs have higher rates of return than their competitors? 
What drives users to contribute such free labor? Further, when traditionally product-centric 
organizations transition to platform-based marketplaces leveraging today’s environment with de 
minimis information constraints, what are the organizational and strategic ramifications? To 
what extent is organizational identity involved in these types of transitions? Can it help with the 
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transition, or is it always a hindrance? How do organizations that participate in another 
organization’s ecosystem balance their need to differentiate with the requirements of compliance 
when they are part of a community? These questions stem from the observation that we are 
living in a world where information is no longer expensive to process, store, or communicate, 
and this opens a world of innovation opportunities for individuals, organizations, and 
institutions. 
55 
 
REFERENCES 
Adner, R., & Kapoor, R. (2010). Value creation in innovation ecosystems: How the structure of 
technological interdependence affects firm performance in new technology generations. 
Strategic Management Journal, 31(3), 306–333. 
Adner, R. (2012). The wide lens. New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin. 
Afuah, A. (2003). Redefining firm boundaries in the face of the Internet: Are firms really 
shrinking? Academy of Management Review, 28(1), 34–53. 
Aker, J. C. (2010). Information from markets near and far: Mobile phones and agricultural 
markets in Niger. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(3), 46–59. 
Albert, S., & Whetten, D. A. (1985). Organizational identity. Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 7, 263–295. 
Allen, T. J. (1977). Managing the flow of technology: Technology transfer and the dissemination 
of technological information within the R&D organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Altman, E.J., Nagle, F., & Tushman, M. (2013). Technology and Innovation Management. In 
R.W. Griffin (Ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in Management. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Altman, E. J., & Tripsas, M. (2015). Product to platform transitions: Implications of 
organizational identity. In C. Shalley, M. Hitt, & J. Zhou (Eds.), Oxford handbook of 
creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurship: Multilevel linkages. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Anderson, J., Reitsma, R., Evans, P. F., & Jaddou, S. (2011). Understanding online shopper 
behaviors. Cambridge, MA: Forrester Research. 
Apple Inc. (2013). Apple’s App Store marks historic 50 billionth download. Retrieved from 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2013/05/16Apples-App-Store-Marks-Historic-50-
Billionth-Download.html.Arrow, K. J. (1975). Vertical integration and communication. 
The Bell Journal of Economics, 6(1), 173–183. 
Baldwin, C. Y., & Clark, K. B. (2000). Design rules. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Baldwin, C. Y., & von Hippel, E. (2011). Modeling a paradigm shift: From producer innovation 
to user and open collaborative innovation. Organization Science, 22, 1399–1417. 
Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: Towards a 
theory of institutional entrepreneurship. The Academy of Management Annals, 3(1), 65–
107. 
Benkler, Y. (2006). The wealth of networks: How social production transforms markets and 
freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Boudreau, K. (2010). Open platform strategies and innovation: Granting access vs. devolving 
control. Management Science, 56(10), 1849–1872. 
Bresnahan, T. F., Greenstein, S. M., & Henderson, R. M. (2011). Schumpeterian competition and 
diseconomies of scope: Illustrations from the histories of Microsoft and IBM (Working 
paper no. 11-077). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Strategy Unit. 
Brynjolfsson, E., Malone, T. W., Gurbaxani, V., & Kambil, A. (1994). Does information 
technology lead to smaller firms? Management Science, 40(12), 1628–1644. 
Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2011). Race against the machine: How the digital revolution is 
accelerating innovation, driving productivity, and irreversibly transforming employment 
and the economy. Lexington, MA: Digital Frontier Press. 
56 
 
Campbell, D. T. (1960). Blind variation and selective retentions in creative thought as in other 
knowledge processes. Psychological Review, 67(6), 380–400. 
Casadesus-Masanell, R., & Yoffie, D. B. (2007). Wintel: Cooperation and conflict. Management 
Science, 53(4), 584–598. 
Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of the industrial 
enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chandler, A. D. (1977). The visible hand: The managerial revolution in American business. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 
Chesbrough, H. W. (2003a). Environmental influences upon firm entry into new sub-markets: 
Evidence from the worldwide hard disk drive industry conditionally. Research Policy, 
32(4), 659–678. 
Chesbrough, H. W. (2003b). Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting 
from technology. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Chesbrough, H. W., & Appleyard, M. M. (2007). Open innovation and strategy. California 
Management Review, 50(1), 57–76. 
Christensen, C. M. (1993). The rigid disk drive industry: A history of commercial and 
technological turbulence. The Business History Review, 67(4)c 531–588. 
Christensen, C. M. (2006). The ongoing process of building a theory of disruption. Journal of 
Product Innovation Management, 23(1), 39–55. 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning 
and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128–152. 
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Dahlander, L., & Gann, D. M. (2010). How open is innovation? Research Policy, 39(6), 699–
709. 
Duan, W., Gu, B., & Whinston, A. B. (2008). The dynamics of online word-of-mouth and 
product sales—An empirical investigation of the movie industry. Journal of Retailing, 
84(2), 233–242. 
Dutton, J. E., & Dukerich, J. M. (1991). Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in 
organizational adaptation. Academy of Management Journal, 34(3), 517–554. 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 660–
679. 
Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., & Van Alstyne, M. (2011). Platform envelopment. Strategic 
Management Journal, 32(12), 1270–1285. 
Facebook. (2013, July 24). Facebook reports second quarter 2013 results. Retrieved from 
http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=780093 
Fiol, C. M. (2002). Capitalizing on paradox: The role of language in transforming organizational 
identities. Organization Science, 13(6), 653–666. 
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1996). Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects 
on organizations. Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: West Publishing. 
Friedland, R,. & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and 
institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new 
57 
 
institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 232–263). Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Gartner Inc. (2013). “Big data.” Gartner IT Glossary. Retrieved from http://www.gartner.com/it-
glossary/big-data/. 
Gawer, A., & Phillips, N. (2013). Institutional work as logics shift: The case of Intel’s 
transformation to platform leader. Organization Studies, 34(8), 1035–1071. 
General Electric Company. (2013). The Finest Print: GE Challenges Innovators to Design Jet 
Engine Parts, Print in 3D Complex Healthcare Components. Retrieved from  
http://www.gereports.com/post/77131814030/the-finest-print-ge-challenges-innovators-to 
Geroski, P. A. (2000). Models of technology diffusion. Research Policy, 29, 603–625. 
Gioia, D. A. (1998). From individual to organizational identity. In D. A. Whetten & P. C. 
Godfrey (Eds.), Identity in organizations: Building theory through conversations (pp. 17–
31). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Greenstein, S., & Nagle, F. (2014). Digital dark matter and the economic contribution of Apache. 
Research Policy, 43(4), 623-631. 
Greenstein, S., & Prince, J. (2007). The diffusion of the Internet and the geography of the digital 
divide in the United States. In R. Mansell, C. Avgerou, D. Quah, & R. Silverston (Eds.), 
Oxford handbook on information and communication technologies. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Greenwood, R., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: The Big 
Five accounting firms. The Academy of Management Journal, 49(1), 27–48. 
Griliches, Z. (1957). Hybrid corn: An exploration in the economics of technological change. 
Econometrica, 25(4), 501–522. 
Gulati, R. (1998). Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal, 19(4), 293–317. 
Gulati, R. (2007). Managing network resources: Alliances, affiliations and other relational 
assets. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Gulati, R., Puranam, P., & Tushman, M. (2012). Meta-organization design: Rethinking design in 
interorganizational and community contexts. Strategic Management Journal, 33(6), 571–
586. 
Hagiu, A., & Spulber, D. (2013). First-party content and coordination in two-sided markets. 
Management Science, 59(4), 933–949. 
Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2013). Marketplace or reseller? (Working paper no. 13-092). Boston, 
MA: Harvard Business School Strategy Unit. 
Harhoff, D., Henkel, J., & von Hippel, E. (2003). Profiting from voluntary information 
spillovers: how users benefit by freely revealing their innovations. Research Policy, 
32(10), 1753–1769. 
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990). Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy, 98(6), 1119–1158. 
Hilbert, M., & López, P. (2011). The world’s technological capacity to store, communicate, and 
compute information. Science, 332(6025), 60–65. 
Hitt, L. M. (1999). Information technology and firm boundaries: Evidence from panel data. 
Information Systems Research, 10(2), 134–149. 
Ibarra, H. (1999). Provisional selves: Experimenting with image and identity in professional 
adaptation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(4), 764–791. 
58 
 
Jaffe, A. B., & Lerner, J. (2004). Innovation and its discontents: How our broken patent system 
is endangering innovation and progress, and what to do about it. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Jensen, R. (2007). The digital provide: Information (technology), market performance, and 
welfare in the South Indian Fisheries Sector. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
122(3), 879–924. 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. 
Kaganer, E., Carmel, E., Hirscheim, R., & Olsen, T. (2013). Managing the human cloud. MIT 
Sloan Management Review 54(2), 23–32. 
Kaku, M. (2012). Physics of the future. New York, NY: DoubleDay. 
Katila, R., & Ahuja, G. (2002). Something old, something new: A longitudinal study of search 
behavior and new product introduction. The Academy of Management Journal, 45(6), 
1183–1194. 
Klein, B., Crawford, R., & Alchian, A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the 
competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2), 297–326. 
Koh, H., and Magee, C. L. (2006). A functional approach for studying technological progress: 
Application to information technology. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 
73, 1061–1083. 
Koomey, J. G. (2008). Worldwide electricity used in data centers. Environmental Research 
Letters 3(3). doi:10.1088/1748-9326-3-3-034008 
Kurzweil, R. (1999). The age of spiritual machines. New York, NY: Viking Penguin Books. 
Lakhani, K. R., & Kanji, Z. (2008). Threadless: The business of community (Multimedia/video 
case 608–707). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School.  
Lakhani, K., Lifshitz-Assaf, H., & Tushman, M. L. (2013). Open innovation and organizational 
boundaries: Task decomposition, knowledge distribution, and the locus of innovation. In 
A. Grandori (Ed.), Handbook of economic organization: Integrating economic and 
organization theory (pp. 355–382). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Lakhani, K. R., & Von Hippel, E. (2003). How open source software works: “Free” user-to-user 
assistance. Research Policy 32(6), 923–943. 
Latif, L. (2013, April 2). AMD claims 20-nm transition signals the end of Moore’s Law. The 
Inquirer 
Lawrence, T. B., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutions and institutional work. In S. R. Clegg, C. 
Hardy, T. Lawrence, & W. R. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of organization studies (2nd ed., 
pp. 215–254). London, England: Sage Publications. 
Lifshitz-Assaf, H. (2013). From problem solvers to solution seekers: Dismantling Knowledge 
Boundaries at NASA (Working paper). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School. 
Liu, Y. (2006). Word of mouth for movies: Its dynamics and impact on box office. Journal of 
Marketing, 70(3), 74–89. 
Lounsbury, M. 2007. A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in the 
professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2), 289–307. 
Luca, M. (2011). Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of Yelp.com (Working paper no. 
12-016). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School. 
Maguire, S., Hardy, C., & Lawrence, T. B. (2004). Institutional entrepreneurship in emerging 
fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. The Academy of Management Journal, 
47(5), 657–679. 
59 
 
Malone, T. W., Yates, J., & Benjamin, R. I. (1987). Electronic markets and electronic 
hierarchies. Communications of the ACM, 30(6): 484-497. 
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York, NY: Wiley. 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 2(1), 71–87. 
Maskell, P. (2000). Social capital, innovation, and competitiveness. In S. Baron, J. Field, & T. 
Schuller (Eds.), Social capital: Critical perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Merritt, R. (2013, May 23). Broadcom: Time to prepare for the end of Moore’s Law. EE Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1263256. 
Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. 
Moore, G. E. (1965). Cramming more components onto integrated circuits. Electronics, 38(8), 
114–117. 
Nagle, F. (2013). Predicting firm value based on social media sentiment about competitors 
(Working paper). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School. 
Needleman, S. E. (2010, June 21). Managing at a distance: New websites help managers at small 
companies keep closer track of their freelancers’ work. The Wall Street Journal. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703862704575100221456493514. 
Nielsen, J. (2010). Nielsen’s law of Internet bandwidth. Retrieved from 
http://www.nngroup.com/articles/law-of-bandwidth/. 
Norris, P. (2001). Digital divide: Civic engagement, information poverty, and the Internet 
worldwide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
Norton, W. B. (2010). Internet transit prices—Historical and projected [Peering White Papers 
Series]. Retrieved from http://drpeering.net/white-papers/Internet-Transit-Pricing-
Historical-And-Projected.php. 
Nuance Communications. (2013). Second quarter fiscal 2013 earnings announcement [Prepared 
conference call remarks], (p. 21). 
Okhuysen, G. A., & Bechky, B. A. (2009). Coordination in organizations: An integrative 
perspective. The Academy of Management Annals, 3(1), 463–502. 
O’Mahony, S. (2003). Guarding the commons: How community-managed software projects 
protect their work. Research Policy, 32, 1179–1198. 
O’Mahony, S., & Ferraro, F. (2007). The emergence of governance in an open source 
community. Academy of Management Journal 50(5), 1079–1106. 
O’Mahony, S., & Lakhani, K. R. (2011). Organizations in the shadow of communities. In C. 
Marquis, M. Lounsbury, & R. Greenwood (Eds.), Research in the Sociology of 
Organizations, Vol. 33: Communities and organizations. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group 
Publishing. 
O’Reilly, C. A., III, & Tushman, M. L. (2008). Ambidexterity as a dynamic capability: 
Resolving the innovator’s dilemma. Research in Organizational Behavior 28, 185–206. 
Parker, G. G., & Van Alstyne, M. W. (2005). Two-sided network effects: A theory of 
information product design. Management Science 51(10), 1494–1504. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
60 
 
Piskorski, M. J. (2013). Social strategy: Why social media platforms work and how to leverage 
them for competitive advantage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Piskorski, M. J., & Gorbatai, A. (2013). Testing Coleman’s social-norm enforcement 
mechanism: Evidence from Wikipedia (Working paper no. 11-055). Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Strategy Unit. 
Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of the corporation. Harvard Business 
Review, 68(3), 79–91. 
Rogers, E. M. (1962). Diffusion of innovations. New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Rosenkopf, L., & Nerkar, A. (2001). Beyond local search: boundary-spanning, exploration, and 
impact in the optical disk industry. Strategic Management Journal, 22(4), 287–306. 
Rothaermel, F. T. (2001). Incumbent’s advantage through exploiting complementary assets via 
interfirm cooperation. Strategic Management Journal, 22(6–7), 687–699. 
Santos, F. M., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2005). Organizational boundaries and theories of 
organization. Organization Science, 16(5), 491–508. 
Shah, S. K. (2006). Motivation, governance, and the viability of hybrid forms in open source 
software development. Management Science 52(7), 1000–1014. 
Shirky, C. (2008). Here comes everybody: The power of organizing without organizations. New 
York, NY: Penguin Press. 
Simchi-Levi, D., Kaminsky, S., & Simchi-Levi, E. (1999). Designing and managing the supply 
chain: Concepts, strategies, and cases. Lexington, MA: McGraw-Hill. 
Simon, H. A. (1945/1997). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in 
administrative organization (4th ed.). New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 69(1), 99–118. 
Smith, W. K., & Tushman, M. L. (2005). Managing strategic contradictions: A top management 
model for managing innovation streams. Organization Science, 16(5), 522–536. 
Staw, B. M. (1990). An evolutionary approach to creativity and innovation. In M. A. West & J. 
L. Farr (Eds.), Innovation and creativity at work: Psychological and organizational 
strategies (pp. 287–308). Oxford, England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Steel, E., & Fowler, G. A. (2010, October 18). Facebook in privacy breach: Top-ranked 
applications transmit personal IDs, a Journal investigation finds. Wall Street Journal. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304772804575558484075236968. 
Teece, D. J. 1982. Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 3(1), 39–63. 
Teece, D. J. (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(13), 1319–1350. 
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative theory. 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency of 
power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 
1958–1990. American Journal of Sociology, 105(3), 801–843. 
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics perspective: A 
new approach to culture, structure and process. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
61 
 
Trapasso, E., & Vujanic, A. (2010). Investment in open source software set to rise, Accenture 
survey finds [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://newsroom.accenture.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=5045. 
Tripsas, M. (2009). Technology, identity, and inertia through the lens of “The Digital 
Photography Company.” Organization Science, 20(2), 441–460. 
Tushman, M. L. (1977). Special boundary roles in the innovation process. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 22(4), 587–605. 
Tushman, M. L., & Nadler, D. A. (1978). Information processing as an integrating concept in 
organizational design. Academy of Management Review, 3(3), 613–624. 
Tushman, M. L., & O’Reilly, C. A., III. (1996). Ambidextrous organizations: Managing 
evolutionary and revolutionary change. California Management Review, 38(4), 8–30. 
Von Hippel, E. (2009). Democratizing innovation: The evolving phenomenon of user innovation. 
International Journal of Innovation Science 1(1), 29–40. 
Warschauer, M. (2003). Technology and social inclusion: Rethinking the digital divide. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Welch Allyn. (2011). Welch Allyn introduces High-Performance Healthcare technology at 
Medica 2011: Medical device manufacturer will showcase its newest line of platform-
based connected and configurable solutions, demonstrate telehealth solution with Cisco 
[Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20111115005064/en/Welch-Allyn-Introduces-
High-Performance-Healthcare%E2%84%A2-Technology-Medica#.VI4rWv10w5s. 
Welch Allyn. (2013). Developer information for Device Connectivity Software Developer Kit. 
Dusseldorf, Germany: Welch Allyn. 
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York, 
NY: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. (1981). The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. The 
American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 548–577. 
Zhu, F., & Iansiti, M. (2012). Entry into platform-based markets. Strategic Management Journal, 
33(1), 88–106. 
 
  
 62 
 
Chapter 2:  Dependency Challenges, Response Strategies, and Complementor 
Maturity: Joining a Multi-Sided Platform Ecosystem 
 
 
Elizabeth J. Altman  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Complementors gain market opportunities by joining ecosystems; they also face challenges from 
relationships with multi-sided platform ecosystems. Prior research provides insights on 
emergence, growth, and competition between platforms and ecosystems. This research focuses 
on managerial challenges and strategic and organizational responses of complementors joining 
ecosystems. Asymmetries lead to dependencies, which I categorize into three types: 1) 
technological, 2) information, and 3) values-based. Based on a three and a half year qualitative 
inductive field-based study, this research finds the organization responds with combinations of 
three strategies: compliance, influence, and innovation. Over time, the organization passes 
through three phases of complementor maturity changing the relative emphasis on each strategy. 
This chapter contributes to platform, ecosystem, and organizational theory research by: 1) 
exploring relationships between complementors and dependencies, 2) articulating complementor 
response strategies, and 3) introducing phases of complementor maturity and outlining how, 
when, and why an organization moves through these phases. 
 
 
Keywords: Managing Innovation, Multi-Sided Platform, Ecosystem, Dependence, 
Complementors, Asymmetric Inter-organizational Relationships, Complementor Maturity 
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“You know how in America we never dip our flag to anybody? At the Olympic Games, you 
know... We never dip our flag, period. Well, I feel like we kind of dipped our flag.”   
        - Zuni manager, 2-8-12 
 
“So, dipping our flag? I’ll dip…I’ll dip… because I know that I’m still in the end delivering a 
better experience than anybody else can.”  
        - The same Zuni manager, 8-26-14 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Some products work better when they are combined with others; a baseball glove is not useful 
unless one also has a baseball. A computer, smartphone or tablet becomes more valuable when a 
user downloads and uses software applications (also known as “apps”) or adds accessories. With 
the growing prevalence of products that include open interfaces, products are becoming 
increasingly more interdependent such that users purchase accessory products, or complements, 
which they use to realize the full potential of their purchases (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; 
Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Accessories exist in the form of software apps and as hardware 
products such as cases, keyboards, headphones, speakers, memory sticks, trackballs, etc. To 
access large markets, organizations that create these complementary products join ecosystems 
and become dependent upon other firms to provide interface specifications, guidelines, 
requirements, technological components, and so on. In many cases, firms that produce products 
that benefit from accessories operate multi-sided platform (MSP) businesses that facilitate 
interactions between buyers of their core products (e.g., smartphones) and producers of 
complementary products (e.g., smartphone accessories). As an increasing percentage of the 
world’s most valuable and influential firms operate platform-based business models (Gawer & 
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Cusumano, 2002; Regalado, 2014; The Economist, 2014), there is growing interest in the effects 
of these businesses on the complementors dependent upon them.  
 Examples of multi-sided platform-based businesses include:  Google Play (formerly 
Android Market), which enables developers to sell apps to Android phone consumers; Amazon 
Marketplace, which facilitates third party vendors to sell used and new goods to consumers; and 
Internet dating sites, which allow individuals to interact with others looking for relationships. 
Research on platform-based businesses continues to increase with recent articles organizing 
platform literature and providing definitions and typologies (e.g., Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; 
Gawer, 2014; Thomas, Autio, & Gann, 2014). Much of the research in this area focuses on the 
emergence of platforms and competition between them finding that network effects generally 
play a role in their success (Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; 
Zhu & Iansiti, 2012).  A burgeoning area of research emphasizes strategic decision-making 
related to platform governance and differentiation and its impact on competition outcomes 
finding there are trade-offs to governance structures, including a platform’s hierarchy (Bresnahan 
& Greenstein, 2014). Throughout this work, platform-based businesses are the focal unit of 
analysis and implications for complementors remain either secondary or left un-addressed. 
 Ecosystem research has focused on challenges and opportunities of ecosystem creation 
(Moore, 1993, 1996), competition (Iyer, Lee, Venkatraman, 2006; Adner, Oxley, & Silverman, 
2013), and technology emergence and substitution (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Adner & 
Kapoor, 2015).22 Ecosystem-focused scholars commonly find that creating and successfully 
                                                          
22 Research relevant to the study of ecosystems also sometimes refers to systems of producers and markets as value 
networks such as in Christensen & Rosenbloom (1995). The definition of a value network, however, does not imply 
the existence of complementors; though, the study of these inter-related interdependent systems are valuable to 
understanding the broader phenomena of ecosystems that include complementors.  
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managing a strong ecosystem of complementors is beneficial to a focal firm (Adner, 2012; Iansiti 
& Levien, 2004), though governance of these ecosystems may also create tensions through the 
emergence of contradictory logics and paradoxical tensions (Wareham, Fox, & Giner, 2014). 
Further, in the emerging management-centered ecosystem literature, researchers have been 
studying trade-offs associated with ecosystem management decisions such as opening 
participation to all actors versus limiting involvement via compliance criteria finding that the 
number of participants on a platform is linked to innovation and investment (Boudreau, 2012). 
Scholars are also applying the complementary asset framework (Teece, 1986) in the context of 
entrants into new industries exploring how complementarities and competition affect strategies 
of these new entrants (Kapoor & Furr, 2014). Still, with few exceptions, this work mostly centers 
on platform owners and managers and stops short of extending findings to managerial 
implications for complementor organizations. These under-studied firms constitute a multi-
billion dollar worldwide industry and increasingly face challenges associated with interfacing 
with large powerful platform managers (such as Apple, Samsung, and Facebook).23  
 To study challenges and response strategies of complementors operating in multi-sided 
platform-based ecosystems, I explored the research question:  What are the strategic and 
organizational issues associated with mature, independent organizations joining established 
ecosystems? In particular, what challenges does an organization face as it enters into asymmetric 
relationships, and how does the organization respond to these challenges? Are these challenges 
and responses different in the context of MSP-based businesses and their complementors, or are 
they similar to those present in other asymmetric interfirm relationships (e.g., buyer-supplier, 
alliances, etc.). Because of the limited existing research related to this topic, I utilized an 
                                                          
23 For example, Strategy Analytics, a reputable industry analyst firm, recently forecast global total apps revenues of 
$33.7B (MacQueen, 2014). 
 66 
 
inductive theory-building approach with a longitudinal single case study design that spanned 
three and a half years and included semi-structured interviews, observation, and archival 
research. I studied this question from the perspective of an incumbent organization joining 
ecosystems as a complementor and investigated challenges experienced by a division of an 
accessory provider as it strived to balance maintaining its own independence and growth 
aspirations with an emerging need to operate as a member of ecosystems managed by large and 
powerful central firms.24  
 My analysis shows we can use theories related to dependency, power, influence, and 
organizational identity to better understand challenges complementor organizations face as they 
join ecosystems, particularly when these organizations are mature incumbents entering 
asymmetric relationships. I have identified three types of dependencies prevalent in such 
situations: 1) technological, 2) information, and 3) values-based. Analyzing data from this study, 
I am able to identify three response strategies the organization invoked to manage these 
dependencies: 1) compliance, 2) influence, and 3) innovation. Further, I propose that over time 
the complementor organization followed multi-pronged strategies that employed a combination 
of these responses, and the composition of these strategies shifted as the complementor gained 
experience operating in the ecosystem. The research findings suggest that as the complementor 
became more mature in its approach to participating in ecosystems, it changed the relative 
emphasis it placed on each of the response strategies. I outline three phases of complementor 
maturity and the variation in response strategies. The findings also suggest that the proportional 
emphasis the organization placed on response strategies during maturity phases may be 
                                                          
24 Although the focal division at Zuni was exploring options to offer complementor products in multiple ecosystems, 
during the time of this study, its primary focus was on providing products to work with Apple products. Thus, the 
vast majority of my data relates to Zuni’s interactions with, and challenges related to, offering products to work with 
Apple products. 
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associated with dimensions of the organization’s existing and evolving identity. In support of this 
finding, I have induced a model illustrating the relationships between theoretical concepts 
identified in this study. Taken together, this analysis of response strategy and complementor 
maturity provides a new way to understand how complementor organizations manage when they 
are engaged in relationships with powerful platform managers. It also adds new insights to our 
understanding of dependencies in interfirm relationships. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Multi-sided platforms, ecosystems, and complementors 
Across platform-related research, the term platform is used with varying definitions. Hagiu and 
Wright (2015a) present a definition for multi-sided platforms (MSPs) (also sometimes referred to 
as multi-sided markets or multi-sided networks) suggesting MSPs are organizations that enable 
or facilitate direct interactions between two or more groups of participants. This is the definition 
I adopt since my research is focused on platform-based businesses in the context of relationships 
with complementors, or firms that independently offer complementary products or services to 
mutual customers (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Yoffie & Kwak, 2006).25,26,27 This 
definition envisions MSPs as enabling a triangular set of relationships in which the MSP and 
                                                          
25 Though firms investigated in this paper are technology-related, this research does not address computer platforms 
(Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999), nor general technology platforms (Kim & Kogut, 1996; Meyer & Seliger, 1998; 
Economides & Katsamakas, 2006), nor specific decisions related to technology platform choices (Boudreau, 2010). 
 
26 MSPs at the center of systems of complementors are also sometimes referred to as “platform managers” 
(Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006), which is terminology I also use here. The term “platform manager” is 
particularly appropriate when an MSP, such as a smartphone provider, does not create its own platform technology 
in its entirety, but rather adopts and modifies a technology (e.g., Android software), and then manages an ecosystem 
associated with that MSPs version of the technology integrated with their products (e.g., smartphones).  
 
27 When I refer to a complementor in this paper, I mean complementors to MSP-based businesses. At the extreme, 
any business model that includes a complementor can be considered to be an MSP. 
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complementor maintain independent relationships with a customer. This definition contrasts with 
a supplier-buyer-customer (or reseller) business model characterized by linear relationships in 
which a supplier sells to a buyer (or reseller), which sells to a customer. (See Figure 2.1 for 
schematic diagrams contrasting linear with triangular business models.) Complementors, taken 
together with the MSP they complement, are sometimes referred to as an MSP’s ecosystem.28  
 
Linear Business Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multi-Sided Platform Business Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 While the term “business ecosystem” often also encompasses suppliers and customers of a focal firm, for this 
paper though suppliers and customers are not explicitly excluded from the definition, the primary emphasis is on the 
complementors that are part of an MSP’s ecosystem. Additionally, when I refer to an ecosystem, I generally mean 
MSP-governed ecosystems in which an MSP is enabling interactions between complementors and customers. 
Multi-Sided 
Platform 
Business 
Side A 
(e.g., Complementor) 
Direct Interaction 
Side B 
(e.g., Customer)  
Affiliation Affiliation 
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Buyer/Reseller  
Direct 
Interaction 
Direct 
Interaction 
Figure 2.1 Business model schematics 
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 Whereas not strictly true of all MSPs, for ones most relevant to this research, indirect 
network effects generally play a role in the success of these platforms as the increasing presence 
of apps or complements on one side brings value to users on the other side (Rochet & Tirole, 
2003; Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). Research has shown this 
to have been true in the Personal Digital Assistant market in which a dearth of third party 
software applications negatively impacted the evolution of the hardware market (Nair, 
Chintagunta, & Dubé, 2004) and in the video game industry in which both pricing and game 
variety affected market growth (Clements & Ohashi, 2005). This is also true for ecosystems 
around smartphones and tablets, the setting for this study:  the more third-party developed apps 
and accessories become available for products, the more value a user can derive from a 
smartphone or tablet. However, these network effects are not necessarily beneficial for any given 
complementor because they encourage increased market entry for competing complementors and 
thus enable less power versus an MSP to accrue to any individual complementor. This dynamic 
is one of the primary reasons why this research focuses primarily on dependencies rather than 
interdependencies between complementors and MSPs. As more complementors join an MSP’s 
ecosystem, the MSP’s power to dictate terms of engagement increases. Complementors remain 
dependent on MSPs along multiple dimensions, but MSPs become less dependent on any 
particular complementor (Boudreau, 2012).  
 Research related to complementors generally addresses strategic decisions platform firms 
face relative to complementors, such as first-mover advantages and standardization (Cusumano, 
Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992), whether or not to treat complementors as complementors or 
suppliers (Hagiu & Wright, 2015a and b), pricing structure decisions (Armstrong, 2006), 
implications of modularity on ecosystem relationships (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), strategies on 
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whether or not MSPs  should compete against complementors (Gawer & Henderson, 2007), or 
more recently organizational challenges MSPs face as the locus of value creation moves to 
networks of complementors (Kapoor, 2013). In this research, rather than keeping MSPs as the 
center of inquiry, I focus on challenges faced by complementors of MSP-based organizations.  
 There is scant work investigating the effects of core firm behaviors on complementors 
(Pierce, 2009) and taking the perspective of complementors. An exception to this is 
Venkatraman and Lee’s (2004) study of the U.S. video game sector, which provides an excellent 
explanation of the important role of complementors as it examines video game console 
manufacturers and their complementors (game developers) and relationships between 
complementors. This research utilized network theory to analyze game developers’ choices 
regarding platform linkages. They found that game developers’ choices are affected by macro 
network characteristics (e.g., density) as well as platform attributes (e.g., newness) and that a 
combination of these characteristics must be considered for each case. Whereas these researchers 
consider dependencies arising in complementor networks, they do not delve into types of 
dependencies nor address response strategies to them as the research in this chapter does. 
 Another exception is emerging work related to mobile applications. Researchers have 
found that the great volume of app entry creates difficulties related to marketing and 
commercialization, specifically matching products and consumers and particularly causing 
challenges for entrepreneurs (Bresnahan, Davis, & Yin, 2014). Though this work is one of the 
few studies specifically exploring challenges from the perspective of complementors, in this case 
app suppliers, it still focuses on market-related challenges of product competition. This chapter 
complements that work by centering on management challenges associated with these 
organizations becoming complementors. 
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 Within related research streams there is also growing interest in the role of 
complementors. For example, within engineering management literature, Kude, Dibbern, and 
Heinzl (2012) study the enterprise software industry and explore complementor firm’s 
motivation to partner with large platforms or what they refer to has “hubs.” They find that the 
reputation of the hub and its ability to provide integrated systems play a role in complementor 
motivation, and more importantly that the level of product complementarity with the hub 
explains variation in how much a hub’s innovativeness drives participation. Although this study 
is one of the few to explore complementor motivations, it doesn’t consider the nature of the 
dependencies between the complementors and hubs and how this drives responses. Additionally, 
marketing scholars are recognizing the importance of MSPs, especially as they relate to sales of 
software and hardware. Binken & Stremersch (2009) study the effect of superstar software 
games in the video game console industry finding that the introduction of a superstar game (e.g., 
Super Mario 64) has a sizable effect on hardware console sales. This research brings a marketing 
perspective to the study of MSPs and ecosystems, and emphasizes the role of complementors, 
but again does not focus on organization-level challenges and responses of these complementors.  
 Information science and software engineering scholars are starting to address challenges 
of building and governing platform-based businesses and software ecosystems (Costa, Silva, 
Santos, Werner, & Oliveira, 2013). Jansen, Finkelstein, Brinkkemper (2009: 187) defined 
software ecosystems as: “a set of businesses functioning as a unit and interacting with a shared 
market for software and services, together with the relationships among them.” They present a 
research agenda encompassing technical and business elements and highlighting a range of 
challenges including establishing ecosystem relationships, managing release timing and quality, 
portfolio and product planning, and knowledge management.  
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 Open innovation, or the movement towards firms soliciting innovative contributions from 
external parties, is being recognized by information science and management scholars as being 
related to MSPs and their ecosystems with research addressing ecosystem management and 
governance. Among others, some research questions address levels of openness versus 
proprietary approaches (Selander, Henfridsson, & Svahn, 2010; West, 2003). Additionally, since 
organizations in MSP-governed ecosystems create value through networks of co-specialized 
firms, this work is also related to burgeoning work on market and industry architecture 
(Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; Ferraro & Gurses, 2009; Ozcan & Santos, 2014). Still, in 
general this research remains focused on ecosystem conveners and managers rather than on 
participants or complementors and the challenges associated with dependencies they face. 
 
Dependency  
Within organizational research, scholars have long noted that organizational structure and 
associated relationships often echo relationships between technological products and/or services 
(Barley, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In the context of interfirm relationships, we see a 
similar pattern with MSP businesses and their ecosystems of complementors. Complementor 
products enhance MSP products and have connections to them (in some cases physically through 
hardware and software interfaces; in others only virtually). This is true also of complementor 
organizations that develop and maintain affiliations with one or more MSP-based organizations. 
  Dependency between organizations has been the subject of much research related to 
interfirm relationships and resulting strategic and managerial challenges (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  Dependence (and specifically resource dependence), interdependency, and relationships 
associated with these concepts have been studied by scholars in a range of fields including 
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sociology (Emerson, 1962; Blau, 1964/1986), organizational theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
strategy (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Holm, Eriksson, & Johanson, 1999; Kim, Hoskisson, & 
Wan, 2004), and management (Bode, Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011; Buchanan, 1992).  
 Scholars have used resource dependence theory to consider organizations as entities that 
rely on an exchange of resources with external organizations such as suppliers, competitors, 
regulators, and so on (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008; Ozcan 
& Santos, 2014). These external entities are similar in some respects to complementors in that 
they impact the performance of the focal entity. More specifically, products and services offered 
by complementors to customers of MSPs (e.g., accessories) depend on products and technologies 
of MSPs to function appropriately. Thus, it is useful to consider organization-level dependencies 
between MSPs and their complementors. Put another way, referring back to the triangle diagram 
in Figure 2.1, not only do complementors have an affiliation with an MSP, but they also 
experience dependencies from the MSP since they rely on the MSP for certain critical resources. 
In the literature on dependency, power imbalance, and interfirm relationships, there is minimal 
research on effective strategies for organizations that are in the less powerful position such as is 
the case with complementors joining ecosystems of MSPs more powerful than they are. 
 When an incumbent organization joins an ecosystem managed by a larger platform 
manager, an asymmetric relationship (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Katila, 
Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008) is created between the two. Scholars have studied asymmetric 
inter-organizational relationships and found they exhibit dependencies (Uzzi, 1997; Doz, 1988; 
Staudenmayer, Tripsas, & Tucci, 2005).  The platform manager may exert power (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Nye, 2011) over the ecosystem joiner in the form of imposing constraints, such 
as technological specifications and branding guidelines. Gulati & Sytch (2007) studied 
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procurement relationships and found that joint dependence improved the performance of such 
relationships, yet this effect was partially mediated by factors such as joint activities and the 
quality of communication between partners. With complementors, there also can be joint 
dependence, particularly early in an MSP’s development when MSPs need complementors to 
gain traction, and there may be shared activities (e.g., marketing) and communication between 
entities. Accordingly, these theories are pertinent to complementor relationships, and this chapter 
extends the existing work by distinguishing more finely the types of dependencies evident 
between complementors and MSPs and complementor response strategies to address them. 
 Customer and supplier relationships have been the subject of considerable research 
exploring the influence of dependencies on inter-organizational learning, value creation, and 
performance (Helper, MacDuffie, & Sabel, 2000; Gulati & Sytch; 2007). Alliance researchers 
have noted that risks and dependencies may be accompanied by behavior monitoring that may 
generate tension between firms (Das & Teng, 2001). This is similar to that seen with 
complementors such as with auditing requirements and compliance testing. However, the 
existing research does not articulate the nature and type of these tensions, nor responses to them. 
Further, it does not articulate how dependencies and responses in the contexts of MSPs are 
similar in some respects, but quite distinct in others, due to the nature of MSP-based 
relationships particularly vis a vis customer interactions. 
 Beyond alliances and supplier relationships, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) considered 
resource dependence in the context of mergers and acquisitions in which power imbalance and 
mutual dependence affected organizations in opposing ways, reducing dependency. These 
dependencies may be related to those seen in complementor relationships because they include 
power imbalance and mutual dependence, but the context of acquisitions is quite different than 
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complementors in that the outcome is the dissolution of the original studied organization. 
Though dependencies may be similar as the M&A process begins, as relationships mature, those 
in an M&A environment eventually resolve through the creation of a singular entity. Those in 
complementor relationships, in contrast, evolve with organizations working to maintain 
independence. Additionally, even within the M&A context, the evolution over time of 
organizational responses to dependencies seems yet to have been fully addressed.  
 Since the data in this study spans a multi-year time period, I am able to examine how 
power imbalances and dependencies in MSP complementor ecosystems affect an organization as 
it becomes a more sophisticated complementor and how this variation affects its responses to 
dependencies. My research suggests that in relationships between complementors and MSPs, 
dependencies emerge and therefore theories that consider dependencies between organizations 
are a useful lens through which to further explore these relationships. For this study, I adopt a 
broad definition of dependency as situations in which an organization relies upon or needs 
important or critical resources from another organization and for which there are limited or no 
alternatives (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Buchanan, 1992).  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research design and setting 
This chapter is based on a qualitative inductive field-based research study spanning three and a 
half years starting in the fall of 2011 and continuing through the spring of 2015 with Zuni (a 
disguised name), a large well-established global technology-based accessory provider. Zuni 
participates as a complementor to multi-sided platform businesses. Other consumer electronics 
firms, both large and small, from Japan, Korea, China, Europe, and the US participate in these 
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markets as well. For the MSP-based markets in which Zuni competes, one side of the MSP 
market is accessory providers like Zuni and the other is users of smartphones, tablets, etc. The 
MSP is a firm like Apple or Samsung, which by selling smartphones that are customizable from 
both hardware and software perspectives enables interactions between accessory providers and 
end users. It is important to note that Zuni retains its relationships with its customers, selling 
accessories directly and through retailers.29  
 The selection of this setting was appropriate for this research inquiry because during the 
time of this fieldwork the business was in the process of joining powerful ecosystems in which 
the division needed to abide by policies determined and enforced by firms that had more market 
influence than it did. It was actively starting to provide products compatible with one large 
platform manager’s products (Apple’s). It was also considering joining other ecosystems during 
the course of the study (initially for Microsoft, Blackberry, and various providers of Android 
products, and later in the study specifically for Samsung as it emerged as a market leader). 
Whereas the dynamics of MSP businesses and their related ecosystems are characterized by 
interdependencies (Thompson, 1967) between entities, this chapter focuses on dependencies and 
less on interdependencies because there is large asymmetry between Zuni and the platform 
managers running the ecosystems in which Zuni operated as a complementor. Consequently, the 
relationship was dominated by dependencies more than by interdependencies. 
 Competitors to Zuni were starting to provide products for these ecosystems, so Zuni 
recognized the opportunity and need to do so. Environmental factors forced the division to make 
strategic decisions that it might not have otherwise chosen to pursue. This is important because 
                                                          
29 Though Zuni also supplies accessories directly to Apple as a small part of its business, the supply relationship 
with Zuni is not the focus of this inquiry. This is reasonable from a research design standpoint because the vast 
majority of Zuni’s products that work with Apple products are not sold through Apple, but rather through other 
retailers such as Best Buy or wholesale clubs in the United States. 
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in much of the platform and ecosystem literature there are implicit assumptions that firms join 
platform-based ecosystems due to growth aspirations. Whereas there were clearly economic 
motivations in this case, there was also a sense of unwillingness and inevitability. If it had been 
possible for this division to maintain its growth trajectory without having to become compliant 
with a powerful ecosystem manager’s constraints, it probably would have done so. Hence, this 
site provides an interesting window into a very successful incumbent organization facing a new 
competitive reality in which growth is via joining an ecosystem, even if reluctantly. 
 The field study site is the headquarters for a division that designs and sells products that 
work with other electronics devices. Zuni has a long history as an independent company with a 
strong brand name. It had to modify its competitive strategy (Barney, 1986) and operations in a 
few divisions because technology evolved such that to develop and sell new innovative products 
it needed to establish relationships with firms providing products with which its products 
worked. The focal division at Zuni became very successful during this study, and that success in 
large measure resulted from devices that worked with (and connected to) Apple products. Sales 
and profit numbers for this division are unpublished, so cannot be included here. However, based 
on confidential interview data there is evidence they have grown steadily from an economic 
standpoint, and also in organizational size and market influence. Revenue and profitability have 
increased substantially. The number of people in the division has grown dramatically. Internally, 
managers of this division have taken leadership roles for initiatives that span the parent 
corporation. And, although this study includes primarily Zuni’s activities related to the Apple 
ecosystem, by the end of the study they were actively starting to participate in other similar 
ecosystems such as Microsoft’s, Samsung’s, and others. 
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 The qualitative case study research approach is an empirical inquiry applicable when 
investigating phenomena within a real-life context, and contributes to appropriate 
methodological fit when the phenomena lends itself to nascent theory building  (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Yin, 2009). This research employs a single holistic case 
study design in which the unit of analysis is a product division (Ragin & Becker, 1992). The 
division is a reasonable unit of analysis rather than the entire firm because the division is a self-
contained business unit undergoing a specific business transition (see Galunic & Eisenhardt, 
1996 for a thorough review of division-centric research). The relationship the division has with 
the platform manager is managed primarily at the division level. The division is a fast growing 
part of the business that contributes a significant share of profits to the parent firm. The study is a 
revelatory case (Yin, 2009) since researchers have not had prior access to this type of field site 
over a prolonged period of time to observe and analyze the phenomenon of a complementor’s 
evolving relationship with a more powerful platform manager.  
Finally, this study is an extreme case where the phenomena can be very clearly seen. This 
is true because both the primary platform manager (Apple) and the complementor (Zuni) have 
characteristics that are extreme compared to peer organizations.  Apple is known to be 
exceptionally strict and challenging in its relationships with complementors, thus providing a 
case of a highly demanding platform manager. Further, this division of Zuni is a very well-
known, highly respected, technology-driven, profitable organization. During this study, Zuni 
became highly dependent upon Apple for continued commercial success and growth.  
Data collection 
This study follows rigorous qualitative field-based research methods. The data include 60 
longitudinal cross-functional and cross-level semi-structured field interviews and archival 
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research. I conducted 56 semi-structured field interviews with all members of the senior 
management team of the division in the fall and spring of 2011-2012, in the spring of 2013, in 
the spring and summer of 2014, and a few confirmatory interviews in the winter and spring of 
2015 providing a rich set of longitudinal data. (See Table 1 for interview details).  
Table 2.1  Data Collection:  Interview Timing and Distribution 
Interview Block Start Date End Date Approximate 
Timespan 
Interview 
Numbers 
First Interview Block September 2011 March 2012 7 months # 1 - #16 
Second Interview Block March 2013 June 2013 4 months #17 - #32 
Third Interview Block March 2014 August 2014 6 months #33 - #54 
Confirmatory 
Interviews 
February 2015 March 2015 1 month #55 - #56 
Expert Additions January 2012 March 2015 4 years #57 - #60 
 
 
Interviews of the management team included the division general manager, direct reports, 
and those who do not have direct reporting responsibility but served on the senior leadership 
team, for example human resources and finance leaders. An interesting feature of this data set is 
that the focal division experienced essentially no turnover at the management level during the 
time of this study. Thus, I was able to conduct repeat interviews with individual members of the 
management team over consecutive years. The data also include a sample of non-senior 
leadership team members ranging from product managers to analysts. During interviews, once 
respondents became comfortable with the interview format, they were willing to tell stories and 
explain situations that did not always cast the division in a positive light, and which were very 
useful during data analysis. This was particularly true in later interview rounds, by which time 
respondents had known me for a few years and had developed a trust and understanding that 
seemed to lead to disclosure of candid observations and organizational insights.  
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 I also conducted formal interviews with industry experts familiar with MSPs and 
ecosystem-based businesses to test concepts and support development of interview questions. A 
formal interview with a former Zuni employee provided cultural and identity related insights. 
More informal conversations with other members of this and related industries informed the 
research questions as well. The average interview lasted approximately 60 minutes, and length 
ranged from approximately 30 to 90 minutes. Interviews involved cross-functional staff 
members, including employees from marketing, research, product development, etc. This 
eliminated bias that might result from interviewing only employees from specific functional 
organizations. Informants had a range of tenures in the organization, though most had been there 
a relatively long time, which is typical of the management team. The interviews spanned 
organizational levels from the general manager of the division to a business analyst. This ensured 
impressions related to organizational change were held across levels of management. By 
spanning functions and organizational levels, this study includes a rich set of data that captures 
observations from a multitude of perspectives.   
 A sister division within Zuni had also joined the Apple ecosystem. This division 
developed different products but sold them through similar channels to similar customers. 
Particularly during the earlier part of the study, the sister division had an independent 
relationship with Apple. As time progressed, the two divisions became more coordinated in their 
communications with Apple. Still, they maintained separate liaisons and had separate processes 
to manage compliance requirements for their respective products. Interviews were conducted 
with members of this sister division in each round of interviews (starting in early 2012 through 
2014). These employees had been actively involved with the relationship between Zuni and 
Apple representing their division, and were very aware of the relationship between Apple and the 
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focal division. Thus, they were able to provide observations from outside the focal division that 
were extremely useful for triangulating data and corroborating stories from members of the focal 
division.  Table 2.2 includes a list of formal interview participants and dates of interviews. 
 
Table 2.2  Data collection:  Semi-structured interview list  
No. Title/Role Date 
1 Marketing, Prod. Management, Sales 9-15-11 
2 Marketing, Prod. Management, Sales 10-7-11 
3 Product Development Engr. 10-25-11 
4 Business Operations, Strategy 10-25-11 
5 Marketing, Prod. Management, Sales 10-28-11 
6 General Manager 10-28-11 
7 Controller, Finance 11-8-11 
8 Engineering 11-8-11 
9 Human Resources 11-8-11 
10 Business Analyst 11-15-11 
11 Market Research 11-15-11 
12 General Manager 2-8-12 
13 Marketing, Prod. Management, Sales 2-15-12 
14 Strategy 2-28-12 
15 Product Manager 3-15-12 
16 New Product Planning 3-29-12 
17 Marketing, Prod. Mgmt., Sales 3-21-13 
18 General Manager 4-11-13 
19 Marketing, Prod. Management, Sales 4-15-13 
20 Product Development Engr. 4-22-13 
21 Controller, Finance 4-24-13 
22 Business Operations, Strategy 4-24-13 
23 Human Resources 4-24-13 
24 Strategy 4-29-13 
25 Engineering 5-1-13 
26 Product Manager 5-21-13 
27 Market Research 5-21-13 
28 New Product Planning 5-22-13 
29 Business Analyst 5-22-13 
30 Marketing, Prod. Mgmt., Sales 5-22-13 
31 Category Business Manager 6-14-13 
32 Category Business Manager 6-10-13 
33 Marketing, Prod. Management, Sales 3-10-14 
34 Marketing, Prod. Management, Sales 3-11-14 
35 Marketing, Prod. Management, Sales 4-22-14 
36 Controller, Finance 4-22-14 
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Table 2.2 (Continued)  Data collection:  Semi-structured interview list  
37 Product Development Engr. 4-25-14 
38 Engineering 4-25-14 
39 Human Resources 4-29-14 
40 Business Operations, Strategy 4-29-14 
41 Strategy 4-30-14 
42 Marketing 5-9-14 
43 Product Manager 5-9-14 
44 Product Manager 5-9-14 
45 New Product Management 5-9-14 
46 Engineering 5-12-14 
47 Strategy 6-2-14 
48 New Product Management 6-3-14 
49 Market Research 6-24-14 
50 Marketing 6-27-14 
51 Business Analyst (Strategy) & Sales 6-27-14 
52 Category Business Manager 7-1-14 
53 Category Business Manager 7-1-14 
54 General Manager 8-26-14 
55 Marketing 2-13-15 
56 General Manager 3-24-15 
57 Non-Zuni: Trademark Attorney 1-13-12 
58 Non-Zuni: Accessory Business 
Manager 
1-13-12 
59 Non-Zuni: Former BD Director 3-16-12 
60 Non-Zuni: Former Zuni Employee 3-21-15 
 
 
The interviews were generally conducted in employee’s offices, though some were in the 
company cafeteria when employees did not have closed door offices or preferred to meet in the 
cafeteria. The interview protocol included an introductory explanation of the nature and purpose 
of the study, a reminder that data were covered under a confidentiality agreement and that the 
company would be disguised, and a request for permission to audio record the interview.   
 Semi-structured interviews were based on an interview guide that included questions 
related to a number of topic areas (see Appendix for an example interview guide). The first topic 
area included questions about products that might work with other firms’ products. This led 
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quickly to discussions of relationships with other firms and interdependencies and dependencies, 
including benefits and challenges of these relationships, changes to relationships, and speculation 
regarding future potential changes to relationships. The second set of questions pertained to 
organizational considerations such as whether the division had to change business processes as a 
result of working more closely with other firms and how these changes might have been 
perceived. The next questions were more open-ended and asked about greatest challenges in the 
organization. In the final interview phase, I asked (relative to their work) what kept informants 
up at night, which frequently led to enlightening discussions about organizational happenings.  
 Interviewing multiple employees across the organization allowed confirmation of the data 
from several sources and eliminated potential biases of individual sources (Golden, 1992; Miller, 
Cardinal, and Glick, 1997).  In many instances, organization members provided confirming 
commentary validating a position previously relayed by another respondent. I used initial 
interviews to validate preliminary assumptions and then adapted the interview protocol for later 
interview rounds. For example, dependency challenges were not originally a central component 
of this research, but as fieldwork progressed and I analyzed data, they emerged inductively as an 
important theme. Additionally, themes related to organizational identity also started to emerge as 
salient. Accordingly, the interview guide evolved to include questions more specifically aimed at 
understanding dependencies and identity-related challenges. Similarly, themes of compliance, 
innovation, and influence emerged during early and middle round interviews, so later interviews 
included more questions related to these and other topics associated with asymmetries, 
dependence, response strategies, and complementor maturity.   
 In later interviews, as research questions became clearer and theoretical framings 
developed, the final sections included more questions related to Zuni’s relationships with 
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platform managers and particularly with Apple. A section was added related to organizational 
identity encompassing inquiries such as:  “What are you most proud of related to Zuni?”, “What 
are you most frustrated by at Zuni?”, and “What do you think Zuni stands for?”  These were 
followed by questions asking if these items had changed, and if so, how might they have done so.  
 In addition to collecting interview data, over the course of the study I gathered significant 
archival data related to Zuni. These data included press releases, advertisements, website 
clippings, media articles, product packaging samples, and retail display photographs from 
locations around the world. These data were instrumental in triangulating findings across sources 
and over time and contributed to ongoing revisions of the interview protocols as iteration 
continued between data collection, data analysis, and theoretical development. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Interviews were audio recorded with hand-written notes keyed to the audio via a LiveScribe pen. 
Interviews were transcribed resulting in over 1,000 pages of text. I coded the interviews with 
Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software. Coding and theory development progressed iteratively 
throughout data collection to inform data gathering. As themes emerged and data analysis 
progressed, all interview transcripts were included in the analysis software enabling searches for 
key coding terms. This enabled comparison of interviews across respondents over time to capture 
variability of perspectives by individual as well as variability across individuals. 
 
Iterative code development 
Code development followed a three-stage process of qualitative analysis: 1) data reduction 
(organizing, coding, and summarizing data), 2) data display (creating tables, network views, and 
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diagrams to view data from various perspectives), and 3) conclusion drawing/verification (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). This process was iterative requiring frequent re-examination of the 
original transcript data while cycling between developing displays, generating initial 
conclusions, continued coding and re-coding, conceptual development and thematic 
identification (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). To avoid confirmation bias, data that both 
confirmed and contradicted findings were included in the coding process.  
 The transcript data were coded by “deriving and developing relevant concepts from the 
data” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 65). The first coding round stayed close to the respondents’ 
words and meanings, sometimes employing in-vivo coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), and 
developing first-order codes and concepts (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Through use of 
Atlas.ti software to manage the significant amount of data, these codes were grouped into code 
families. Comparative analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) was useful to compare incidents across 
interviews and timeframes. For example, multiple respondents used the same examples of Apple 
interactions to illustrate points; these were all coded together. Similarly, because the data are 
longitudinal, perceptions of concepts across time could be captured via coding. An example is 
the two quotes that open this chapter from the same person separated by two and a half years.  
 
Code relationships 
Network views were developed as part of the second stage analysis. For code families that 
emerged as most important, these network views enabled visualization of relationships between 
codes and assisted in later abstraction to higher level categories, concepts, and themes. In the 
tradition of grounded theory research and building on more modern qualitative inductive 
research techniques (Glaser & Strauss, 1999; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Gioia, Corley, & 
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Hamilton, 2013), from first-order code families, concepts emerged and then second-order themes 
were induced. These then mapped to three aggregate strategies Zuni used to address 
dependencies. See Figure 2.2 for a diagram showing this data structure and the relationships 
between elements (Gioia, Price, Hamilton, & Thomas, 2010; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). 
The process of building network views, and iterating between data coding, concept development, 
and thematic analysis led to insights related to asymmetries, power relationships, dependencies, 
response strategies, and complementor maturity that developed as Zuni joined MSP ecosystems. 
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A MODEL OF COMPLEMENTOR MATURITY 
As a result of the data analysis, I have developed a grounded theory model identifying 
relationships between ecosystem joining, ecosystem-related dependencies, and complementor 
maturity response strategies. Figure 2.3 provides a diagram of this model. The following sections 
explain the elements of the model and the relationships between them. 
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 With powerful platform providers such as Apple, Microsoft, Samsung and others 
developing huge markets for smartphones, tablets, and other mobile devices, in 2011 a large 
market had been developed for accessory products. Zuni recognized the market opportunity to 
design products that were optimized to work with particular MSPs’ products, and in particular to 
enter Apple’s ecosystem by developing products that would be approved by Apple and marketed 
with Apple’s “Made for iPhone” or “Made for iPad” certification logos. These decisions to 
create products that required Apple certification, and to move the product portfolio mix 
substantially in the direction of creating complementor products for powerful MSPs, led to Zuni 
entering into an asymmetric relationship with Apple as a developer of complementary products. 
 
DEPENDENCIES OF ECOSYSTEM JOINING  
As Zuni joined ecosystems of powerful platform-based businesses Zuni experienced three types 
of dependencies: 1) technological, 2) information, and 3) values-based30. I define and outline 
each category below with evidence of dependencies associated with each.   
 
Technological Dependency 
When Zuni started making products to interoperate with Apple products, it experienced 
technological dependency. Consistent with the definition adopted above of dependency as 
encompassing the need for important or critical resources, I define technological dependency to 
capture situations in which Zuni needed resources and requirements from an MSP to create and 
deliver products and services as part of that MSP’s ecosystem (i.e., complementary products). 
                                                          
30 A fourth type of dependency could also be articulated as economic dependency. However, through the data 
analysis, it became clear that this dependency was really a product of the other dependencies. Thus, I have not called 
out economic dependency as a separate type, but it is essentially captured as a result of the other three types. 
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Frequently, and most obviously, these resources and requirements were technology related, 
however, this dependency encompasses all situations in which an MSP prescribed a particular 
way to do something, or a performance level that needed to be achieved. Thus, also included 
under the umbrella of technological dependency are all occasions in which an MSP provided 
packaging or business process requirements as well. Essentially, whenever Zuni was being told 
what to do or how to do it, I consider it a technological dependency. 
 The data analysis showed that the concept of technological dependency also included 
sub-types of dependencies. These sub-types can be envisioned along a spectrum varying by level 
of resources need by Zuni. An alternate way to conceptualize the spectrum is by considering 
variation in restrictiveness imposed on Zuni by an MSP. For example, the extreme (worst case) 
was when specific technologies and their implementations were prescribed by an MSP (e.g., 
when Apple required accessory providers to use a specific component chip only available from 
one vendor). A less restrictive example was when an MSP provided technological requirements 
or standards that a complementor must achieve. These situations imposed different dependencies 
on Zuni, yet both related to decision-making and resource needs so are captured in the notion of 
technological dependency.  
 As it experienced the first type of technological dependency, Zuni had to choose whether 
to use the required technology. For example, Zuni had to choose whether to incorporate the chip 
into its design and buy it from the specified vendor. Once Zuni agreed, there was little latitude in 
how it implemented the requirement to use this technology. Additionally, there were intellectual 
property (IP) considerations because Zuni was forced to use (license via the chip fee) another 
firm’s IP. This felt to Zuni like a very strong and restrictive requirement. An engineering 
manager explained, 
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 “So, we had to license a chip. We had to actually utilize the [component from the supplier] that 
they recommended... And, we had to use their specifications for reference designs in order for it 
to work with all the varied devices: iPod Nano, iPod Touch, iPhone, iPad. It was a little 
awkward and what’s really interesting is we had trouble making them work.”(10-25-11) 
In addition to feeling like this was a strong requirement, Zuni perceived that Apple included 
technologies that did not add value to the accessory product, but added value only for the MSP. 
For example, one was a technology that enabled Apple to maintain proprietary limitations across 
the ecosystem. A product manager explained, 
“They then put these certain requirements and one of them is this [component] that is just super 
expensive and, from our perspective, adds no value.” (5-9-14) 
Not only did Apple dictate technologies Zuni needed to use, but some of those technologies 
required Zuni to make performance trade-offs because it believed its own internal designs would 
result in better products. An informant outlined the problem: 
“I think one of the key things about the Apple problem is… Apple really did want to influence the 
design of the product. So, if you remember back, we were of the opinion at the time that our 
designs for the [product attributes] were better than what Apple was forcing us to use. That, I 
think, was at the heart of one of my problems here.” (2-8-12) 
 For decades, Zuni had been developing products to industry standards, but those 
standards were relatively straightforward technologically and provided Zuni with significant 
flexibility in how to implement them. When Zuni decided to create products to interface with 
Apple products that would need to be approved by Apple, Zuni had to adhere to stringent and 
constraining requirements. In instances when a chip was not specified but Zuni was required to 
meet requirements, Zuni had flexibility in how to achieve required performance levels, so this 
dependency was weaker and allowed more flexibility. Still, because required performance 
dimensions were prescribed, the organization’s decision-making capabilities were affected as it 
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had to design products in certain ways (potentially contrary to how the organization would have 
preferred to design them), and therefore a technological dependency existed. One manager noted: 
“...this whole design is because of them. We used to have it [this way], but when you [interfaced 
it with] an iPhone or whatever, [there would be a problem] ...  So, we had to completely change 
the design… But at the end of the day, it was all driven by them, by their products, and how 
people use their products.”  (10-25-11) 
In 2014, even as Zuni had matured as a complementor and accepted the need for compliancy, it 
was still dealing with significant technological dependency broadly defined to encompass 
various specification types as Apple continued to impose requirements. An informant explained,  
“So, there’s a lot of things that are value added, but all this other junk comes along and now…it came up 
again a couple of weeks ago ...they’re specifying more and more of the implementation details of our 
product and I’m not very happy about it. …because it’s starting to constrain us and second guess us more 
and more and more. I understand their intent. Their intent is they want this ... so that it works properly. 
...but as it’s maturing they’re getting into their partner’s shorts more and more.” (4-25-14) 
Table 2.3 provides additional quotes illustrating technological dependency. 
 
Information Dependency 
Another form of dependency Zuni faced was information dependency. I define information 
dependency to characterize situations when Zuni needed information from a platform manager to 
deliver product or services. To compare this with technological dependency, when Zuni was 
required to meet standards, the need to comply with those standards generated a technological 
dependency. In contrast, needing to communicate about standards, obtain information about 
them, learn about them, and so on, generated information dependency. Information dependency 
was characterized by difficulties related to communication between Zuni and an MSP and 
challenges obtaining information that generated uncertainty related to product design.  
 As with technological dependency, the data analysis showed sub-types of information 
dependency. Two types included:  1) availability or completeness of information, and 2) timing 
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obtaining information. In some circumstances the challenge of the dependency was to get 
information that was not being released. In other situations, the difficulty was trying to obtain 
information faster than it was being offered. Related to the former, one manager said: 
“It is a little bit hard to get answers from them. They have a lot of people, and then they have 
this certification, ‘Made for iPod, iPad’ certification that can be a little bit of a pain too, and 
they have a whole suite of tests but they'll never tell you which ones they'll run...”(10-25-11)   
Because of lack of information availability, Zuni spent more time and resources than would have 
been necessary if it had obtained better information. As a member explained, 
“So, you spend a lot of that time because they are so secretive and don’t tell anybody anything… 
spending a lot of your time sort of speculating, ‘if this, then we’ll do that,’ and having 
contingency plans.” (2-28-12) 
Members not only recognized this information dependency, but also the potential impact on their 
business and the advantages of trying to respond to the dependency. An informant explained,  
“We’re always trying to extract from them, ‘Okay, what are you guys going to do next?’ They 
don’t tell us, but sometimes they’ll give us a wink, wink, nod, nod.  Or, we’ll say, ‘Hey, we are 
going to be doing this.’ And they’ll say, ‘I’m not sure I’d do it like that, I think I’d do it like this.’  
And when you don’t have that relationship, it’s like a tsunami. You get wiped out.”  (2-28-12) 
 Apple provided Zuni with various forms of requirements (technological, packaging, 
financial, etc.) and controlled information flow. There were many times Zuni wanted more 
information about topics like compliance testing and product design. One manager noted: 
“You know they’re very closed about what they do technically…very closed. So, it’s really 
difficult to figure out what their product roadmap is.” (4-24-13) 
Even once the relationship between Zuni and Apple was well established and Zuni was more 
sophisticated in its interactions with Apple, Zuni faced information dependencies significantly 
impacting product development. A manager explained the difficulty, 
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“Another thing that was a real pain in the neck, even though we’re a great partner and they 
want to work with us, just like everybody, nobody got to know what the size of the iPhone 5 was 
going to be. We guessed.” (8-26-14) 
 
Table 2.3 provides additional quotes illustrating information dependency. 
 
 
Values-Based Dependency 
A third dependency Zuni experienced was values-based. I define values-based dependency as 
situations in which Zuni’s core values were challenged or threatened as a result of Zuni’s 
attempts to participate in an MSP-governed ecosystem. Examples of this type of dependency 
were challenges to how Zuni treated customers or managed interfirm relationships. For instance, 
Zuni had a different view of customer relationships than did platform managers. As Zuni became 
a member of MSP-governed ecosystems, those MSPs began to shape boundaries that governed 
Zuni’s customer relationships and Zuni began to lose control of the boundaries. Values-based 
dependencies can also be broken into sub-types including: 1) values threats, and 2) values 
clashes. 
Zuni prided itself on customer service and ensuring products lasted a very long time. 
Zuni informants often mentioned the need to assure products continued to work with older (and 
newer) generations of products (a.k.a., backwards (and forwards) compatibility). Zuni noted a 
mismatch with MSPs on expectations of appropriate product lifecycles, which threatened Zuni’s 
values. A member explained,  
“…it was just these very small mechanical changes that they require that make things 
incompatible with previous versions and then make it hard for people to use them with other 
products … and so their whole philosophy of not worrying as much about backwards 
compatibility as we do, is a disconnect sometimes.” (11-8-11) 
Another informant also noted the difference in perspectives: 
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“It was very important to us, but it takes a lot of bandwidth to do this to make sure that it worked 
with all the devices that they make as they change. Because they don’t have a lot of backwards 
compatibility drive. As a matter of fact, they have said to us, ‘You guys are nuts. It’s not 
compatible anymore. Tell them to buy a new one.’” (10-25-11) 
In 2014, over three years after Zuni had started actively participating in Apple’s 
ecosystem, Zuni managers across functional areas still noted that problems remained related to 
disconnects in customer service. Zuni’s values were not aligned with Apple’s, yet Zuni was 
dependent upon Apple and thus affected by Apple’s values.   
“It’s a challenge because…and this is the thing where I can’t understand how they continue to 
grow. They have no concern about their customers …they’ll introduce a new product, they will 
have new technology and new functionality and new everything, and they completely ignore their 
previous customer and the product that they had.” (4-29-14)  
The values-based dependency went beyond product compatibility to encompass an overall 
approach to product development. In 2012, a manager summed up the tension and how that 
derived from the values of the organization. 
“I have to admit that ... I still don’t want to be a part of these ecosystems. That’s still where I am. 
I recognize the need and I recognize how I can be successful, but I would still rather not be a 
part of it. That’s where I stand... It’s just not the way we were raised here. We’re not supposed to 
do that. It’s just not right. Our products are our products. They speak for themselves.”(2-8-12) 
 Another values-related dependency Zuni experienced was related to interfirm 
relationships and expectations. This dependency created clashes with Zuni’s values. Before 
joining Apple’s ecosystem, Zuni managers noted Zuni had not placed high value on working 
with other firms. One manager noted: 
“There’s a saying around Zuni, which is quote-unquote, ‘We dip our flag to no one.’”(10-7-11) 
Zuni didn’t acknowledge a need to work with other organizations, particularly in relationships in 
which another party had more power and could dictate activities. As Zuni started to realize the 
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importance of a relationship with Apple, and the importance of having Zuni products work well 
with Apple (and other MSPs’) products, this began to change. As another member noted: 
“…the reason why we are willing to do that now is because of a change in corporate philosophy 
right now. Apple created such an environment that we finally had to swallow our pride and say, 
‘If we don’t do things contrary to the way that our philosophies tell us to do things, we will not 
be compatible.’  (10-28-11) 
There was also growing recognition of the asymmetry of the relationship between Zuni and 
Apple and the dependency that created. As the same manager continued, 
“So, that was a philosophical change. ‘Okay, they win. They win. We used to be bigger, they 
were smaller. Now they’re a heck of a lot bigger, and we’re a heck of a lot smaller than they are, 
and they win. We dip our flag and we’ve got to learn to work with them.’” (10-28-11) 
Table 2.3 provides additional quotes illustrating values-based dependency. 
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Table 2.3  Dependency data examples 
Dependencies Data example 
Technological 
 
“Apple is the only one who we customize our products to work with their 
products.” (10-25-11) 
 
“So, when we actually came back and said, ‘Okay, these are the demands of 
Apple. They are incompatible with our technology strategy and, frankly, we 
don’t agree with them. We don’t think this is the right customer experience.’ 
We said, ‘No, thank you.’ We walked away from tens and tens of millions of 
dollars of business.” (10-28-11) 
 
“Once the needle is in the arm and you’re used to that drug, and you’ve got a 
big business… the company can’t afford for it to go away overnight. I’m 
responsible for making sure that it doesn’t go away, and that Apple doesn’t 
take a hard right turn and we keep going this way.” (2-8-12) 
 
“One thing I worry about is that as the ecosystem matures the base 
functionality expectation keeps rising, and so the amount of money and 
engineering effort we have to put into stuff that is checkbox…which, if just 
doing checkbox we’re going to execute on it extremely well, so we still want to 
do the job, but I’m really uneasy about the portion of our time focus, BOM 
costs on the stuff that is not making us stand out from others is becoming too 
high...”  (5-1-13) 
 
“So, I think in the Apple context they have the ability to leverage the 
technologies that they believe are the most important, and [technology X] has 
no value to us but it has real value to them.” (5-9-14) 
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Table 2.3 (Continued)  Dependency data examples 
Information  “Now, the scary part about that is they continue to change their products 
and the iPhone 4S is out… And they don’t tell us. There’s no 
communication to us ...” (10-25-11) 
 
“That’s well beyond the bandwidth they have to deal with us. They’ve got their 
teams. They’re designing their stuff, then there’s the engineer that works with 
the alliances or the ecosystem that says, ‘Okay, can I answer your questions for 
you?’ There’s not the path to bring it back in, at least we haven’t found that 
path, yet.” (10-25-11) 
 
“What my hope is that we can just still be communicative. I wish they would be 
a little bit clearer on some of their expectations. I wish that they would be 
clearer on what’s coming next, but I can’t really begrudge them that. I mean, I 
wouldn’t tell anybody what’s coming up, so why would they tell anybody 
what’s coming up?” (2-8-12) 
 
“Yeah, I would love it if these people could figure out, what’s an Android 
standard? What’s a Windows standard? What’s a RIM standard? Oh, my god. 
It’s not out there. There’s just no standard and it looks like…oh, god, it looks 
like there may…what is it? HTC, I think it’s HTC, might even be trying to 
create their own Android standard.” (2-8-12) 
 
“One form of communication with Apple is called their MFi portal...Apple 
limits the number of people that have access because there is company 
confidential information...Our solution was to create this group of people so 
even though there might be another product that wants to get certified, that 
program product manager would come to me and say, ‘I need to do x, y and z,’ 
and I would help them get that done..” (5-21-13) 
 
“They keep enabling more functionality. So, with more functionality just comes 
more complexity which is more testing, but actually where I think the problem 
is coming into play more is as their ecosystem grows and more players want to 
be a part of it, it’s harder to get Apple’s attention to get approval. Sometimes 
you need the approval, sometimes you can self-approve. It’s a little 
confusing...” (8-26-14) 
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Table 2.3   (Continued) Dependency data examples 
Values-
based  
“One of our challenges with [Apple] is we are very customer focused and if [a customer] 
bought our product, we want that product to be able to work with other products. Apple 
doesn’t care. They don’t worry about last year’s version… Well, if that phone changes 
and you bought [X] two years ago and they are on iPhone 6 or 7, they don’t care about 
you…  And that is different for Zuni. We struggle a lot with that... So they do create 
more turmoil for us, if you will, in how they operate.” (10-25-11) 
 
“Yeah, this is only hearsay, but … ‘Apple, wait a minute. Do you realize that 
you’ve gone to a nonstandard [interface] and that nothing is compatible?’ And 
the answer back was, ‘Those are the old customers. We care about the new 
customers. You guys spend too much time worrying about customers who have 
already given you money. Worry about the ones who haven’t given you money 
yet.’ That is hard for us…that’s hard for me to fathom. I don’t get it.” (10-28-11) 
 
“I think..., philosophically, they don’t really worry about backward compatibility. Buy a 
new one, right? Get the next one. Get the latest. They don’t feel an obligation for… 
that’s not as high a priority for them as it is for us... They’ve got a business model and a 
set of user expectations that say, ‘Yeah, just throw it away. Get the next one. Get the 
next one.’ People expect our products to last for shockingly long amounts of time and 
they get really, really mad at us when they wear out.” (11-8-11) 
 
“By the way, the whole relationship with Apple is quite new… We developed products 
on our own terms. Now, we have this external force that is coming and giving us nudges 
to what is right and wrong.  Where, as an organization, for the last 30 years, we decided 
what was right and wrong.”  (3-15-12) 
 
“Our general strategy is one of differentiation in the marketplace.  The challenge with 
having a differentiation strategy when you are working within an ecosystem, or with a 
partner, is that we, almost by default, don’t necessarily want to do things exactly the way 
they were put in the specification, or they ask us to.  So, figuring out how to balance our 
needs against their needs, and find the middle ground to say, ‘Here is what we will do, 
here is what we will be able to do, and here is what we would like to do.  We understand 
this is where you are, what can you live with to let us do the things we need to do in our 
products?’  And, sometimes that works really well; sometimes it doesn’t go our way.”  
(3-29-12) 
 
“…here we’re doing all this quote, unquote, work, with these…the team, and yet we’re 
not…clearly, we’re not being treated as enough of a partner that they would even share 
that seemingly basic information on the dimensions of the product.” (4-24-13) 
 
“We had everything lined up, ready to go, because we have [a product] that’s designed to 
work with an iPhone and it says right on the box, “Compatible with iPhone.” ... There’s 
one human being on the face of the earth who has to approve those accessories. It took 
that one individual on the face of the earth six months to approve it.” (8-26-14) 
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RESPONSE STRATEGIES TO DEPENDENCIES 
Zuni experienced technological, information, and values-based dependencies associated with 
joining ecosystems managed by powerful MSPs. Over time, as Zuni learned to manage its 
relationships with platform managers and became more experienced at being a complementor in 
each ecosystem, Zuni developed a variety of response strategies to cope with these dependencies. 
The data show evidence of three types of response strategy: 1) compliance, 2) influence, and 3) 
innovation. In different phases of maturity becoming a complementor in an ecosystem, Zuni used 
combinations of these strategies, with varying emphasis on each, to address dependencies. In the 
following sections, I provide evidence of each of these response strategies.  
 
Compliance 
There were times when Zuni adopted a compliance strategy as it chose to live with challenges 
associated with ecosystem-related dependencies and comply with rules and mandates imposed 
upon it. Accordingly, I have labeled the first response strategy compliance. For example, when 
Zuni decided to increase the number of products optimized to interoperate with MSP products 
the general manager, senior leadership staff, and product managers decided to comply with 
specifications, guidelines, requests, and so on even though doing so required trade-offs related to 
performance and other dimensions (e.g., added costs). In these instances, Zuni did not attempt to 
resolve tensions associated with becoming technologically, information, and values-based 
dependent, but rather learned to work within constraints associated with them. This strategy is 
characterized by Zuni learning about the new constraints imposed upon it (e.g., technological 
requirements, branding guidelines, etc.) and deciding how to cope with these new constraints 
(e.g., to what extent does it want to be compliant and in what ways). Compliance spanned not 
 102 
 
only technological requirements, but also marketing (e.g., compliance logo guidelines, packaging 
requirements), financial (e.g., royalty audit clauses), and so on. 
 Some cases of compliance addressed the heart of the organization, its product design 
decision-making associated with product performance. Early in Zuni’s path towards becoming a 
mature complementor, Zuni recognized that standards Apple required it to meet were not only 
dictating product design decisions, but also leading to designs that diminished performance 
below what Zuni could otherwise accomplish operating independently.  Still, after weighing 
trade-offs, Zuni chose to comply, as one manager explained,  
 “We had a lot of conversations about whether or not the performance they were dictating was 
up to the standards of being a Zuni product. We had a lot of conversation about that. Finally, in 
the end we agreed that it was acceptable, but it was certainly not preferred.” (10-28-11) 
 Although Zuni initially resisted complying with specifications imposed by other firms, it 
began to acknowledge the need to do so to ensure interoperability and gain access to larger 
markets. Recognizing the value Apple was creating throughout the ecosystem, even though it 
was demanding compliance, a manager explained, 
“Apple is the only one right now who has really effectively created a well…I say this in air 
quotes, ‘well-understood ecosystem where you know what you have to do to be able to play.’ And 
once you’ve done that and you’ve got your certificate, then you can put this icon on your product 
and everybody knows.”(2-8-12) 
 Still, challenges remained even as Zuni became a much more mature complementor and 
accepted its need to comply with requirements. An informant acknowledged Zuni’s need to 
comply and relayed the ongoing frustration, 
“[Apple is] continuously increasing the requirements document around compatibility with their 
Made for iPhone program, and so the list of things we must comply with... they’re ever 
increasingly specifying what must be done to the point where I’m starting to get really unhappy 
and uncomfortable.” (4-25-14) 
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Apple maintained significant influence on Zuni product design choices that required compliance 
and cross-organizational interfirm processes. A manager who played a leadership role in this 
process explained the certification process, 
“...we communicate with Apple through this web interface. We tell Apple what products we’re 
about to develop and they either accept that idea or reject it, and if they accept the idea, then we 
can start buying certain components... we develop prototypes... we send them to Apple and they 
certify they operate appropriately ,...we also submit our packaging....” (5-9-14) 
 
Influence 
Compliance is associated with acceptance. Influence, in contrast, is based on the notion of not 
accepting circumstances, but rather aiming to change them. The data analysis shows that as an 
element of Zuni’s multi-pronged strategy to address ecosystem-related dependencies, it 
employed an influence response strategy to try to improve circumstances in which it operated 
and to test the boundaries of the constraints under which it was operating. Whereas the 
compliance strategy was most directly aligned with responding to technological dependencies, 
the influence strategy applied across all three dependencies:  responding to technological by 
trying to alter requirements, information by trying to influence to gain better and more timely 
information, and values-based by trying to change values-challenging situations. Although 
compliance and innovation responses encompassed Zuni activities within boundaries of its own 
organization, the influence response addressed interfirm relationship challenges and crossed 
boundaries. It centered on interactions outside organizational boundaries, and captured instances 
in which Zuni attempted to influence sensemaking (Weick, 1995) and activities of another party.  
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 Early in the study when Zuni was newly operating as a complementor, the data suggest 
that influencing was not a notable part of Zuni’s overall approach. Zuni did not yet believe it had 
the ability to influence. A working level manager explained, 
“... basically, we take what we’re given, interpret it to the best of our abilities, go through, 
basically, normal and routine channels of question asking, but that’s really all it is. It’s a 
specification with question asking and clarification without any ability to impact those 
specifications or change them ....” (10-28-11) 
Even at that time early in its path to becoming an established complementor, a more senior Zuni 
manager held the optimistic expectation that if they worked hard to build a relationship with 
Apple the relationship would grow and be mutually beneficial. Zuni placed a high value on 
relationships and building trust over time, and presumed other companies did as well. Thus, this 
manager believed that by executing a compliance strategy, or playing by the rules, Zuni would 
be able to influence the relationship. He explained, 
“I think part of our philosophy is also that, over time, if we can respond appropriately and 
behave appropriately, then that kind of behavior, hopefully, will drive products that will be very 
successful at Apple. And the good company they are, they’ll recognize, ‘Whoa, there’s an 
opportunity for a lot more success working with this company than others. Alright, let’s make 
this relationship stronger.’ So, I think that our unwritten hope is that by following the rules, 
doing what we’re supposed to do, that will be the entry into a bigger relationship.” (10-28-11) 
 As Zuni became more mature as a complementor, it developed established processes for 
working with Apple, and slowly started to push back on certain requirements to address 
dependencies it encountered. Though Zuni could have pushed for changes for the entire 
ecosystem, Zuni’s main motivation was to gain freedom of action for its own products so, at least 
initially, Zuni was content (and potentially preferred) to gain exceptions to existing requirements, 
or waivers, rather than requirement changes. Referring to how Zuni used influence to address a 
technological dependency, a product planner explained, 
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“...[Apple] puts together guidelines for certain technologies and says, ‘You should do this big 
list of things’ And, for one of our products...we wanted to treat it like a different set of 
requirements... so, I brought pictures and I pitched it to them... We actually got through that... 
we got an exception.” (3-29-12) 
 There were also occasions in which requirements caused problems and Zuni attempted to 
influence Apple to change these requirements. Apple started to recognize the value Zuni brought 
technically and began to more readily accept Zuni’s technical inputs. A Zuni manager explained, 
“Well, Apple, in their last upgrade, they somehow [caused a problem with the product 
interface]…we pointed it out to them.  [Apple said,] ‘Ahh, yeah, we’ll have to fix that.’  So…they 
appreciate …what we bring to the party from a technology point of view...” (4-24-13) 
 Relevant to both technological and information dependencies, a manager explained how 
the relationship between engineering teams had evolved, 
“...the engineering relationship is actually at this point quite deep and you know the thing we 
talked about where we feel like we can give them information to make it work better?  I mean 
we’ve been having actually that kind of relationship with their engineers where we found some 
bugs that they didn’t know ... and you know they revised it...” (3-14-14)  
When I asked if this type of relationship had existed from the beginning, the manager replied, 
“Not at all. No, not at all. I mean first of all, Apple is not open to that mostly but, second, we just 
haven’t been positioned but we sort of said to ourselves a few years ago we need to get in 
deeper. We’re so dependent on them. We need to try to get in deeper, and the only way to get in 
deeper is to offer them value... To help them establish the standard for something new.”(3-14-14) 
 Zuni’s aspiration was to be a preferred partner of Apple’s in their complementor role. 
They hoped Apple would come to them first to discuss product ideas and provide early 
information regarding upcoming technology changes. Put another way, as Zuni managers 
referred to it, they were trying to avoid being one upgrade cycle behind, which happened when 
they did not get advance product information (and therefore had to wait until a product was 
launched to get full information about it). To that end, as Zuni became more adept in its role as a 
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complementor there were times when Apple asked Zuni for input, so Zuni was able to exert 
influence. An informant explained,  
“So, we have zero visibility because we’re not a customer, we’re not a supplier, we’re a user of 
their technology and they look to Zuni for helpful input because they trust us.” (4-25-14)  
 Though engineering interactions grew stronger, as the relationship matured, the 
management team began to perceive the relationship in a less positive manner. Apple had always 
competed to some extent with Zuni products by offering their own versions, but as the market 
grew they began to more aggressively do so and started to compete more directly with Zuni. As 
this occurred, it became clear that Zuni would not be a preferred partner and Zuni managers 
recognized that though they had some success influencing Apple’s technical decisions, they had 
not built the relationship for which they had originally hoped. They realized that their product 
offerings would always be slightly behind those offered directly by Apple because of the 
imbalance in information.  
 In August 2014, a key manager reflected, 
 “I think the relationship we established was only on the surface. It never went deep.”(8-26-14) 
This comment, and others like it, contrasts with previous quotes explaining the improved depth 
of the relationship and may have been affected both by Apple’s more aggressive moves into 
Zuni’s markets and also Zuni’s evolving maturity as a complementor. It illustrates that there 
were different opinions within the organization about the level of influence Zuni had with Apple, 
and these opinions seemed to depend on whether one was discussing technical bug fixes and 
such, or more strategic technology and product planning. The strategy of influencing was quite 
successful relative to tactical problems with technical specifications, fixing bugs, clarifying 
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confusion, and so on, but was much less effective relative to generating substantive product 
changes that benefitted Zuni (and in keeping Apple out of direct competition with Zuni).  
 As Zuni management recognized that the level of influence they were able to have was 
limited, and that the relationship they were building was not as mutually beneficial and trusting 
as they had originally hoped, Zuni became more sophisticated with its communication 
approaches and its influencing attempts. Continuing the previous discussion about having a 
surface-level relationship, the manager explained further how he only wanted to influence in 
ways beneficial to Zuni, 
 “…every meeting I had with [our liaisons] where we would talk about this I reminded [them] 
every chance I got, ‘Don’t…go too far with this. Please don’t teach. Please don’t share. Please 
answer questions in a way that still lets us keep our competitive advantage but…enables us to 
impact some of the decisions they might be doing so our stuff can work better.’” (8-26-14) 
Zuni was attempting to influence, but to do so to improve its own ability to innovate. Still, 
outcomes were not always as expected or desired. This was particularly true for outcomes that 
were less tactical and more strategic in nature. Lamenting the difficulties with the relationship, 
the same manager further explained, 
“If I can interpret some conversations I had from the engineers after their meetings I actually 
think we helped... I think we helped the Apple engineers think through, architect, and craft some 
of the [interfaces]...There’s no question in my mind we helped. But there’s also no question in 
my mind we reaped absolutely no benefit from that. None, none whatsoever.”(8-26-14) 
 
Innovation 
Beyond compliance and influence, the data show Zuni invoked a third response strategy, which I 
have labeled innovation. Zuni chose to make changes to its offerings, and organizational 
processes, to resolve challenges associated with dependencies of being a complementor. These 
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changes can be grouped into two types, 1) those aimed at making Zuni a better complementor 
within the constraints of an MSP’s ecosystem (e.g., developing innovative approaches (possibly 
technologies) that enable it to comply better with requirements), and 2) those aimed at Zuni 
avoiding dependencies by creating products that do not require compliance even though they still 
may work with an MSP’s products (e.g., by using a standard industry interface, or developing 
products to work with competitive products).  
 In the first type of innovation within the constraints of an ecosystem, innovations 
sometimes were product-design-specific (e.g., modifying a product design to be less dependent 
upon Apple technology) and other times affected marketing and other functional areas (e.g., 
changing a product’s color or advertising). Though Zuni accepted it often needed to be compliant 
with MSPs’ requirements, and realized it had some ability to influence, it also recognized that 
even with an ecosystem, compliance did not limit flexibility along all dimensions. Zuni retained 
the ability (and necessity) to innovate to differentiate, and understood that although it could 
become compliant along some product dimensions, it could still innovate along other dimensions 
that might lead to higher differentiation.  
 Pursuing the second type of innovation, Zuni also began to innovate with other 
technologies that had much less or potentially no dependency on ecosystem requirements. These 
initiatives were aimed at Zuni being able to offer products that would work with an MSP’s 
products, and thus Zuni would still be a complementor, but might not require Apple compliance. 
A non-Zuni example of this would be if an accessory maker produced a case for an Apple 
product, but didn’t run it through any Apple testing. It would not be able to display the “Made 
for iPhone” logo, but it also would not be faced with Apple dependencies. Zuni pursued 
innovation projects that might enable it to also offer products that would work with Apple 
 109 
 
products, but not have as much (if any) significant dependencies. Additionally, as Zuni became 
more mature in its relationships with MSPs, and particularly with Apple, it began to more 
actively join other ecosystems (e.g., Samsung’s) and to innovate in how it operated in new 
ecosystems to attempt to reduce risks associated with dependencies. 
 Zuni had always been a technology-centric innovation-focused organization, which was 
clear from the earliest interviews. At that time, the innovation focus was almost entirely on 
technological innovation, and not innovating around Apple requirements. A manager explained, 
“Our goal is not to become the largest market share or the highest sales dollars. It’s around 
technology innovation, because our philosophy is always that if you can drive that, then the level 
of profits and margins all come after.” (10-28-11) 
Thus, Zuni’s inclination was to think in terms of technological innovation. As it focused more on 
products to work with Apple products, Zuni needed to think more holistically about its products. 
Joining an ecosystem began to affect how Zuni was innovating from a product perspective. 
Another informant explained, 
“... the whole relationship with Apple is quite new... We developed products on our own terms. 
Now, we have this external force that is coming and giving us nudges to what is right and wrong.  
As an organization, for the last 30 years, we decided what was right and wrong.”(3-15-12) 
Zuni started to consider how to balance its need for compliance with its desire for differentiation. 
An organization member relayed the difficulty, 
“As a company, our general strategy is one of differentiation in the marketplace.  The challenge 
with having a differentiation strategy when you are working within an ecosystem, or with a 
partner, is that we, almost by default, don’t necessarily want to do things exactly the way they 
were put in the specification, or they ask us to.”  (3-29-12) 
 As Zuni’s role as complementor continued to evolve and it became more sophisticated in 
its thinking about how to remain competitive and address the dependencies it faced, it realized 
that although historically it looked to measures of technological performance, it needed to re-
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frame its conceptions of performance and focus on other dimensions beyond technology. Zuni 
innovated by redefining what it considered its primary means to differentiate. A manager said, 
“The heart of the product has to be technology. The reason for the product to exist and the 
reason for it to be in the Zuni portfolio is because it’s delivering performance…in the past that 
was what we focused on and that’s what we marketed. What we are understanding now... is that 
we have to expand our definition of the word ‘performance.’” (4-11-13) 
Zuni eventually also recognized that becoming part of an ecosystem, and the dependencies 
associated with that, affected multiple parts of the organization so responses needed to permeate 
the organization, including affecting product innovation processes. The same manager explained, 
“...when we define our product concept up front we have to take into account relationships now. 
We have to take into account which products are these going to be used with and which parts of 
the ecosystem do we have to have alignment with?...it’s got to be much more tied together?”(4-
11-13) 
 
 Since Zuni employed a multi-pronged response strategy, the innovation strategy was 
deployed in conjunction with compliance and influence strategies. For example, as Zuni was 
becoming an active complementor to other MSP businesses such as Samsung, Zuni recognized it 
could use its ability to innovate to be more successful at influencing. Although Zuni didn’t like 
being burdened by technical requirements, it came to recognize the value of requirements for 
increasing interoperability and reducing risk. A manager speculated about what actions Zuni 
might take to innovate and create its own standards and then influence an MSP to use them, 
“They have no ecosystem so we’re going to have to probably build an ecosystem for them. We’ll 
probably have to point out to them that there is nothing to develop to, that they don’t actually 
have standards, and so we’re going to have to make decisions like:  Are we going to make 
standards and give them to Samsung?  ...” (5-9-14) 
 
Table 2.4 provides additional examples of response strategies from the data. 
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Table 2.4  Response strategy data examples 
Response 
strategy 
Data example 
Compliance “...we needed to recognize the value of Apple products to our customers. Like I said, 
when 80 percent of them are using Apple products, if we wanted to continue to grow 
sales, we needed to make that realization...”  (10-25-11) 
 
“It creates a service issue for us, so we need to come up with a minor tweak to 
our engineering to work with their systems, if you will.” (10-25-11)  
 
“...in the past we were more than willing to walk away from business. It’s not quite the 
same anymore. We needed this business; otherwise, all of our great technologies were 
not going to end up being used anyway. … I can honestly say I would not be sitting 
here in this role and this division would not be doing what it’s doing if [Apple] hadn’t 
done what they did.”  (10-28-11) 
 
“…we’re going to be massively influenced now by the biggest players in this 
ecosystem. If (platform managers like) Samsung are all of a sudden going to dump $2 
billion dollars in marketing around their new device, and guess what, we don’t work 
with it…(sigh)…bad news.” (4-11-13) 
 
“The thing that’s happened recently, and we’re still ... trying to get our head around 
this, is that Samsung is emerging as a pretty substantial competitor to Apple in the 
smartphone space where it seems like they’re starting to become the one that’s going to 
bubble up above all the others. That’s interesting because now… there’s maybe a 
smaller subset of things that if we could make sure we’re compatible with those, then 
life is good, right?”  (5-1-13) 
 
“So, it’s a love/hate relationship with them, you know? Their sales have allowed us to 
grow ourselves, but they don’t make it easy.” (4-29-14) 
 
“...  we still make our products [perform] right, but we are either adding in cost or 
complexity. There are new failure modes that could happen. So, from not necessarily 
customer-facing but internally we’re like, ‘We could have made this better. There are 
more elegant designs’…but we had to do it this way.” (5-9-14) 
 
“... everything that we did was sort of justified in the market context. Like, ‘If we don’t 
do this with Apple, we will lose the majority of our business.’”  (5-9-14) 
 
“The only thing special we’re doing is we are incorporating the design that they require. 
So, to use their [technology] there’s a certain [technological] approach. There are 
specifications that have to be in the product to do that. ... So, we do something specific 
so that it can [work with] an Apple device and we put the little Apple thing on the 
packaging based on their specifications, but that’s it. There’s nothing else that we’re 
doing…” (8-26-14) 
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Table 2.4 (Continued)  Response strategy data examples 
Influence “I think our hope someday is to have our engineers speaking with their engineers 
to generate solutions. And, also, our marketers [to be] speaking with their 
marketers, although I think that is more pie in the sky… We’re not going to really 
work with them in that sense, but I mean that would be nice if we could mutually 
solve those types of problems as well.”  (3-15-12) 
 
 ”I mean so once the spec is a spec…I mean so what I will say I’ve observed is 
they do actually listen to us and we have some relatively special access to be able 
to talk to people who will listen and are close enough to decision making, but 
they occasionally…you know months later they’ll come back and say, “Hey, this 
changed.” It’s like, ‘Oh, okay.’ We never know if that’s under discussion or it’s a 
closed convers…we don’t know what is actually being taken and run with versus 
just dismissed.”  (4-25-14) 
 
 “As a company we’ve made a conscious decision that we’re not going to 
have…not anybody can just reach out to Apple with questions or concerns. They 
all get funneled through [name]. I’ll craft an e-mail that goes to [name] and I’m 
like, ‘[Name], this is why we did it,’ and he and I will banter back and forth 
whether or not I was right or wrong because…it’s possible that I’m wrong. ...And 
then we craft that reply together...”  (5-9-14) 
 
 “What else has to change is that you need somebody that can go out and interface 
with them and understand, okay, make the proper impedance match so there’s 
just relationship management and then there’s some technical management that 
has to happen. …the person that’s going to take advantage of the ecosystem, in 
this case Zuni, that has to understand the licensing deal and it has to be maybe a 
combination of a legal person and/or a licensing specialist and then finance has to 
be involved because they have to be paid royalties, so we have to figure out how 
am I going to do this?” (6-2-14)  
 
 “... outside of the just general transactional side I think there’s a little bit of 
bilateral influence going on. We certainly advocated for certain things and even 
gotten them. They’ve advocated for certain things and gotten them from us... I 
mean in the scheme of things they probably…well, they certainly have more 
power in the relationship but the nature of influence has been reasonably well 
balanced ... They’re incented to build an ecosystem and work with partners so 
they want to do well.”  (6-3-14) 
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Table 2.4 (Continued)  Response strategy data examples 
Innovation “...the reason the products are changing is because the applications that they’re 
attached to are changing.” (11-8-11) 
 
“We don’t necessarily want to be expert in xyz. And then we had to decide, was 
that important enough to us? It is. Can’t find it. Develop it. And we have the 
research backing in [parent] where we’ve got material science groups, we got 
pure researchers.’”  (10-25-11) 
 
“Honestly, I’ve worked for three other companies. I’ve never seen people as 
passionate about the company, the brand, the products as I have [here]. It’s 
really... it’s a beautiful thing. It really is. We encourage innovation in all aspects 
of our work, not just engineering, but everywhere and, together, we create value 
for our customers.” (11-8-11) 
 
“We’ve gone both ways. We’ve changed products when we’ve needed to meet 
their spec, and we’ve excluded their technology.”  (3-29-12) 
 
“... finding the right balance of, you got to do those things to stay in the game, at 
least some of them, but if you do them all you’ve got nothing left for the stuff 
that is why you’re better and different than everyone else. And so, that balance 
worries me.”  (5-1-13) 
 
“I don’t think the performance part is ever going to go away. I don’t think 
engineering ..., I don’t think that will ever go away. I mean that’s really, really, 
really at the heart. The difference is that it’s not only that. There are other pieces 
that are part of it...” (3-14-14) 
 
“I don’t think anything has changed as far as values go. That is actually pretty 
strong. It can be a hindrance to progress because [values are] used as a crutch. 
Because people sort of use [values] as an excuse, so people are like, ‘Oh, we 
haven’t done it that way in the past because we never do this, this or this.’ And 
it’s like, ‘Alright, so I just have to frame the problem differently so that it does 
fall within our values.’”  (5-9-14) 
 
 
Table 2.5 provides examples of how Zuni applied the three response strategies to each of 
the ecosystem dependencies. The responses along the upper left to lower right diagonal (i.e., 
complying to cope with technological dependence, influencing to resolve information 
dependence, and innovating to address values-based dependencies) are the most obvious and 
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ones that potentially might have been expected. The off-axis responses provide some more 
surprising and interesting findings and examples. For instance, Zuni’s struggles related to 
compliance in the context of threats to their core values, and Zuni’s efforts to innovate to reduce 
information dependency, show the broader scope and applicability of the framework and 
highlight how it can be used to uncover more subtle challenges and responses of MSP-
complementor relationships, particularly in the presence of power asymmetries. 
Table 2.5 Example response strategies mapped to dependencies of ecosystem joining  
Response 
Strategy 
Technological 
dependence 
 
Information  
dependence 
Values-based  
dependence 
Comply 
 Comply with 
specifications 
(e.g., technical, 
packaging, 
business 
processes) 
 
 Proceed with info 
received and 
don’t share to 
influence 
 
 Comply with logo 
guidelines and 
work to understand 
intention of MSP as 
comply; Focus on 
interpretation and 
customer 
implications 
 
 
Influence 
 Provide feedback 
to fix and 
improve specs 
 
 Create liaison 
process and 
appoint contact 
people to 
negotiate  
 
 Suggest standards 
and logo 
compliance 
guidelines; aim to 
change intentions 
and customer 
experience 
 
Innovate 
 Design products 
that take into 
account platform 
requirements and 
re-define how to 
differentiate 
 
 Design products 
less dependent on 
platform info 
 
 
 Offer products 
less sensitive to 
backwards and 
forwards 
compatibility to 
reduce customer 
concerns 
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COMPLEMENTOR MATURITY 
 
Zuni matured as a complementor as it improved its ability to respond to the dependencies 
associated with joining an ecosystem, adopted new behaviors, and shifted attitudes toward being 
a complementor. Zuni combined three response strategies (compliance, influence, and 
innovation) into strategies addressing ecosystem dependency challenges. The relative mix of 
response strategies Zuni used varied as Zuni became more mature in an ecosystem relationship. 
Since the data in this study encompass primarily Zuni’s relationship with Apple, I use the 
evolution of Zuni’s maturity as a complementor to Apple to distinguish three phases (or stages) 
of complementor maturity. Leveraging the temporal element of this data, enables me to take a 
process perspective and identity an arc of stages through which Zuni passes as it becomes more 
mature as a complementor to Apple. It is also clear in the data that Zuni began to move through 
similar stages as it joined other ecosystems. In subsequent ecosystem joining, such as with 
Samsung, Zuni started to move quickly through the phases, but still started at the first phase 
(rather than starting at a later phase). Using this data set and related analysis, I can identify a 
strategic process Zuni followed as it aimed to increase its performance through its role as a 
complementor to Apple.  
 The data collection for this study took place in three main blocks of time separated by 
approximately one year each (see Table 2.1 for dates). The identified phases closely align to 
these time periods since they match well with Zuni’s evolution as a complementor. During the 
first interview block, the focal division had recently started offering products optimized for 
Apple’s ecosystem. Thus, data in this block matches well with Phase 1 since Zuni was very 
compliance-centric. During the second interview block, the division’s product portfolio had 
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become almost entirely designed to work with Apple products. This corresponds well with Phase 
2 since Zuni was working to influence Apple and align products with Apple product launches. 
However, to more closely match with the data, the second phase spans two interview blocks and 
crosses from the second to the third interview block. In the early portion of the third block of 
interviews, the division was still heavily focused on attempting to influence Zuni and build a 
stronger relationship. During the later time of the third block of interviews, Apple began to more 
aggressively compete with Zuni by entering its markets. Thus, the third phase starts during the 
middle of the third interview block when Zuni started more vigorously pursuing an innovation-
centric strategy. By the end of this block, with Zuni firmly in Phase 3 of complementor maturity, 
the data show Zuni more actively focusing on products for other ecosystems and becoming less 
dependent on technologies, information, and aligning values with Apple. 
 Various indicators provided evidence as to when Zuni moved through different stages of 
complementor maturity. For example, during later interviews, informants mentioned 
organizational structures, liaison processes, and standard operating procedures that had been 
established to address compliance considerations. Similarly, informants explained routines 
related to meetings with Apple and the outcomes of these meetings, which provided data 
associated with Zuni’s influencing strategies and accompanying activities. They provided 
indications of the difficulties associated with working with Apple, gathering information from 
them, and attempting to modify the constraints under which Zuni was operating. 
 
Phase 1 – Compliance-centric 
In the first phase, which I refer to as compliance-centric, Zuni expended a great deal of effort 
reacting to the new requirements imposed on it as it became a more active ecosystem participant. 
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During this phase, not only was Zuni figuring out how to become compliant, but it was also 
wrestling with decisions about to what extent it was comfortable with following requirements. 
Though the phase is called compliance-centric to represent the amount of attention being paid to 
the notion of compliance, it is important to recognize that some of this effort was, in essence, 
being directed at figuring out ways not to be compliant. Still, the data shows a good deal of effort 
being placed focusing resources and attention on how to become compliant. An informant 
explained the difficulties of compliance: 
“…engineering never goes like it’s supposed to. Simply being handed a card or handed a spec or 
handed a requirement... it’s not rocket science, but I think it’s more work than a lot of people 
would guess… you can make A work and you can make B work, but when you plug A and B 
together, you always get unexpected interactions, period.”(11-8-11) 
A great deal of managerial focus was spent on challenges and tensions related to compliance 
with various informants mentioning meetings and discussions struggling with performance trade-
offs and debates about new design influences and Zuni’s willingness to comply with new 
requirements. Although Zuni was highly focused on technological prowess and product design, 
during this phase it was grappling with a growing recognition of the need to compromise to 
participate as a complementor in an MSP ecosystem.  
 An example of this compliance-centric thinking that moved beyond product design to 
branding and packaging revolved around ecosystem compliance logos. Zuni strongly resisted 
adding any other firm’s brand to its packaging and struggled with the idea of having to comply 
with branding requirements. It eventually chose to allow the logos, but this was a highly 
emotional decision for many of the managers. An informant explained, 
“And then the fact that you have to put Apple mandated stuff on your packaging - that made it 
tougher. One of the things I’m realizing now, it’s actually beneficial to be able to do that... So, if 
I can finally accept the fact that our product is an accessory and not a product, which…don’t tell 
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anybody in the company I admitted that. Then, it behooves the customer at the point of sale to be 
able to know:  ‘Can I use this accessory with the thing that I want to use it with?’” (2-8-12) 
Zuni became accustomed to including others’ brands on its packaging. Contrary to Zuni’s initial 
resistance to logo inclusion, Zuni became so comfortable with this complementor compliance 
mentality that managers became frustrated when MSPs would not provide logos and guidelines:  
“I mean…we’re trying to figure out, what is Windows’ compatibility? Windows doesn’t even 
know and they won’t let us use their icons. So, how can you tell a customer, ‘I’m compatible with 
a Windows phone,’ when Windows’ licensing team won’t even let you use the Windows name or 
icon on your product?” (2-8-12) 
 During this phase, Zuni did not emphasize influencing Apple but rather recognized it did 
not have a relationship with Apple in which it could provide input. An informant explained, 
“They’re not asking us, ‘So, what are you trying to do? What experience are you trying to 
create?’ There’s none of that.”(10-25-11)  
Still, supporting the notion that Zuni was following a multi-pronged strategy, a senior manager 
noted that Zuni needed to start thinking along the lines of an influence strategy: 
“We’ll learn from our relationships with Apple to make sure we do things better in the future, 
but I think at this point everything is moving so fast, we’ve got to ramp up our ability to 
contribute to this ecosystem, as well.”(2-8-12) 
Though Zuni was not significantly innovating against dependencies in this phase, Zuni was 
starting to develop an innovation response. Zuni senior managers were beginning to think about 
innovation to address the dependencies. A manager explained, 
“It’s time for us to start to think about, how can we create a new category? We need to be 
looking at technology that is not just going to be subservient to them. How can we create an 
experience that is independent of this ecosystem? Ideally, it would be one that doesn’t even need 
this ecosystem. So, that is actually where I’m putting my creative juices emphasis...” (2-8-12) 
 
Phase 2 – Influence-centric 
In the second phase, which I refer to as influence-centric, the angst associated with being newly 
saddled with compliance requirements seemed to abate somewhat. Zuni accepted the need for 
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compliance and started to learn to work within Apple’s processes. One of the key managers 
explained how they coped with testing requirements, 
“...as Apple evolves their products there’s increasing amounts of interoperability testing we need 
to do, but they do a very good job of supporting their devices in a way that maybe there’s some 
slight variation, but largely we do things according to their rules and it works.” (5-1-13) 
Zuni developed a liaison process with regular meetings, documentation, etc., which enabled less 
significant senior management involvement in the process. A participant explained,  
“So, we have a standing meeting that we call the MFi meeting…some of us were chosen to make 
sure we fully understand how to introduce a new product for Apple. We sit down and we discuss all 
the issues that we’re having with Apple. We then document all those issues and give them to one of two 
people.” (5-21-13) 
In a similar example, the organization accepted the need to include compliance logos on its 
products, and implemented a process for complying with these requirements (but emotional 
tension around it remained): 
“With Apple it was sort of a…we had to work with them to get permission and to get the logo, 
pay the royalty; we held our nose and we did all that stuff.” (6-14-13) 
Compliance continued as an essential response strategy to cope with dependencies, but on a 
relative basis, management effort towards it was reduced. 
 With regular compliance-related interactions somewhat under control, and thus increased 
bandwidth available for other types of response strategies, Zuni continued to mature as a 
complementor and shifted its attention towards relationship building and influencing 
circumstances. Zuni was able to place more emphasis on instances in which dependencies caused 
problems and needed to be substantially addressed. Explaining a Zuni response to a situation that 
included a technological dependency and a performance trade-off, an informant explained: 
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“...sometimes it’s like, ‘Well, that’s not what we were going to do and really that’s not the best 
way to do it,’ and so we’ll argue with [Apple] sometimes, but I gather that we’re actually one of 
the few people that argue with them about that sort of stuff.” (5-1-13)   
Similarly, a manager explained another interaction in response to a technology dependency in 
which Zuni influenced the situation:  
“So, we went back to them and we said, ‘We are not implementing [that technology],’ and their 
reaction was typical which is, ‘Why not? We told you to.’ And then, we provided data that said it 
degrades the experience - we cannot do it. They reacted well to that and had us provide data 
with our measurement techniques...  they really appreciated the thoroughness...” (5-21-13) 
Another manager emphasized the extent to which Zuni was learning how to submit feedback, 
work within Apple’s systems, and move beyond a simple compliance mentality. He explained, 
“...right now we’re trying to be more proactive, so not only would we submit a bug report but 
then we’re beginning to improve our network where whoever submitted the bug report will e-
mail [a Zuni liaison] and say, ‘You ought to bring this up [to Apple] and tell them to reach out to 
me with a more detailed explanation with data.’” (5-21-13) 
While operating in this phase, Zuni also began to more steadily incorporate an innovation 
response as it started to more specifically recognize how dependencies were causing 
inefficiencies in Zuni products. While explaining another very specific example of a 
technological dependency, the same manager explained,  
“So now I’m always thinking of ways around that because that annoys me. It just makes the [part 
of the Zuni product] expensive and it’s not value added to the customers... It doesn’t degrade the 
experience but it’s not adding value to the customer, so it bothers me that I pay for it when I 
could use that money elsewhere to enhance the experience.” (5-21-13) 
 
Phase 3 – Innovation-centric 
Though in Phase 2 the data show examples of Zuni beginning to innovate to avoid dependencies, 
it is in Phase 3 when Zuni continues its evolution as a complementor and more substantially 
starts to use innovation as a relatively significant response strategy. In this phase, Zuni places 
 121 
 
relatively more management emphasis on innovation than compliance or influencing. Consistent 
with these behaviors, I refer to this third phase as innovation-centric.  
 In this phase, Zuni seemed to spend less management attention on compliance details 
because, though the organization still exhibited many compliance behaviors, these behaviors (or 
routines) had become part of a normal operating mode. As a manager explained, 
“We’ve gotten a lot more mature… There’s a lot more organizational ownership of working to 
their specs. I’ve set up a whole cross-functional team and they’re mostly running on their own. 
We’ve got much more internal buy-in that this is what we’re doing…we all grump about it 
sometimes but people understand why we’re doing it and we do it …it’s just part of our standard 
work.” (4-25-14) 
Similarly, yet somewhat counter-intuitively, in this phase Zuni also started to reduce its emphasis 
on influencing as a response strategy; during Phase 2, Zuni’s management emphasis on 
influencing seemed to have peaked. By Phase 3, senior managers recognized Zuni was not going 
to be successful in building the type of relationship with Apple to which it had initially aspired. 
A managed commented: 
“So, I think the lesson that we’ve sort of learned here is…there really isn’t a two-way ecosystem. 
There really isn’t something where two companies who are competing in a marketplace 
really…really want to work together for mutual benefit because one is always bigger than the 
other.” (8-26-14) 
Apple had started to aggressively enter Zuni’s markets and compete head-to-head with Zuni 
products. Zuni’s influencing efforts reverted to focusing primarily on tactical changes to 
technical specifications and bug fixes. 
 Zuni’s primary emphasis in this most mature of the three phases was on innovation and 
determining how to continue to offer differentiated competitive products while living with the 
dependencies imposed by operating within a large ecosystem controlled by a more powerful 
organization. A manager explained, 
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“If I don’t pursue these other side opportunities I think the way that Apple has evolved is going 
to prevent me from getting the growth I need. That’s why I need to do it.”(8-26-14) 
As part of these efforts, Zuni not only focused on innovation within its own boundaries, but also 
on actively engaging with other ecosystems run by large MSPs (e.g., Samsung, which by this 
time had emerged as another powerful market leader). Referring to working both with Apple and 
Samsung, yet also highlighting the need for an innovation strategy, one informant noted, 
“I still have to work with Apple. I mean, my god, I still have to make things that work with the 
Galaxy device. I realize that. But I’ve got to do more.” (8-26-14) 
 
 To summarize, Zuni progressed through three phases of complementor maturity. In each 
phase, Zuni deployed three response strategies (compliance, influence, and innovation) to 
varying degrees to counteract the effects of dependencies they experienced as they joined an 
MSP ecosystem. Figure 2.4 summarizes shifts in management attention through the phases.  
 
 
Phase 1: 
Compliance-centric 
 
Phase 2: 
Influence-centric 
 
Phase 3: 
Innovation-centric 
 
Compliance 
 
 
 
  
Influence 
 
 
 
  
Innovation 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Key:            = substantial management attention 
                    = medium management attention             
                    = less management attention 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Management attention variation by complementor maturity phase 
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 Reading across the columns provides an overview of the relative emphasis on strategies 
in each phase. In the first phase, Zuni focused primarily on compliance with much less attention 
placed on influence and innovation. In the second phase, Zuni placed a great deal of emphasis on 
influencing, and still worked considerably on managing compliance while also starting to 
increase attention on innovating to respond to dependencies. This phase was the peak time for 
Zuni’s efforts related to influencing. In the third phase, Zuni had shifted its attention to a great 
extent towards innovating while still placing some emphasis on influencing (mostly around 
tactical topics like software bugs). In this third phase, Zuni had already established new norms 
and operating procedures to address compliance, so exerted less management effort on 
compliance.  
 Reading across the rows provides a view of how each response strategy shifted through 
the phases. The compliance strategy started high and steadily decreased in management 
attention. The influence strategy started low, then increased in the middle, then decreased once 
Zuni recognized the relationship was not progressing to address strategic initiatives. Finally, the 
innovation strategy started low when Zuni was heavily focused on compliance, and then steadily 
increased as Zuni matured as a complementor. 
 
DISCUSSION  
In this chapter I explore how mature incumbent firms that join MSP-governed ecosystems as 
complementors cope with dependency challenges. I highlight three response strategies that 
employed in combination comprise multi-pronged strategies complementors execute as they pass 
through three phases of complementor maturity. My theoretical framework illustrates how a less 
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powerful firm joining an established ecosystem experiences dependencies and then addresses 
these challenges over time by modifying a hybrid set of response strategies. 
 A complementor perspective - The vast majority of current literature related to MSP-
based businesses and ecosystems focuses primarily on platform managers governing these 
systems and the various barriers to growing and competing in ecosystems such as the “chicken 
and egg problem” (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003) and winner-take-all concerns (Cennamo & Santalo, 
2013). Scholars have proposed solutions to address these problems that include types of pricing 
strategies (Hagiu, 2009), governance mechanisms (Boudreau, 2010), and multiple approaches to 
building and growing ecosystems (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). By looking at 
platforms and ecosystems from the perspective of an accessory provider joining ecosystems as a 
complementor, and focusing on an organizational perspective, I am able to contribute new 
insights to our understanding of these systems including those related to dependencies, response 
strategies, and phases of complementor maturity.  
 Complementor maturity - Recent literature on ecosystem governance has studied 
technology ecosystems at different stages of maturity considering how ecosystem evolution may 
affect generativity and innovation of entering complementors particularly in the face of 
contradictory logics and paradoxical tensions (Boudreau, 2012; Wareham, Fox, Cano Giner, 
2014). Wareham, et al. (2014) note that from a population perspective complementor maturity is 
relevant and they call for further exploration of generativity as ecosystems evolve, but this work 
does not explore strategic and organizational changes undertaken by complementors as they 
mature in their ecosystem participation.  
  MSP-complementor relationships are different from other types of interfirm 
relationships - Whereas supply chain and alliance researchers study interfirm relationships 
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similar to complementor relationships that also exhibit joint dependencies with shared risks and 
outcomes (Gulati &  Gargiulo, 1999; Helper, MacDuffie, & Sabel, 2000) and potential 
asymmetric power dynamics, the MSP complementor relationships studied here have 
characteristics that distinguish them from these other forms of interfirm relationships. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.1, MSP relationships exist in a triangular form in which both the MSP and 
the complementor establish relationships with end customers. In contrast, in supplier 
relationships and alliances, the focal organization operates in a linear fashion with its suppliers 
and/or partners whereby one entity (usually the buyer or larger alliance partner) owns the 
customer relationship and ultimately provides the added value (Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996). 
In contrast, in complementor relationships, the MSP offers a product or service and the 
complementor offers a distinctly different product or service (e.g., an accessory product) that 
builds upon the initial offering to add increased value (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Yoffie 
& Kwak, 2006). The primary difference between linear and triangular form relationships is that 
in the triangular (MSP) form, the complementor maintains a direct channel to the end customer. 
Thus MSPs have some similar characteristics to other forms of interfirm relationships, but are 
distinctly different (see Hagiu & Wright, 2015b for a more extensive comparison of the MSP 
business form with other business models). It follows also then that dependencies associated with 
MSP-complementor relationships might be different than those exhibited in other types of 
interfirm relationships.  
 Dependencies and responses are different in MSP-complementor relationships - 
Management scholars have explored responses organizations use to control dependencies in 
interfirm relationships (Green & Welsh, 1988; Provan & Skinner, 1989; Xia, 2011). Since MSP 
relationships share attributes with traditional interfirm relationships, it is worth considering 
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whether dependencies and responses in complementor relationships are different than those in 
other forms of interfirm relationships. Technological dependencies are evident in linear 
buyer/supplier relationships in which a buyer can dictate specifications and requirements to a 
supplier. However, the risks associated with this dependency are different than in an MSP 
complementor case because contractual guarantees exist between buyers and suppliers, and roles 
of the two are very clear. Hence, there is less risk that the supplier ends up with unsalable 
product. In the MSP case operating as a triangle with multiple customer relationships, there is 
considerable technological dependency and risk because the MSP can unilaterally change 
specifications. This is principally true when the MSP controls a sizable share of a market. 
Because both the MSP and complementor have relationships with customers, when the MSP 
changes technologies, the complementor may be negatively affected as it still needs to manage 
its relationships with its customers. The complementor’s product offerings may potentially 
become non-interoperable with the MSP’s offerings. 
 As in MSP-complementor relationships, information dependency also exists in buyer-
supplier relationships in which suppliers desire more and quicker information from buyers. 
However, in MSP-complementor relationships, an MSP might have a strategic incentive to 
withhold information because it is managing across multiple complementors and may be 
attempting to maintain a “level playing field” across the ecosystem. The MSP might also 
withhold information when it is competing, or planning to compete, against its own 
complementors (Gawer & Henderson, 2007). There might be some of this behavior evident in 
the case of buyer-supplier relationships, in which a buyer might be maintaining multiple sources 
of a component or item, or might be planning to vertically integrate (Hagiu, 2015a and b). Still, 
information dependency is likely to be much more pervasive in the MSP context because MSPs 
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maintain a separate and distinct relationship with customers. They aim to maintain these 
relationships and need to be sure they do not get commoditized. One of the ways for an MSP to 
retain power in an ecosystem is by carefully managing information flow and creating 
information dependencies for complementors, making information dependencies more severe in 
MSP-complementor relationships. 
 The same types of dynamics hold true relative to values-based dependencies: they exist in 
other forms of interfirm relationships, but are different in an MSP context. In buyer-supplier 
relationships there might be values mismatches between actors, but once the supplier chooses to 
engage in a relationship with a buyer, these become minimized. In this linear relationship, the 
buyer will own the relationship with the customer, so the buyer’s values related to customer 
relationships will dominate. In complementor relationships, because the complementor also 
maintains customer relationships, it is more likely there will be core values divergence and 
therefore values-based dependencies as evidenced in the Zuni case. Thus, across all three types 
of dependencies, we see they exist in other forms of interfirm relationships, but they are likely to 
be more prevalent, and more impactful, in the MSP-context. 
 The same analysis is relevant for response strategies comparing how we would expect 
them to manifest in more traditional linear forms of interfirm relationships versus in MSP-
complementor relationships. Asymmetries in power affect relationships between firms and their 
responses to challenges (Dahl, 1957; Emerson, 1962; Nye, 2011). With respect to compliance, a 
less powerful and more dependent entity must comply with requirements of a more powerful 
entity. This dynamic is likely to be similar across forms of interfirm relationships in which there 
is an asymmetric power relationship, including with MSPs. However, again as illustrated by the 
triangular business model schematic (Figure 2.1) complementors create and maintain 
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relationships with their own customers, so they retain flexibility in determining to what extent 
they will comply with MSP-requirements. Still though, the MSP can use mechanisms such as 
compliance logo branding programs (e.g., Apple’s MFi program) to encourage and enforce 
compliance behavior by complementors. Thus, whereas at first analysis it may seem like 
compliance is a less relevant strategy with MSPs versus other interfirm relationship forms, the 
data in this research shows compliance is a dominant strategy early in a complementor’s maturity 
and stays relevant as long as the complementor remains in the ecosystem. 
 The influence response strategy appears to be quite different in the MSP case versus a 
linear business model. In most buyer-supplier relationships, a supplier has minimal leeway to 
influence the requirements of a buyer, though there are some strategic relationships in which a 
supplier may work directly with a buyer to influence requirements. Still, in the MSP case, the 
complementor can use its relationships with customers (all of whom by construction are also 
customers of the MSP) to influence the MSP. Additionally, if the complementor has its own high 
level of technological (or other functional domain) expertise, as was the case with Zuni, the 
complementor may be able to use this knowledge to influence an MSP. Further, a high risk of 
vertical integration by a platform into a complementor’s market space affects opportunities for 
complementors (Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Hagiu & Wright, 2015a and b). An influence 
strategy might enable a complementor to get an early inclination that an MSP might be 
considering vertical integration into its market. Thus, an influence strategy is likely to be more 
prevalent in MSP-complementor relationships versus other interfirm relationships. 
 Finally, the innovation strategy also appears to be different in MSP-complementor 
relationships versus traditional linear buyer-supplier or alliance business models. In a buyer-
supplier relationship the contractual obligations provide significant restrictions. In an MSP-
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governed ecosystem, the complementor can decide along which dimensions it desires to comply 
and on which it wants to innovate. This can be as simple as choosing to change product colors or 
marketing strategies, or as technologically complex as switching to adopt an industry standard 
versus an MSP-proprietary one (e.g., switching to an industry-wide wireless interface standards 
such as Bluetooth). 
 In addition to articulating types of dependencies and response strategies in MSP-
complementor relationships, this study recognized three phase of complementor maturity. Since 
these phases incorporate how a complementor employs responses, and these strategies can be 
different in MSP-complementor relationships versus other interfirm relationships, these maturity 
phases are also likely to be different in MSP relationships. In sum, the findings show that 
dependencies, responses, and maturity phases are related to those evident in linear interfirm 
relationships, but distinctly different. This is primarily due to the triangular nature of 
complementor-MSP-customer relationships in which both the MSP and customer maintain 
customer relationships.  
 Why do complementors choose specific combinations of responses as they mature? -  In 
this study, why Zuni chose the response strategies it did during each phase, and why it moved 
from one phase to another might be attributed to a number of factors. One plausible set of 
explanations relates to Zuni’s strong and long established organizational identity (Albert & 
Whetten, 1985). Joining an ecosystem governed by a much more powerful player may have 
challenged Zuni’s identity (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). Zuni 
considered itself to be a fiercely independent technology-centric product organization. It also 
believed strongly in “doing the right thing” and behaving with the utmost integrity. Thus, it is not 
surprising that as Zuni started to participate in an ecosystem, its first concerns would be those 
 130 
 
related to technological performance and complying with the imposed requirements. 
Additionally, Zuni struggled with the notion of being a complementor and becoming 
significantly dependent upon other organizations. Early in the study, Zuni’s behaviors were 
consistent with a very independent organization trying to comply, but on its own terms.  
 As the organization gained experience in the ecosystem, it started to recognize how 
dependent it had become on another organization and began to more actively test boundaries, 
resist rules, and work to change them; it moved into the influence-centric second phase. Over 
time, as the results of the influencing were not progressing to the organization’s liking, and the 
organization became more accustomed to its role in the ecosystem and its ability to be successful 
as a member, it fell back on its strong heritage and organizational identity characteristics as an 
innovator. In the later phase, the organization showed signs of having modified some of its 
identity dimensions. It underwent an attitudinal shift by accepting that it was an accessory 
provider and dependent upon another organization, but it also adopted behaviors completely 
consistent with its dominant identity characteristics of being an innovator. Rather than exhibiting 
a substantial organizational identity shift, Zuni showed organizational identity resilience as its 
fundamental identity remained. 
 Reacting to technology-driven change as a complementor - Scholars have long known 
that organizations find it difficult to adapt to technology-related change (Tushman & Anderson, 
1986, Henderson & Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997) and that managerial cognition plays a role in 
this inertia (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). This study builds on this tradition by empirically exploring 
over a multi-year period the challenges a complementor organization faced as it joined a 
technologically driven ecosystem and how the routines, behaviors, and capabilities of the 
organization evolved. The organization gained experience as a complementor as it became 
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successful offering products in the ecosystem. It began to accept its role and also learned how to 
adjust to perform even more effectively within it developing new heuristics and capabilities.  
 This is particularly noteworthy because accepted wisdom is that significant discontinuous 
organization change is usually accompanied by executive team change (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 
1996). Throughout the duration of this study, the management team of the division did not 
change; this organization exhibits very little management turnover. It is true and noteworthy that 
the president of the parent organization had changed soon before this study began and it is likely 
that executive shift affected the approach of this division. Still, over a multi-year period it was 
very clear the management team associated with the studied division altered its mental models 
related to its participation in MSP-governed ecosystems.  
  Complementor maturity as an ecosystem-specific construct - During the duration of this 
research, Zuni was joining and participating in multiple ecosystems. However, because of the 
market dynamics in the smartphone and tablet markets, it made most sense for Zuni to focus its 
efforts on creating products that worked well with Apple products. Somewhat unfortunately for 
Zuni, but fortunately for this research, joining Apple’s ecosystem imposed more requirements 
(and thus dependencies) on Zuni than those of Android, Microsoft, or other device makers. The 
question arises:  Were the phases of complementor maturity here relationship-specific or were 
they applicable to the Zuni such that when it later joined another ecosystem it would already be 
more mature?  
 The data indicates that these phases are relationship-specific. The idiosyncratic nature of 
relationships between complementors, in this case Zuni, and platform managers seems to affect 
how a complementor moves through phases of maturity. As each relationship is different, it 
follows that there might be variation in how a complementor manages its relationships with 
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platform managers. This is particularly interesting in situations, which are becoming increasingly 
common, where complementors simultaneously compete in a variety of MSP-based ecosystems.  
Towards the end of this study, Zuni began to more actively create products to work with 
Samsung devices as Samsung was emerging as an Android smartphone market leader. When 
presented with the phases of complementor maturity framework in March 2015, Zuni’s general 
manager agreed that they were in essence operating in Phase 1- Compliance-centric as they 
navigated their relationship with Samsung. He noted that they would probably move through the 
phases more quickly than they had with Apple as they joined this second large ecosystem, but 
confirmed that they were not starting with an innovation-centric mindset. First, they needed to 
focus on how they were going to address compliance questions, including the possibility of 
helping Samsung develop standards. Again, Zuni was pursuing a multi-pronged strategy with 
variable relative emphasis on responses.  
Since each MSP is unique and creates its own governance regime, it is reasonable to 
expect that the phases of complementor maturity would to some extent reset as a complementor 
joined a new ecosystem. However, it also seems that Zuni underwent attitudinal and behavioral 
shifts, and gained competencies, as it became a more mature complementor such that it would go 
through subsequent sets of phases more quickly and more skillfully. The research suggests that 
these findings are generalizable beyond the joining of Apple’s ecosystem and should hold 
relative to other ecosystems as well. Additionally, though this study included extensive data from 
one complementor, confirmatory interviews with other industry participants also suggests that 
the findings should hold for other complementors as well.  
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
A construct not thoroughly covered in this research, yet commonly associated with ecosystem 
development is that of co-opetition in which an organization joining an ecosystem is both 
cooperating with, but also competing against, the platform manager (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 
1996; Afuah, 2000). The notion of organizations both competing and cooperating is not a new 
one (Deutsch, 1968), and organizations operating within MSP ecosystems are often confronted 
with the dynamic since platform managers have been known to compete with the complementors 
they enable (Gawer & Henderson, 2007). Because the empirical data in this study provided 
insights into new frameworks of dependencies, responses, and complementor maturity associated 
with joining MSP-governed ecosystems, I chose to focus this chapter on internal challenges and 
responses rather than on competitive dynamics. However, there is great potential to continue this 
research considering co-opetition dynamics and tying more tightly to existing and emerging 
research on co-opetition. 
 Though we can use organizational identity theory to consider when and why an 
organization might invoke response strategies, this study focused almost entirely on 
organizational identity in terms of insiders’ views of their own organization. An extension might 
be to include how insiders account for how others perceive them (particularly because there was 
significant branding work underway during this study) and also how others perceive the 
organization. Also, since identity theory spans both micro (individual) level and macro 
(organizational) levels, future research could tie this work more closely to micro identity themes. 
It could also complement emerging work on ambivalence in organizations (Pradies & Pratt, 
2010; Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies, 2014) since that research shares considerations with 
identity research and also spans micro and macro levels. 
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 Agency and leadership are two topics that also were not addressed in this chapter, but are 
relevant and would add further insight into how an organization copes with challenges studied 
here. The general manager played a significant leadership role throughout the time of this study 
as did one of the senior managers on the team. Yet, organization members had significant 
autonomy in how they interacted with MSP representatives and interpreted platform 
requirements. Studying the interplay between leadership directions and de facto strategy 
development (Burgelman, 1994) in this context would be very interesting.   
 Though this single case study is appropriate for this topic, this empirical work might also 
benefit from additional cases. During the course of this research, Zuni was entering multiple 
ecosystems in addition to its efforts related to Apple. The findings indicate that Zuni was starting 
to move through similar phases with Samsung and others, thus one option for continued research 
would be to conduct more extensive fieldwork in the same division as it more aggressively joins 
additional ecosystems. Another option would be to study another division of the same firm, and 
yet another option might be to expand the study to other firms in the same ecosystem. A further 
expansion might be to include accessory or complementary provider firms in additional 
industries. Finally, although qualitative methods are appropriate to address the research questions 
here since they are nascent and the theoretical contribution is a suggestive model (Edmondson & 
McManus, 2007), as the research questions become more well defined, quantitative survey and 
other methods might provide further insight. 
 This chapter addresses challenges and responses as organizations join ecosystems. 
Consistent with the focal case study, it addresses mature incumbent organizations joining 
ecosystems. Another related research area could investigate challenges faced by organizations 
that become complementors, but which are not already well established, such as entrepreneurial 
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ventures. Based on the findings in this chapter, it is reasonable to expect that dependencies 
encountered by entrepreneurial ventures might be similar, particularly related to technology and 
information, though possibly less so related to values. The complementor firm might have had 
less time to establish processes strongly aligned with existing values. Similarly, it is reasonable 
to expect that response strategies might incorporate compliance, influence, and innovation, but 
potentially to different extents. Thus, the nature and timing of the phases of complementor 
maturity might differ.   
 Additionally, whereas this chapter focused entirely on organizations joining ecosystems, 
as information constraints continue to decrease and platform-based businesses become 
increasingly more prevalent (Altman, Nagle, & Tushman, 2015), firms are transitioning from 
product to platform-based business models and undergoing changes in institutional logics 
(Gawer & Philips, 2013). Though this is a different transition than ecosystem joining, 
organizations adopting MSP-based business models are essentially on the other side of the 
dynamics explored in this chapter as they are imposing dependencies and encouraging response 
strategies from their complementors. It would be interesting to study organizational changes 
associated with product-to-platform transitions exploring dependencies, responses, phases of 
maturity, and organizational identity considerations (see Altman & Tripsas, 2015 for an 
introduction to this topic).   
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter contributes to the burgeoning research on multi-sided platforms (e.g., Hagiu & 
Wright, 2015a; Gawer & Phillips, 2013) and that related to business ecosystems (e.g., Iansiti & 
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Levien, 2004; Adner & Kapoor, 2010, 2015; Kapoor & Adner, 2012; Kapoor & Lee, 2013; 
Wareham, Fox, & Cano Giner, 2014) by taking an organizational theory approach and 
elucidating challenges, response strategies, and phases of complementor maturity as 
organizations join complementor ecosystems. This research extends existing research on 
complementors (e.g., Cusumano, Myloanadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992; Gawer & Henderson, 2007) 
in that this is one of the first empirical studies to take the perspective of a complementor entering 
and participating in these networks to understand the challenges it encounters and its responses. 
Although most of the platform and ecosystem literature is economics-based and focused on 
pricing, competition, and governance, this work considers organizational and managerial 
challenges and identifies three types of dependencies (technical, information, and values-based) 
confronted by organizations joining ecosystems, three response strategies (compliance, 
influence, and innovation), and three phases of complementor maturity characterized by the use 
of these strategies to varying degrees. This is also the first time that dependency, power, 
influence, and organizational identity theories have been brought to bear to help us understand 
phenomena associated with platforms and ecosystems.  
 The dependencies and response strategies articulated in this research are characteristic of 
MSP-based ecosystem and complementor relationships, and the managerial implications of this 
work are numerous. The frameworks presented here can be adapted such that managers of 
complementors starting to join an ecosystem can consider the types of dependencies they might 
face and how they might respond to them. Technological dependencies map to concerns related 
to product and service development and delivery. Information dependencies encompass 
communication-related challenges. Values-based dependencies are related to considerations of 
identity and culture that are of great concern to organizational leaders. Managers could use these 
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frameworks to develop their own responses taking into account those presented here. In addition, 
managers of MSPs can consider these dependencies and responses as they create ecosystems and 
better understand how their complementors may be affected by their actions and policies.  
 Complementor firms play a large role in the arena of multi-sided platforms and 
ecosystems, yet their challenges have been substantially under-explored and researchers rarely 
focus on the interactions between complementors and platforms. As tablets, smartphones and 
other devices that rely on complementor products to deliver full functionality continue to grow in 
popularity worldwide, and firms continue to recognize value in joining ecosystems in which they 
can offer complementary products, there will be increasing interest in challenges organizations 
face as they join ecosystems governed by powerful platform managers.  
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Appendix 2.1 Sample interview guide for semi-structured interviews 
Interview Guide 
Elizabeth J. Altman – Zuni Field Research Project 
November, 2013 
 
OPENING COMMENTS: 
 Explain purpose and nature of study:  Research for doctoral project – potentially will become 
dissertation material and academic paper. 
 Show consent form 
 Some questions may seem odd or farfetched because they may be appropriate for one person 
and not another; we can skip ones if they don’t make sense for this person’s role or if they are 
uncomfortable answering for any reason.   
 No right or wrong answers.  Interested in their opinions and personal experiences. 
 Feel free to interrupt, ask for clarification, criticize line of questioning, etc. 
 Would like to ask permission to record the interview for my research purposes.  
 
PROVIDE CONSENT FORM 
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QUESTION PROTOCOL 
 
BACKGROUND/RAPPORT BUILDING 
 
 Please tell me a little about your primary role in the business. 
{Follow-ups:  Expand on business role, clarify, and ask questions that might help understand 
organization both from formal and informal perspective…} 
 
 How long have you been in your current role?  In this organization? 
 
 Where were you before? 
 
 [Ask any appropriate follow-up questions about organizational structure, who reports to 
whom, etc.?] 
 
JOINING ECOSYSTEMS 
 Does your business provide any products that work with other companies’ products?  Can you 
tell me a little about those products and how this works? 
{Trying to see if they have complementary products and what they might be.  If they aren’t naming 
any, but I know they have them, ask about ecosystems, applications, accessories, etc.} 
 
 Do you have any direct relationships with the makers of those other products?   
{Looking for understanding of whether or not they are “arm’s length” relationships where they can 
just get information such as Software Developer Kits (SDKs) on-line, or whether or not they have 
interactions with the other company.} 
 
 How have those relationships changed in the past few years, months?  
{Aiming to see if there has been a transition, particularly in the nature of the relationships.  If so, try 
to find out why.  Did the technology change so the products now interoperate more (e.g., one 
product can control the other)?} 
 
 [OPTIONAL IF WE ARE NOT GETTING THERE…] I understand that your company has started to 
supply products that work with Apple [or Samsung] products. Can you tell me a little about 
when that started and how it is going? 
 
 How do you envision they might change in the future?  
{They may know a technology shift is imminent. If I know one is, this is also a way to see how aware 
they are of what is happening in their ecosystem. Tech shift might require them to license technology 
from the platform company, or modify products to interface differently.} 
 
 What are the benefits and challenges that you have with these types of relationships?   
{Interested both in external challenges related to how the companies interact with each other and 
also internal challenges related to how internally they are dealing with having these types of 
relationships.  Prompt further about the other type if only getting one, but be sure to go far enough 
with whichever one they mention first.} 
 Do you consider that your business is participating as a member of any business ecosystems? 
If so, which ones?   
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{Possible prompts:  Application developer?  Accessory provider? Avoid specific supply chain 
discussions and focus on complementor roles.}  
 
 Why does your firm participate in this/these ecosystem(s)? 
 
 If only in one, do you plan to be in others?  Why did you choose one over another? 
{See if can also determine who is making the decision in the organization.} 
 
 How long have you been participating in this ecosystem? 
 
 Do you know if there are other companies in this ecosystem that produce products similar to 
yours?  If so, how would you compare your company with those companies? 
{Looking for information about competitors; trying to see if they have anything to say about power 
relationships here also...can probe for this.} 
 
PRODUCT TO PLATFORM TRANSITIONS 
 
 I am also interested in product to platform transitions. Are there any efforts underway that 
you are involved in where the organization is moving to be more platform-based?  
 
 Do you need to incorporate technology from other firms into your products? If so, how is that 
relationship structured and managed? 
{e.g., licensing? Software developer kits (SDKs)? etc.} 
 
 Do you enable others to incorporate their technologies into your products?  If so, how is that 
relationship structured and managed? 
 
 Are there interfaces that you are opening that enable others to work with your technologies?  
Please tell me about these. 
{Follow-up with questions related to APIs and SDKs, and trade-offs of the two.  Anything related to 
who is the platform versus who is in the ecosystem.} 
 
 What are the challenges related to these transitions? 
 
 Are you creating any developer ecosystems? 
 
 Do you think there are challenges particularly because your company is an incumbent firm in 
these markets? 
 
 Do you need to incorporate technology from other firms into your products? If so, how are 
those relationship structured and managed? 
{e.g., licensing? Software developer kits (SDKs)? etc.} 
 
 Do you enable others to incorporate their technologies into your products?  If so, how are 
those relationship structured and managed? 
 
 Have you had to address questions related to how open or closed a platform might be?   
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o In what way?   
o What are the considerations?  
o Challenges?   
o Successes? 
 
INTERNAL/ORGANIZATIONAL SPECIFIC 
 Have you had to make any changes in business processes as you have started to work in the 
ecosystems we discussed earlier, or started to create these platform-based businesses? 
{e.g., in product development processes, in financial systems, in HR, etc.} 
 
 Any changes related to interfaces?  
 
 Have you had to make internal organizational changes? If so, how were these changes 
received by the organization? 
{e.g., Team organization, recruiting, retention, training, compensation?} 
 
 Have you had to make any changes relative to how you work with external parties?  
Developers, for example? 
 
 How successful or unsuccessful have any of these changes been?   
o What are the biggest challenges with the changes?   
o What are some of the greatest accomplishments? 
 
 Has goal setting changed if at all?   
 
IDENTITY AND VALUES RELATED 
 What is most important to you about being an employee of [company name]? 
 
 What are you most proud of related to [company name]? 
 
 What are you most frustrated by? 
 
 What do you think [company name] stands for? 
 
 What is most rewarded at [company name]? 
 
 What do you think employees here value most about [company name]? 
 
 Have these changed in the last year?  Two years? Three years? (with appropriate pauses) 
 
 Can you think of anything that has caused changes to the above? 
 
 How would you describe the overall mission of this organization? 
 
 If you were to describe the values that people share in this organization, what would they be? 
 
o Is there any part of this values discussion that is relevant for joining ecosystems  
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 Do any of the values help with these transitions? 
 Hinder them? 
o Is there any part of this values discussion that is relevant for product to platform 
transitions? 
 Do any of the values help with these transitions? 
 Hinder them? 
 
EMPLOYEE MORALE AND LOYALTY 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, will you please tell me how satisfied you are working at this organization? 
 
 For how much longer do you think you will work at this organization? 
 
 On average, how long do you think most of your co-workers plan to work here?  Can you 
provide me with a range? 
 
EXTERNAL FOCUS 
 
 How do you think customers view [company name]? 
 What do you think would be the first three things a customer would say if I asked 
them to describe [company name]? 
 Have these changed in the last year?  Two years? Three years? (with appropriate 
pauses) 
 Can you think of anything that has caused changes to the above? 
 
 [If appropriate]:  How do you think developers view [company name]? 
 What do you think would be the first three things a developer would say if I asked 
them to describe [company name]? 
 Have these changed in the last year?  Two years? Three years? (with appropriate 
pauses) 
 Can you think of anything that has caused changes to the above? 
 
ADDITIONAL PROBING 
 
 What are the biggest challenges you see your business facing both in terms of what we have 
been talking about, but also more broadly?  Relative to your business role, what keeps you up 
at night, if anything? 
 
 Is what we have been talking about important to your business or are there other more 
pressing issues? 
 
SNOWBALL SAMPLING 
Are there other people in the organization, either on your team or elsewhere, with whom you 
think it would be beneficial for me to meet? 
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THANK YOU 
 
 Thank you very much.  
 Look forward to staying in touch as the research progresses. 
 If you have any questions for me, feel free to contact me.  
 If you think of anything more that you think we should have discussed, please let me know. 
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Chapter 3:  Product-to-Platform Transitions:  
Organizational Identity Implications 
 
 
Elizabeth J. Altman and Mary Tripsas 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Organizations are increasingly recognizing that value they once derived from offering stand-
alone products can be significantly enhanced if they transition to platform-based businesses 
harnessing innovative capabilities of complementors. Whereas the competitive dynamics of 
platform-based businesses have been studied extensively in the economics and strategy 
literatures, the organizational implications of shifting from a product- to a platform-based 
business model remain relatively unexplored. We propose that such a shift is not simply an 
operational change but may challenge the core of how an organization views itself, calling into 
question organizational identity. Organizations that define themselves as creative and innovative 
may have trouble accepting a platform-based context in which outsiders engage in creative 
activity on their behalf. Organizational identity can also influence whether and how 
organizations become platform-based. To succeed, organizations must question elements of their 
existing identity and actively modify it to become consistent with their new business approach. 
 
 
Keywords: organizational change, organizational identity, multi-sided platforms, ecosystems, 
complementors, managing innovation 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ability of organizations to innovate and adapt to changes in the external environment is a 
critical component of competitive success. Historically, scholarship has focused on 
understanding the challenges of technological innovations that require organizations to master 
new scientific disciplines and develop new competencies (e.g., Henderson & Clark, 1990; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986). More recently, scholars have started to explore the role of business 
model innovation (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Zott & Amit, 2008). In particular, 
organizations in many industries have adopted platform-based business models in which, rather 
than simply sell a product, organizations manage multi-sided platforms that “get two or more 
sides on board and enable direct interactions between them” (Hagiu & Wright, 2013). Some 
platforms, such as mobile phone app stores, connect producers of a complementary product (e.g., 
developers) with consumers, whereas others serve as marketplaces that connect buyers and 
sellers of goods (e.g., eBay) or match users (e.g., dating platforms). Platforms enable direct 
interactions between both sides, but each side also typically has a relationship with the platform 
provider. These relationships range from less formal interactions, such as single people signing 
up for an account on a dating site, to formal economic contracts such as application software 
developers registering with a smartphone manufacturer’s developer website and then selling 
software via an app store. Figure 3.1 provides a schematic representation of this type of business. 
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The traditional yellow pages directory is a classic example of a multi-sided platform-
based business enabling buyers and sellers to search for (and then interact with) each other, yet 
both buyers and sellers are also customers of the yellow pages provider (Evans, 2003; Rysman, 
2004). eBay is a more modern example of a multi-sided platform-based business: Buyers and 
sellers interact directly with each other (i.e., a seller pays a buyer directly when buying an item), 
yet the interaction is enabled through eBay. Both sellers and buyers are affiliated with eBay; 
sellers pay eBay a fee, and buyers have a registered account on the site. The videogame industry 
provides a hardware- and software-centric example. Manufacturers sell videogame consoles to 
consumers, and game titles are developed by both console manufacturers and independent 
producers. Consumers can buy games from manufactures or directly from third-party producers 
through console manufacturers’ websites (e.g., www.microsoftstore.com/) and other venues. 
Thus, the videogame console manufacturers enable interactions between consumers (one side) 
Multi-Sided 
Platform 
Business 
 
Side A 
Direct Interaction 
 
Side B 
Affiliation Affiliation 
Figure 3.1 Multi-sided platform business model schematic 
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and game producers (the other side); the game producers offer a complementary product that 
enhances the value of the game consoles. Multi-sided platform firms are now primary players in 
a variety of both online and offline industries that include mobile phones, tablets, personal 
computers, on-line retailing, credit cards, media, innovation contests, financial services, and 
shopping malls (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). 
Although some of these markets have existed for a long time, current technological 
advances are making these industries and organizations increasingly relevant (Gawer, 2009). 
Leveraging the declining costs of information processing, storage, and communication and the 
associated increasing penetration of broadband Internet and computing, organizations in many 
industries are expanding their innovative activities by engaging with external communities, 
frequently through platform-based business models (Altman, Nagle, & Tushman, 2015). In 
addition, with the widespread adoption of technologies such as software operating systems that 
enable external development of applications and other complementary services, industries that 
were traditionally composed of single-sided, product-based businesses now consist of 
organizations adopting platform-based business models. Even the automotive industry has 
recently moved in the direction of multi-sided platforms, with firms like General Motors creating 
new structures such as their developer ecosystem program. This program facilitates interactions 
between consumers and external software application developers, such as those building apps 
that enable drivers to communicate with their cars remotely or that track mileage for business 
expenses (Trop, 2013). 
As multi-sided platform-based businesses have become ever more relevant in the global 
economy, researchers have increasingly focused attention on topics related to their growth and 
management. The competitive and strategic implications of multi-sided platforms have been 
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studied extensively in the economics and strategy literatures, including modeling of pricing, 
competitive dynamics, and growth strategies (Armstrong, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2006). 
However, the organizational implications of shifting from a product-based to a platform-based 
business model remain relatively unexplored.31  
In particular, the implications of this transition for organizational identity and the role of 
organizational identity in guiding the transition are not well understood. Yet, these transitions 
can affect the essence of how an organization views itself and operates. If an organization 
attempts to make a product-to-platform transition without taking into account the implications of 
identity, problems may arise. If organizational identity does not evolve to accommodate the 
activities and beliefs that accompany a platform-based business, dissonance may result between 
those involved in building the platform-based business and those historically involved in the 
product-based business, inhibiting an organization’s ability to successfully transition. At the 
same time, some aspects of organizational identity may influence the type of platform-based 
strategies a firm utilizes. In this chapter, we explore the relationship between movement to a 
platform-based business model and organizational identity. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 
We conceptualize organizational identity as a shared understanding on the part of organizational 
members about “who we are as an organization.” It represents what individuals believe is central 
to and defining about their organization, often in contrast to other organizations (Albert & 
Whetten, 1985; Corley, Harquail, Pratt, Glynn, Fiol, & Hatch, 2006). Organizational identity 
manifests in two ways. First, organizational identity can address the question, “How do we 
                                                          
31In this chapter, when we refer to transitions from product-based to platform-based business models, we also 
include those that might be from merchant-based to platform-based models. We see this in the case of Amazon, 
which shifted from being entirely merchant-based to including platform-based offerings. 
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define what business are we in?” This aspect of identity is often expressed by claiming 
membership in a particular product market or industry category (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). For 
instance, Koch Industries was defined as an “oil and gas company” (Barney, 1998), and Linco as 
a “digital photography company” (Tripsas, 2009). Second, organizational identity can consist of 
a set of attributes that members collectively believe are core. For instance, in their study of the 
New York Port Authority, Dutton and Dukerich (1991, p. 526) listed a set of six attributes that 
organizational members identified as distinguishing their organization. These included items 
such as being “a professional organization . . . , ill-suited to social service activities,” and being 
“ethical, scandal-free, and altruistic.” Similarly, in their study of a unit that was spun off from an 
established firm, Corley and Gioia (2004, pp. 185–186) found that key elements of the unit’s 
identity included being a “younger, more agile competitor than [Bozco,] ‘an industry founder,’ 
‘an aggressive competitor,’ [and] a ground-breaking marketer.” 
Because organizational members have a shared understanding of “who we are,” there is 
also an implied agreement about “what we do” (Navis & Glynn, 2011). Organizational identity 
therefore creates a clear set of expectations about what constitutes appropriate action. These 
expectations often result in a set of heuristics and routines that guide and coordinate 
organizational action (Kogut & Zander, 1996). Interpretation of the external environment is 
filtered through the organization’s identity, providing a common ground for decision making 
(Tripsas, 2009). 
Although organizational identity can serve as a guidepost that unifies an organization, it 
can also create conflict. Actions inconsistent with the organizational identity result in discord and 
dysfunctional behavior within the organization (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 
1997). Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found that when liberal arts colleges adopted vocational and 
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professional programs that were inconsistent with a liberal arts identity, those programs were 
denounced by key actors. In addition, if a firm violates the norms and expectations that outsiders 
have for a given product market category, the firm loses legitimacy (Benner, 2007; Zuckerman, 
1999, 2004). For instance, Zuckerman (1999) found that securities analysts provided less 
coverage to firms that did not conform to generally accepted categories, and the share prices of 
those firms suffered. 
Managing identity effectively can help increase an organization’s flexibility in response 
to environmental shifts. For instance, in contrast to Polaroid, which maintained a narrow identity 
as an instant photography company, Fujifilm redefined itself as an “information and imaging” 
company, an identity that encompassed digital imaging activities and made those activities 
legitimate in the eyes of organizational members (Tripsas, 2013). Scholars have also shown that 
proactive, planned changes in identity are often necessary to effectively accomplish other types 
of organizational or strategic change. For instance, Gioia and Thomas (1996), in their study of 
institutions of higher education attempting to become more business-like, found that articulation 
of a new, desired future identity was important in managing the transition. 
 
MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS 
With multi-sided platform firms gaining in prominence, there has been a focus on this 
organizational form in the field of economics, with roots in industrial organization (Armstrong, 
2006; Boudreau, 2010; Rochet & Tirole, 2006). Research can be grouped roughly into two 
segments addressing two broad areas of strategic choice. The first relates primarily to 
competitive dynamics and examines the implications of network effects on pricing and growth 
strategies. The second addresses platform governance and covers questions about how open a 
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platform should be, whether standards should be proprietary, and the establishment of criteria for 
interacting through a platform. 
 
Competitive Dynamics and Network Effects 
From an economics perspective, one of the factors that distinguishes a platform-based business 
from a product-based business is the presence of network effects, also sometimes referred to as 
network externalities (Hagiu & Yoffie, 2013). Network effects are present when the value of a 
product or service increases as others utilize that product or service and expand the size of the 
network (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). Network effects are said to be direct when the source of 
increased value is direct connections among members. The classic historical example is a public 
telephone system: Having more people to call increases the value of the system to each 
individual who has a telephone. 
There are also systems that exhibit what are referred to as indirect network effects, in 
which the source of increased value for customers is the greater number and variety of 
complementary products and services that are available when more customers use a product. A 
classic example is the computer hardware/software paradigm: As more users adopt a particular 
type of hardware, such as a personal computer or videogame console, more software will be 
developed for that hardware (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). Indirect network effects are also sometimes 
referred to as “opposite side network effects” because the value to an individual member on one 
side is affected by the actions of members on the other side of the network. 
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Multi-sided platforms are most affected by indirect network effects: The larger one side 
of a platform becomes, the more value is created for actors on the other side of the platform.32 
For instance, the availability of more high-quality applications for a smartphone platform is 
beneficial to consumers, and the more consumers there are on the platform, the more attractive 
the platform becomes to application developers (Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2009; Rochet & 
Tirole, 2006). Empirical research has demonstrated the strength of these network effects in the 
yellow pages (Rysman, 2004), the personal digital assistant (PDA) industry (Nair, Chintagunta, 
& Dubé, 2004), the video cassette recorder (VCR) industry (Cusumano, Mylonadis, & 
Rosenbloom, 1992), and the videogame industry (Clements & Ohashi, 2005). In some cases, 
network effects are so strong that a “winner take all” phenomenon is at play and the market 
“tips” in favor of the dominant platform (Arthur, 1989; Cusumano et al., 1992; Shapiro & 
Varian, 1998). 
Given the strength of network effects, much of the research related to platforms has 
focused on how firms can quickly build critical mass on both sides of the platform to get a 
feedback loop started (Evans, Hagiu, & Schmalensee, 2006; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Parker 
& Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). This is sometimes referred to as the chicken-and-
egg problem, or getting the flywheel going, and it addresses the challenges of getting early 
adoption (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Evans, 2009). Scholars have shown the effectiveness of a 
number of approaches to growing a platform when network effects are in place. These include 
                                                          
32Economics scholars disagree about whether, strictly speaking, the existence of network effects is necessary for an 
entity to be considered a platform. However, because we are studying product-to-platform transitions and the 
platforms of most interest to us tend to have indirect network effects as a defining characteristic, we center our 
discussion on platforms that contain network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Gawer, 
2009). Additionally, in this chapter, when we use the generic term network effects, we are in most cases referring to 
indirect network effects. 
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pricing strategies, potentially including subsidization, and providing free services to some 
participants on the platform. 
To achieve early growth, firms may cut prices to generate demand. In a formal model of 
two-sided markets, Caillaud and Jullien (2003) focused primarily on e-commerce marketplace 
platforms and found that effective pricing strategies were in the mode they called “divide-and-
conquer,” where the firm subsidizes one side and recovers the loss on the other. Parker and Van 
Alstyne (2005) extended this work by addressing the question of which side of the platform is 
optimal to subsidize. Using a formal model, they show that in two-sided markets comprised of 
content producers and consumers, the best approach is to subsidize the side of the market that 
contributes more to demand for the other side. 
Another approach to jump-starting a platform is to provide free technical support to either 
or both sides. For instance, to encourage adoption of the Postcript standard, Adobe Systems 
provided laser printer manufacturers with a free boilerplate reference design for a Postcript 
interpreter and also gave technical support to application developers who wanted to create 
Postcript output (Tripsas, 2000). Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) illustrated the theoretical 
justification for this approach in their model; they found that firms can profitably invest in 
developing products they give away for free (e.g., application development toolkits) because 
doing so increases the number of providers on one side of the platform (e.g., number of 
application developers), which drives demand on the other side of the platform (e.g., end-users), 
and the revenue from the enhanced demand more than covers the cost of development. 
While platforms need to obtain the appropriate level of participation to start their growth 
engines, the dynamics related to gaining a “critical mass” of adoption vary (Evans, 2009). For 
some markets, such as dating platforms, organizations need to secure critical mass of both sides 
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at launch to succeed. There are yet other cases in which organizations may need to make pre-
commitments to one side to entice them to invest in the platform. For example, in the case of 
hardware/software products such as console-based videogames, hardware providers (console 
manufacturers) need to convince software developers to invest in product development (creating 
videogames) before the console is on the market and proven to be a hit with consumers. 
Hardware providers must provide enough pre-release confidential information to convince 
developers to invest or provide financial guarantees to catalyze demand for the console (Evans, 
2009). 
 
Multi-sided Platform Governance and Management 
Scholars have also addressed platform management questions, such as to what extent a platform 
should be open or closed and how to manage the quality of contributors to a platform. The 
distinction between open and closed is not straightforward, because there are varying degrees of 
openness (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Boudreau, 2010). Although organizations that have 
decided to provide a platform-based offering have already chosen to be open, at least to some 
extent, by enabling others to transact through their offering, there are still many choices related 
to the level of openness they are willing to allow and the means with which they achieve it. 
For example, organizations that offer closed, self-contained software products and decide 
to transition to a multi-sided platform-based business model need to decide to what extent to 
open their software and how to enable complementors (developers) to interact with their 
products. One such decision, which is tactical but may have significant strategic consequences, is 
whether an organization is going to offer application programming interfaces (APIs) and/or a 
software developer kit (SDK) to developers. Decisions about whether and how to offer APIs and 
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SDKs highlight trade-offs between open and closed access, flexibility for developers, and ease of 
access for developers, all of which reflect an organization’s stance toward moving to a platform-
based business model. An API is essentially a set of specifications and rules that explain how to 
interact with and access software code. The act of “opening an API” means that the organization 
is providing access to code for developers and is a step toward openness. An SDK is a set of 
software development tools for designing apps on a particular system; it typically includes one or 
more APIs (and possibly software code for accessing those APIs). The tools that are part of an 
SDK may provide structure and guidance for developers but only proscribed access to the code. 
Thus, although they may deliver significant assistance to developers, this may come at the 
expense of constraints on access, which may limit creativity and flexibility. Decisions about 
which APIs to offer, whether or not to include an SDK, and what form the SDK should take are 
examples of practical decisions that an organization transitioning to a platform model needs to 
make that set the stage for the level of openness the organization is willing to allow for its 
complementors. 
Organizations must choose between developing their own proprietary standards through 
which to interact with others and adopting industry standards. West (2003) noted that firms have 
an incentive to follow closed, proprietary strategies that can provide better barriers to imitation, 
higher margins, and more control (because they do not necessitate interoperability with other 
standards). However, there are frequently technical and economic considerations that force 
organizations to move to either open or hybrid strategies. For example, to balance the creation 
and capture of value, when Adobe Systems introduced the Postcript “page description language” 
and font standard that allowed software applications to communicate with laser printers, it was 
both open and closed. To increase adoption of Postscript and thereby create value, it was open to 
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application developers. As Charles Geschke, one of the founders, explained, “We made a 
decision early on that the standard itself—the documentation for how you describe the page—
would be open, freely available and we would publish it. We would retain the copyright and the 
trademark, but we would make the interface open to anyone” (Tripsas, 2000). To capture value, 
however, the standard was closed, in that Adobe did not disclose the technology for interpreting 
the Postscript language in a laser printer. Laser printer manufacturers had to pay to license the 
controller technology from Adobe. 
Another topic related to multi-sided platform governance is how organizations keep out 
unauthorized or low-quality contributors through a regulatory role. In the videogame console 
industry, Atari suffered from allowing too many poor-quality games into their ecosystem. 
Nintendo later solved the problem through deploying a security chip that enabled only authorized 
games to work with their systems (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009). Similarly, Apple addressed this 
problem when they introduced their App Store by maintaining the ability to remove 
inappropriate applications such as the “I Am Rich” $999 app that didn’t provide any useful 
functionality (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009). With the introduction of topics such as the regulatory 
role that multi-sided platform-based businesses play, this research is starting to address more 
management-related issues. 
 
PRODUCT-TO-PLATFORM TRANSITIONS 
Some organizations are born platform-based. eBay was founded as an online auction and 
shopping website with the aim of connecting buyers and sellers; Match.com was initially started 
as a test site for a newspaper classified advertising system with the explicit goal of connecting 
individuals. In such cases, from the start of building the business, a management team can take 
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into account that there are multiple sides of the platform to be served. The activities of the 
organization can be aligned with creating a platform-based business or marketplace. However, in 
some instances, organizations start as product-based, directly providing complete products to 
customers, and then transition to multi-sided platforms that enable other entities to transact with 
each other. As technologies are evolving such that products and services are becoming more 
receptive to complements, product-based organizations are increasingly finding themselves in 
situations where they need to transition to being platform-based to remain competitive. 
The mobile phone industry exemplifies a historically product-based industry that has 
become platform-based as mobile phones have become technologically more sophisticated such 
that consumers add after-market applications (apps) to increase a smartphone’s functionality. For 
many years in the United States, firms in this industry thrived by selling basic mobile phones 
(called feature phones) to network carrier customers (e.g., Verizon Wireless), who then sold 
them to consumers. Firms that developed feature phones created most of the innovations and 
features in their own R&D laboratories or contracted directly with developers to embed new 
technologies in phones before they were shipped. As microprocessor technology evolved such 
that programmable operating systems could reside on inexpensive mobile devices, smartphones 
that could run apps began to substitute for feature phones. With smartphones, consumers could 
procure their own apps and add them to their devices to increase functionality. With the 
widespread proliferation of smartphones, most firms in this industry now operate as multi-sided 
platform-based businesses. They enable consumers and software app developers to interact 
through an intermediary (e.g., the Apple App Store, Google Play marketplace). Figure 3.2 
provides a schematic representation of this transition.  
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Figure 3.2  Example of transition from product- to platform-based business model 
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As organizations make this change, they not only need to modify their product or service 
offerings, but they also need to modify the activities that support these offerings. We next 
describe the primary activity-related changes that organizations undertake as they transition from 
being product- to platform-based (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1  Product-based versus platform-based activities 
 
Product-based Activities 
 
Platform-based Activities Example 
Provide the best product Develop best network of 
complementors 
Amazon: From providing best selection of books 
to providing best selection of vendors offering 
both new and used books 
 
Maximize product profit Drive platform adoption Adobe Systems: Offering Acrobat Reader for 
free to drive adoption of Acrobat software that 
creates PDF files 
 
Maximize units sold Maximize transactions 
enabled 
Amazon: From books sourced and sold to 
revenue shares of transactions enabled and 
hosting fees 
 
 
From Providing the Best Products to Developing the Best Network of Complementors 
In product-based businesses, an organization’s goal is to develop products that best meet 
customers’ needs. The organization that offers the most value to customers—the best product 
given its price—will generally outperform others in the marketplace, all else being equal. 
Organizations, therefore, focus their efforts on gaining a deep understanding of customer needs 
and segmenting the market so that they can target products effectively. 
In platform-based businesses, the value created for a customer is dependent not only on 
the quality of a particular product but also on the number and quality of the complementors. 
What matters is the volume of participation on the platform and the strength of the network 
effects. Rather than focusing exclusively on developing superior technology to have the best 
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product performance, organizations need to develop structures to identify and attract the best 
complementors to grow adoption of their platform. In the videogame console industry, for 
instance, having a blockbuster game such as Electronic Arts Tiburon’s “Madden NFL” or 
Activision’s “Call of Duty” available to run on a firm’s platform is just as important as including 
features such as superior graphics capability of a gaming console. Organizationally, in some 
cases, a separate group may be developed with professionals who are adept at working with this 
second type of customer (e.g., with developers). Policies for this new group, such as 
compensation, may also need to be modified to align with and provide proper incentives for 
serving these complementors. 
 
From Maximizing Product Profit to Driving Platform Adoption 
It takes time to build a critical mass of users in a platform-based business. In addition, many of 
the short-term strategic moves that organizations make to encourage adoption, such as cutting 
prices or giving products away for free, result in losses. The goal is to maximize the number of 
customers participating on each side of the platform, even if this means losing money in the short 
term. This type of behavior is in direct contrast to accepted norms of product-based businesses, 
in which profits and profitable growth are primary (and usually short term) goals. Shifting this 
behavior is important, but not without controversy. 
After developing Postscript, Adobe Systems started to compete aggressively in the 
shrink-wrap software business with products such as Photoshop and Illustrator. Then, in 1993, 
the firm introduced the Acrobat software system, which required two types of software: one 
product to create PDFs and another to read them. When Adobe introduced the software, the 
products lost money for about 4 years. Initially, Adobe charged for both types of software: 
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people who just wanted to read PDFs paid between $35 to $50 for Acrobat Reader software, and 
those who wanted to create PDFs paid $195 for simple Acrobat creation software or $695 for the 
full-featured Acrobat product. Eventually, to encourage adoption, Adobe changed its approach 
and offered the Acrobat Reader software for free. Essentially, they needed to incentivize one side 
of the market to adopt the software, so they subsidized it. As Adobe founder, John Warnock, 
explained in a recent interview, “The board questioned [the decision.] ‘You’re going to give the 
Reader away?’ I think it was one of the first instances of giving software away” (Adobe Acrobat 
at 20, 2013). Other Adobe software packages, such as Photoshop, followed a more traditional 
product-based model, and the contrast with Acrobat created internal organizational conflict. 
Warnock noted, “We had meetings where [the managers of] other applications, like Photoshop, 
[would say], ‘Why in the hell are we spending a dime on Acrobat when we make all the 
money?” (Adobe Acrobat at 20, 2013). However, providing the Acrobat Reader for free created 
a large base of users that could consume PDF content and therefore helped increase demand for 
Acrobat PDF–creation software. Acrobat eventually became one of Adobe’s most profitable 
lines of software, and 20 years after its launch, the PDF format is still a dominant means for 
exchanging documents. 
 
From Maximizing Units Sold to Maximizing Transactions Enabled 
Two conventional measures of success for product organizations are units sold and market share. 
Employee compensation, bonuses, and award structures are often based on these numbers, and 
individuals typically make decisions with the goal of maximizing sales profitably. As an 
organization transitions to becoming platform-based and starts to enable others to transact with 
its traditional customers, other, nontraditional metrics may become relevant. 
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In 1995, Amazon began as an online book seller that procured books from publishers and 
sold them to consumers. In 2000, the Amazon team launched Amazon Marketplace, which 
allowed other businesses to sell merchandise, in an integrated fashion, on Amazon’s website. 
The shift also meant that a portion of Amazon’s traditional sales would likely be cannibalized 
because buyers could easily purchase from competitors through Amazon’s main website. In fact, 
over time, the volume of sales through Marketplace affiliates grew to the point that it became a 
significant portion of Amazon’s overall business. Although Amazon’s profit on individual 
Marketplace transactions was lower, the overall number of transactions increased. In addition, by 
simply collecting a royalty payment and not holding inventory or incurring logistical costs 
associated with physical handling of goods, Marketplace became highly profitable. With the new 
platform-based model, however, prior metrics for measuring success, such as units sold and 
market share, might no longer be adequate. Instead, metrics such as number of merchants 
participating in the program, number of transactions, or aggregate royalties might be more 
relevant. 
 
PLATFORM TRANSITIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 
When an organization transitions from being primarily product-based to being platform-based 
and adopts new activities and behaviors consistent with this transition, there are important 
implications for organizational identity. Given dramatic changes in “what we do,” the answer to 
the question, “What business are we in?” may change. Similarly, new activities associated with 
platforms may be inconsistent with existing identity attributes, and this may cause discord if left 
unresolved. In the following section, we explore how specific aspects of identity may be 
challenged by the shift to a platform-based business model (Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2  Example implications of the shift to platforms on organizational identity 
 
Product-based 
Identity 
 
Platform-based 
Identity 
Example 
Merchant bookseller Marketplace Amazon: Bookseller to marketplace 
 
Technology driven Business 
development 
focused 
RIM/Blackberry: Early history from internally product 
driven to third-party application business development 
focused 
 
End-user service 
oriented 
End-user and 
complementor 
service oriented 
 
Amazon: From focused on serving consumers only to 
focusing on consumers along with other merchants 
 
Creative Disciplined Canon: Impact of display size design changes when 
there is not a community of complementors versus when 
there is one 
 
Self-reliant Team player Nokia: Difficulty transitioning to a platform-based 
industry 
 
 
From One Definition of the Business to Another 
As organizations evolve, their identity claims also sometimes shift. For instance, as it extended 
its product line from memory cards for digital cameras to include flash drives, Linco went from 
defining itself as a digital photography company to defining itself as a memory company 
(Tripsas, 2009). After breaking away from AT&T and the Bell System, US West went from 
being part of a telephone company to “not a telephone company” to a “multimedia company” 
(Sarason, 1998). Similarly, the transition from a product-based to a platform-based business is 
likely to imply a shift in how an organization defines its business—in other words, what category 
claims it makes. 
When Amazon started operations as a bookseller, Jeff Bezos, the founder, referred to the 
company as “Earth’s Biggest Bookstore” (A Retail Revolution Turns 10, 2005). Consumers 
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visited Amazon’s website, searched for a book, and then ordered it from Amazon. Amazon took 
the payment from the customer, procured the book, and sent it to the customer. Amazon was a 
straightforward online merchant (Hagiu, 2007). Although the business model was innovative at 
the time, the sales transaction still occurred simply between the end customer and Amazon. 
When Amazon launched its Marketplace initiative, allowing third parties to sell goods through 
Amazon’s platform, the business model shifted from a pure merchant model to a combined 
merchant and platform-based model. Given this major change in “what we do,” Amazon 
broadened its identity claims to encompass being a marketplace for books and many other types 
of goods. Today, Amazon’s website lists as its mission, “To be Earth’s most customer-centric 
company where people can find and discover anything they want to buy online” (Amazon Inc., 
2015). 
By changing the answer to “what business are we in?” through both modifying its 
business activities and claiming membership in a different or broader industry category, a firm 
can alter what is considered legitimate behavior. In Amazon’s case, the organization expanded 
its strategic mission and modified its claims to support that expansion in alignment with its new 
activities and behaviors. This sort of shift in organizational identity may be particularly 
important when moving from product- to platform-based businesses given the significant 
changes in “what we do.” 
 
From Technology Driven to Business Development Focused 
In many organizations, the prominence of a particular functional area is a key identity attribute. 
For instance, Fiol (2002, p. 654) discussed the transformation of a large information technology 
organization from an “engineering-driven data storage company [with] a primarily hardware, 
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engineering mind-set to a mind-set of information management and storage solutions.” Similarly, 
Nag, Corley, and Gioia (2007, p. 822) explored how one telecommunications organization 
moved “from an engineering-oriented (‘technology-push’) R&D organization into a business 
development–oriented (‘market-pull’) R&D organization.” In each of these cases, organizational 
members had originally considered the firm’s technical skills and accomplishments to be 
defining characteristics; then, through an identity transformation process, they shifted to consider 
market-based capabilities to be more salient. In the case of the information technology company, 
developing total solutions required a deeper understanding of customer needs, and in the case of 
the telecommunications company, once the organization became a separate establishment, 
business development capabilities became essential. 
We propose that when organizations shift from being product-based to platform-based, 
like those studied by Fiol (2002) and by Nag et al. (2007), these organizations may need to shift 
their identity to become more focused on business development. In a product-based organization 
where research and product creation are the most highly valued skills, scientists and engineers 
may be the most respected, well compensated, and well treated members of the organization. As 
a result, these organizations are likely to view being “engineering oriented” as a core part of their 
organizational identity. However, in a platform-based organization that depends on 
complementors to be successful, business development people may hold more sway. They may 
be the employees who primarily manage relationships with complementors and ensure that an 
organization is building solid relationships with external partners. As these external interactions 
increase in number and importance, so too should the prominence of the people who manage 
them. In some cases, identity may evolve in an emergent fashion as business development gains 
importance, such that eventually the organization is no longer engineering driven. In many cases, 
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however, this type of identity shift encounters resistance because it implies a change in the power 
dynamics among functional areas. 
For example, Blackberry, which was formerly known as Research in Motion Limited or 
RIM, is a highly technology-driven organization that early in its history changed from being 
primarily internally product-driven to becoming more business development–focused as its 
products became more platform-based and dependent on applications. At the time of their initial 
public offering (IPO) in 1996, the focus was on engineering. The paragraph describing the 
corporation in the IPO prospectus stated, “RIM develops and supplies radios and other network 
access devices. . . . RIM has developed an international reputation in the wireless industry for 
innovations in radio engineering” (Research in Motion Limited, 1996, p. 2). In 1998, Jim 
Balsille, RIM Chairman and Co-CEO, noted the importance of externally developed applications 
in an earnings release, emphasizing “the broad range of industries currently developing 
applications for our products—such as financial services, field service, health care, public safety, 
real estate, retail, security, telecommunications, transportation, utilities and the military” 
(Research in Motion Limited, 1998). By that time, RIM appeared to have moved beyond 
focusing solely on their own capabilities and recognized the need to highlight the role played by 
other organizations in developing applications to drive demand for RIM’s products. 
 
From End-User Service Oriented to End-User and Complementor Service Oriented 
Commitment to customer service is often a salient element of an organization’s identity. For 
instance, Dutton and Dukerich (1991, p. 526) found that being “a provider of superior service” 
was a key identity element of the New York Port Authority. If an organization’s identity is tied 
to the quality of its customer service, when the nature of the customer changes, such as in a 
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product-to-platform transition, the organization’s identity may be challenged. Product 
organizations are focused on serving customers who use their products; being customer service 
oriented means that understanding and satisfying end-users is paramount. In contrast, platform-
based organizations attempt to serve the needs of not only end-users but also complementors. 
More specifically, organizations with developer platforms serve customers that purchase end-
products (e.g., smartphone buyers) and also the developers that create products that complement 
those end-products (e.g., application developers). Those with marketplace platforms serve both 
customers who wish to acquire products (e.g., buyers of used goods) and entities that aim to sell 
to those customers (e.g., sellers of used goods). So, when an organization shifts to a platform-
based offering, members must expand their view of who the customer is and what good customer 
service means to them. If they fail to do this, deeply held beliefs about being a “service-oriented” 
organization may be violated as employees make trade-offs that emphasize the welfare of 
complementors as opposed to prioritizing end-consumers or vice versa. 
When Amazon was simply a bookseller, its focus was entirely on consumers who 
purchased books and other items the firm offered. After introducing the Marketplace, a large-
scale platform initiative integrated into its main consumer website, it also needed to meet the 
requirements of merchants selling on Amazon’s platform. Whereas booksellers may care more 
about ease of posting items for sale or ease of transaction processing, book buyers might be more 
concerned with breadth of offerings and competitive pricing. In some cases, the preferences of 
participants on a platform may be in direct conflict; for instance, Amazon merchants may want 
more advertising opportunities, whereas Amazon buyers may want fewer (Hagiu & Jullien, 
2011). To manage these situations, we propose that an organization must adapt its identity. 
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Unlike other identity attributes that we have discussed, in this situation, organizations 
may be able to adapt by broadening the meaning of existing identity labels such as “service 
driven,” to accommodate service to both sides of the platform. This sort of “adaptive instability” 
(Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000) enables organizations to accommodate the new behaviors 
associated with a platform-based business without completely shifting their organizational 
identity. Intuit is in the process of transforming its QuickBooks small business accounting 
software product family to a platform-based offering. It is working to expand its traditionally 
end-user customer-focused organization to one that similarly places high value on serving the 
needs and challenges of developers and other complementors. In the process, it may be 
undergoing identity work that takes into account the new behaviors while maintaining core 
elements of the existing organizational identity (Hagiu & Altman, 2013). 
 
From Creativity to Discipline 
For many organizations, being creative and being innovative are important identity attributes. 
For instance, the organization studied by Corley and Gioia (2004) included “an innovative 
company” as one of its core descriptors, and many of the universities studied by Elsbach and 
Kramer (1996) also included “innovative” as an important dimension of their identity. Bang and 
Olufsen, a design-oriented audio/video system manufacturer, included “inventiveness” as one of 
its seven identity components (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). When organizations produce stand-
alone products, they control the overall architecture, which allows for high levels of freedom and 
creativity in making design decisions. They can optimize product designs based purely on 
aesthetic design and functionality considerations. Firms designing small kitchen appliances and 
tools, for example, can place aesthetic and ergonomic design considerations high on their list of 
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priorities and not worry about interdependencies with accessory or application providers. 
Similarly, on an old Sony 8mm camcorder, if the designers decided to move the hand strap from 
one side to the other, the change influenced only the design of that product and did not affect any 
other products supplied by members of an ecosystem. On a digital camera, if Canon decides to 
change the size of a display on the back of a camera, no complementor firms are affected. 
For platform-based offerings, designers cannot unilaterally make changes that might 
affect complementary products; potentially many external firms are relying on a design to remain 
stable along certain dimensions so that accessory or application products can work with that 
design. Organizations need to be aware of considerations such as backward compatibility 
because these affect the complementor firms in their ecosystem. As a result, discipline—
following an orderly process to determine which product characteristics to maintain as product 
generations mature—becomes a valuable and necessary skill. Further, standard interfaces that 
enable seamless interoperation among products become essential elements and need to be 
mandated and enforced by the organization. For software products, this is frequently discussed in 
terms of adopting a service-oriented architecture (SOA), and the extent to which an organization 
does so may be considered a measure of how committed it is to transitioning to being platform-
based. 
When design decisions affect complementors, it can cause extreme difficulties for them if 
they do not have enough lead time to redesign or modify their complementary products 
(Staudenmayer, Tripsas, & Tucci, 2005). If a smartphone manufacturer decides to change the 
size of a display, an entire cadre of application developers and accessory providers is affected. 
This curtails the level of creativity that a platform-based organization’s designers can exhibit. 
They operate under significant constraints imposed by the needs of the complementors and have 
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fewer degrees of freedom within which to operate. If Canon decides to adopt an open operating 
system that allows independent developers to create apps for cameras, then its designers will 
have a whole new set of constraints. Display size decisions will become dependent on operating 
system versions and the needs of application developers. Designing to standards and creating 
rigidly standardized interfaces to benefit an ecosystem may be perceived as “not nearly as much 
fun” as designing what looks and works best. 
As organizations transition from product-based to platform-based, particularly if they are 
moving from an entirely closed product to one with open interfaces, they may notice that 
designers and/or engineers are frustrated by newly instituted requirements to hold elements of 
designs constant for the benefit of complementary developers or accessory providers. Engineers 
and designers, who pride themselves on their creativity, may have difficulty with the transition to 
an organization that has to choose upon which elements to compete and upon which to adopt 
standardized approaches. They may resist this change by continuing to design products that are 
not fully compatible with other platform elements or trying to design around platform 
specifications. 
 
From Self-reliant to Team Player 
Organizations accustomed to performing most key activities internally may include self-reliance 
as a key identity element. For instance, “individuality” was an identity component at Bang and 
Olufsen, and this was projected using the phrase, “We think differently” (Ravasi and Schultz, 
2006). Becoming a platform essentially involves moving into a mode of working more 
extensively with and enabling an expanded group of partners in one form or another. The 
transitioning organization needs to change from prioritizing providing solutions through internal 
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development and a select, narrow set of strategic partners to enabling a broader range of 
complementor partners (e.g., developers, users, other ecosystem members) to serve their 
customers as well. 
This is particularly difficult for organizations that consider independence and self-
reliance to be core parts of their identity. Their management’s first impulse is generally to 
consider how they can accomplish tasks themselves and build their own internal capabilities. 
Even for organizations that have previously entered into many supply or marketing partnerships, 
if they have not engaged extensively in product development alliances that affect core 
operations, they may encounter significant challenges. Opening up interfaces and allowing others 
to contribute to their products, possibly affecting central product propositions, can be a very 
hard, and thus identity-threatening, shift. If an organization’s general approach to challenges is to 
work harder internally, or potentially to acquire an outside firm, rather than build relationships 
with other organizations, moving to a platform orientation can be particularly difficult. 
Nokia provides an example of an organization that had trouble changing along this 
vector. Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, part of Nokia’s identity was its emphasis on 
internal technology development. It was also known to be a very difficult firm with which to 
partner (Vilkamo & Keil, 2003). When the mobile phone industry shifted to being smartphone-
centric, which required phone providers to build strong relationships with application developers, 
Nokia faltered. Although it attempted various platform-based strategies related to mobile 
software, none of them took hold to the extent of becoming an enduring industry-wide standard, 
perhaps in part because they were not implemented in a way that was attractive enough to 
developers and other partners (Selander, Henfridsson, & Svahn, 2010; Steinbock, 2001). 
Although the reasons for Nokia’s troubles are certainly complex, the inconsistency between 
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partnering behaviors and Nokia’s historical organizational identity as an internally focused 
mobile phone developer may have contributed to the situation. The organization’s existing 
identity served as a barrier to change. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we have examined the relationship between innovation in the form of platform-
based business models and organizational identity. We propose that moving from a product-
based to a platform-based business model requires organizations to engage in a broad range of 
activities that may influence, or be influenced by, an organization’s identity. We have primarily 
discussed cases in which the product-to-platform transition required activities that challenged 
expectations associated with the organization’s existing product-based identity. However, we 
also recognize that there are cases in which existing organizational identities are supportive and 
reinforcing of these changes. An organization’s strong identity may guide the strategic choices 
necessary to accomplish these transitions. 
For example, when Apple needed to choose a standard to enable its devices to stream 
media with one another and with other firms’ products, it chose to develop its own proprietary 
system called Airplay instead of adopting the industry standard platform, Bluetooth. Although 
the literature frames this as a strategic decision (West, 2003), one could argue that it also echoes 
Apple’s identity. Apple has always been a design-focused firm with an emphasis on creating the 
most customer-friendly experiences. Controlling the user experience by developing Airplay was 
consistent with Apple’s identity. Similarly, while creating the iPhone App Store resulted in 
Apple’s losing some control of the user experience, the manner in which Apple implemented the 
App Store, with approval required before an app could be offered, was fully consistent with the 
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meticulous approach the firm takes to managing customers’ overall experiences with Apple 
offerings. In the same vein, after introducing the Marketplace, Amazon marketed a branded 
guarantee program, which provided customers a full refund if they had a problem with a 
purchase made through an Amazon affiliate. This step was consistent with its identity claim of 
being “Earth’s most customer-centric company” (Amazon Inc., 2015). In each of these cases, 
although the transition to a platform-based business model likely challenged many aspects of the 
organization, by incorporating elements that were well aligned with the core, management did 
not challenge organizational identity. 
Still, in many cases, particularly during times of considerable transition, organizational 
identity may be challenged by substantial strategic change. Organizations must rethink the “who 
we are” as the “what we do” changes dramatically. To be successful, organizations should 
question elements of their existing organizational identity and, when there are inconsistencies 
with new business approaches, actively attempt to adapt their organizational identity to resolve 
them. Whereas proactively changing identity can be a challenging process frequently 
accompanied by organizational resistance, as illustrated by prior research (e.g. Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991, Ravasi and Schultz, 2006, Tripsas, 2009), ignoring the need to attempt an 
identity shift may result in dissonance and contribute to dysfunctional behaviors that may hinder 
innovativeness, creativity, and entrepreneurial behaviors. 
 In this chapter, we contribute to the literature on platforms in two ways. First, platform-
related research generally considers the focal entity to be an existing or emerging platform-based 
organization rather than an incumbent, more mature, organization transitioning from another 
business form into a platform-based one. Yet, established organizations with a long history of 
traditional, product-based business models make up a significant portion of the organizations 
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starting to compete in platform-based markets. We suggest that understanding how to manage 
these transitions is as important as comprehending the pure competitive dynamics of platform-
based businesses. Second, we link our discussion of organizations making this transition to 
considerations of organizational identity. Although economics and strategy scholars have done 
an excellent job of evaluating the optimal strategic moves in platform-based markets, they have 
for the most part ignored the organizational considerations suggested by a shift from product- to 
platform-based competition. We propose that success in the implementation of new strategic 
opportunities created by transitioning to a platform-based business model may require a shift in 
organizational identity. 
 
Future Research 
Although our discussion has encompassed a variety of considerations related to product-to-
platform transitions and organizational identity, we believe there are significant opportunities to 
expand this research in a number of directions. These research avenues include contributions to 
both the organizational identity literature and the multi-sided platform literature. Additionally, 
they encompass multiple research methodologies, some of which have yet to be fully leveraged 
in these arenas. 
This chapter has highlighted a variety of dimensions of organizational identity that are 
relevant to product-to-platform transitions. However, the dimensions discussed here are by no 
means exhaustive. We believe there are likely to be other identity elements that generally change 
when an organization makes the type of shift we have discussed. Furthermore, organizations will 
potentially need to overcome constraints imposed by their current organizational identity. In-
depth qualitative field-based research could enable researchers to better understand the change 
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mechanisms associated with transitions to platform-based organizations and determine which 
dimensions of organizational identity are most salient. Additionally, there may be 
interdependencies among these dimensions affected by shifts from product to platform that are 
worth studying further. 
As organizations become platform-based, in some instances the dimensions of 
organizational identity may not shift from state A to state B, but rather move from state A to 
state A+B (or, A+B+C, and so on). We highlighted such a shift as we discussed Amazon’s 
transition from being end-user focused to being both end-user and complementor focused. We 
recognize that new dimensions of organizational identity may be added to an organization as it 
makes this type of shift, and this may lead to potentially interesting implications for the study of 
organizational identity. What happens if the new additional states are inconsistent with the 
existing states? For example, if the existing organization has been entirely consumer focused but 
the platform-based organization must also focus on application- developers, what are the 
implications? Are they the same as when an organization simply expands into new markets, or is 
something different at play because these new markets consist of complementors and function as 
part of a platform-based business model? We know that organizational identity can constrain an 
organization’s ability to adapt and implement change. What is the process by which 
organizations accomplish changes in identity associated with the transition to platforms? Are 
there instances in which an organizational identity change precedes a strategy change or 
modifications in activities? Or is it primarily the case that strategies and activities are changed 
first, followed by a realignment of organizational identity? How does this differ from other 
contexts in which organizations shift identity? Are some mechanisms more effective than others? 
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Although we have emphasized changes to organizational identity, some attributes of 
organizational identity may remain intact as an organization makes a transition to platforms. In 
general, values dimensions of identity that relate to beliefs, social concerns, or morals are 
unlikely to be affected. For instance, organizations that are connected to a particular religious 
doctrine or have political affiliations are likely to maintain those aspects of their identity even if 
they move from a product-based to a platform-based model. Ironically, having some elements of 
identity that remain constant may actually make it easier for organizations to change other 
aspects. In general, changes in identity are difficult to accomplish and are disruptive to the 
organization (Fiol, 2002; Tripsas, 2009). Individual-level identification with the organization 
makes changes in organizational identity a highly personal and emotional experience for 
employees. If organizational members are provided with identity anchors that remain consistent, 
they may be more willing to accept changes in other aspects of the organizational identity. This 
connection between individual-level identification with macro-level organizational change, 
particularly in association with product-to-platform transitions, remains a fertile area for 
multilevel research. 
Finally, multi-sided platform research has also observed that organizations can operate 
along a continuum of dimensions ranging from being pure multi-sided platforms to being pure 
product suppliers or retailers (Hagiu & Wright, 2011). Although we have considered the 
transitions that organizations make, we need to remember that the transitions are not necessarily 
binary and may involve moving only partially to a platform-based model (e.g., allowing other 
entities to offer complementary products, yet retaining strict control on what they can offer and 
who is authorized to do so). Or only part of an organization may transition (e.g., maintaining a 
traditional product-focused division alongside a platform-based one). Regardless of the extent 
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and form of the transition, challenges to organizational identity are likely to be present. Research 
considering different units of analysis beyond more traditional organization-level platform 
analysis (i.e., considering transitions for product divisions within multidivisional firms) may be 
particularly interesting. 
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